Dwight David Eisenhower’s legacy in military and security affairs embraces historic world achievements in peace and war — achievements to which his leadership contributed in great measure. It includes as well the acts and accomplishments that portray the brand of leadership he exercised and above all the foundation stones of character — principles, convictions and personal values — that guided him in all he did. His legacy is found not only in high-impact, high-visibility historic achievements such as victory in Europe during World War II, but also in less public, less well known yet highly important contributions to national security and to the maintenance of powerful yet soundly budgeted military forces. His principled leadership and professional strengths were of great value to the country during times of grave danger, and they offer today and for the future important lessons to our nation and its leaders.

Several of Eisenhower’s many outstanding accomplishments during World War II stand out and typify his leadership as a general and as a citizen. As supreme commander, first in the Mediterranean in 1942-43, and later in Northwest Europe in 1944-45, he was the heart and soul of the Allied military coalition. By dint of his vision and steadfast determination, the Allies were able to forge the winning partnership that brought about victory. Almost single-handedly, he established the parameters by which the war against the Axis powers was fought. In so doing, Eisenhower had to overcome enormous problems and confront endless criticism that might well have caused others to bow under the pressure and lose the unity of this complex command. He always acted as a supreme commander in what he believed were the best interests of that command. He never shied from controversy, even when it could have seriously jeopardized his future. In North Africa, Eisenhower’s controversial decision to back a Vichy French official for military reasons might easily have led to his dismissal as the Allied commander. Then a rookie commander of limited experience, he made an unpopular, potentially explosive decision without consideration of the personal consequences of going against the wishes of Roosevelt, his own commander-inchief, and the British prime minister Winston Churchill. Meeting Roosevelt at Casablanca, Eisenhower candidly told the President that “generals could make mistakes and be fired but governments could not.”

With a combination of tact, diplomacy, determination, and, when necessary, arm-twisting, Eisenhower created a truly international headquarters, first in the Mediterranean and later in England. As he matured into his job, he proved himself capable of penetrating independent thought in dealing with the unprecedented strategic challenges that headquarters faced. When necessary, he was the great conciliator who held together the military alliance. Whether he was handling his difficult, often exhausting relations with Churchill, satisfying Roosevelt, or responding to pressure from General Marshall and the Combined Chiefs of Staff, Eisenhower never forgot that his first responsibility was to lead the coalition to the best of his ability. The war, he knew, would be won not by Americans or Britons but by allies fighting in a common cause.

Eisenhower’s shining moment came in the difficult days before D-Day in early June 1944. When the weather in the English Channel made it impossible to carry out the invasion of Normandy on June 5, he was obliged to postpone Operation Overlord, the greatest amphibious invasion in history. Faced with what, at best, was a dangerously marginal weather forecast for June 6, he made the most difficult decision any military commander has ever been called upon to make. His belief in the predictions that the weather would hold led to a decision that ultimately determined the outcome of the war. Had Overlord failed, he was fully prepared to accept sole responsibility. Well after D-Day his naval aide found a note in his shirt pocket that Eisenhower had scribbled before the invasion. It read:

Our landings in the Cherbourg-Havre area have failed to gain a satisfactory foothold and I have withdrawn the troops. My decision to attack at this time and place was based upon the best information available. The troops, the air, and the Navy did all that bravery and devotion to duty could do. If any blame or fault attaches to the attempt it is mine alone – June 5, 1944.

No commander ever cared more for the safety and well being of his soldiers. Shortly after D-Day he wrote: “The soldiers, sailors, and airmen are indescribable in their elan, courage, determination and fortitude. They inspire me.” To his generals he was a stern, demanding commander, but to his troops he was simply “Ike."

When Germany launched what became known as the Battle of the Bulge on December 16, 1944, Eisenhower acted without hesitation to redress what soon became a grave situation. His decision to reinforce Bastogne and St. Vith led directly to a disastrous setback for Germany and helped end the war in the spring of 1945. Throughout, he supported British Field Marshal Sir Bernard Montgomery’s command of the northern portion of the front despite vigorous protests from his American subordinates: Allied considerations always came before national ones for Eisenhower.

Although by war’s end Dwight Eisenhower was one of the most acclaimed men of the century, he remained modest in victory. When he reported the surrender of German forces, he penned a brief cable utterly devoid of self-congratulation: “The mission of this Allied force was fulfilled at 0241 hours, local time, May 7, 1945.” Many years later, when he returned to Normandy, the scene of his greatest triumph as a commander, he never mentioned his own role, but instead spoke movingly of the need for eternal peace. As he once explained, “I hate war as only a soldier who has lived it can, only as one who has seen its brutality, its futility, its stupidity.” As for himself, he quoted words that summed up his humility and sense of democracy: “…just do the best you can. Be proud of yourself, but remember, there is no indispensable man.”

Following the end of the war, Eisenhower served in turn as Chief ofStaff of the Army, President of Columbia University, and supreme allied commander, SACEUR, of the military forces of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). As Chief of Staff, charged with responsibilities for the Army’s post-war demobilization, its shift to a peacetime configuration, and its ongoing occupation duties in Germany and Japan, he skillfully guided the establishment through a period of severe turbulence and sometimes chaotic change. Of lasting significance were his steadfast efforts in behalf of unification of the nation’s armed services and establishment of the U.S. Air Force, historic changes achieved in the National Security Act of 1947.

During his presidency of Columbia University, he was asked to return to the Pentagon to preside as informal Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff as they prepared the first consolidated budget of the newly unified military establishment. The task proved to be historic in its significance as well as its difficulty. Eisenhower’s role required every bit of his unique professional military skills and persuasive abilities. He helped the Service Chiefs clarify realistic security needs, define a unified strategy to meet them, and come together on the plans, programs and budgets to carry that strategy out. His leadership, which embodied his dedication to our national security as a higher goal than the self-interests of the separate services, provided lessons we can still profit from today.

In late 1950, President Truman called on him again, this time to serve NATO as its first Supreme Allied Commander (SACEUR). In order to block communist aggression in Europe, Eisenhower was charged with forming a collective military force. He quickly established Allied Headquarters (SHAPE) and an integrated command structure, binding NATO’s national forces in Europe through regional commands under his overall direction, with full participation of European officers of all services — land, sea and air. His leadership and the rapid, visible progress it evoked on operational planning, training, equipping and infrastructure for the force quickly brought a higher sense of confidence to NATO. Only one man in the world could have done it, and he did it exceedingly well. He worked closely with those advisors reconciling in a realistic way the needs of defense with the politico-economic capabilities of the member nations. In particular, he promoted the ultimately successful effort to bring a West German military force into the NATO defense. His accomplishments in the vital task of consolidating NATO’s military structure help explain the contrast between the catastrophic carnage of the first half of the twentieth century and the tense but relatively peaceful changes of the second half of the century.

In 1953, Eisenhower took office as President of the United States during a challenging stage of the Cold War against communism. The Soviet nuclear arsenal had been growing steadily, and when Stalin died in March 1953, he left that awesome power in the hands of untested successors. The Communist victory in China, the outbreak of the Korean War, and the struggle in Vietnam had expanded the Cold War to Asia. The collapse of colonialism was spawning numbers of weak, poor and vulnerable states. And the strategy (embodied in National Security Council document 68) Truman had adopted in mid-1950 in response to the Soviet nuclear test and the attack in Korea was in grave disarray.

Eisenhower’s experience in security and world affairs uniquely prepared him to meet this challenge. He had two bedrock convictions: First, that a major nuclear war would be suicidal for all of the participants; security required the United States to prevent nuclear war as well as counter the Soviet threat. Second, that if this effort were successful, the Cold War would be a “long haul,” depending as much on political and economic factors as on military capability; a viable strategy would have to balance and integrate all three. During his two administrations, Eisenhower met these criteria.

Eisenhower firmly believed that sound policy required an orderly process to marshal data on the issues, to ensure thorough analysis, and to benefit from informed debate among the key officials, including the President. The aim was to produce the coherent strategy and clear guidelines for policy that would provide a solid foundation for decisions in the Oval Office. Eisenhower quickly overhauled the National Security Council (NSC). A Planning Board, composed of agency officials appointed by the President, prepared policy papers for discussion at the NSC’s regular meetings, with the President actively participating. The process was managed by a Special Assistant who was not a policy advisor. The personal interest of the President assured that the papers were meticulously staffed and highlighted new policies, that the NSC members came well prepared, and that the NSC debate was lively. Following Stalin’s death, for instance, Eisenhower initiated a special exercise (called Solarium) for an intensive examination of alternative policies toward the Soviet Union. Three teams of experts developed three possible strategies and presented their reports to an all-day session of the NSC, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Planning Board, and other relevant officials. Their reports were then turned over to the NSC Planning Board as input for preparation of the administration’s first Basic National Strategy.

The Eisenhower strategy was his most significant contribution to the conduct and outcome of the Cold War. This new strategy revised the appraisal of a Soviet threat, the objectives, and the means embodied in NSC68. It rejected the prospect of Soviet attack by a date of maximum danger. The threat could be deterred, Eisenhower concluded, by a secure retaliatory capacity and Soviet expansion thus contained indefinitely until eroded by internal decay and deterioration. Coerced “roll-back” of Soviet power was rejected. The military forces and other means of applying pressure must be sustainable by the U.S. and its allies over a “long-haul” of many decades. Economic vitality and political cohesion were critical components of security. Under Ike, the United States would seek agreements with the Soviet Union to serve common interests, such as avoiding the risks of nuclear war by miscalculation or accident. This country and its allies would assist the post-colonial states to strengthen their regimes and societies to become less vulnerable to subversion.

The Suez Crisis threatened to disrupt Eisenhower’s strategy. He was convinced that the United Nations and its principles were important steps toward a more peaceful world. When Egyptian President Nasser seized the Suez Canal in July 1956, Eisenhower insisted on seeking to resolve the resulting dispute by diplomacy and negotiation without resorting to force, in keeping with the United Nations Charter. After three months of diplomacy, however, the United Kingdom, France and Israel secretly conspired to attack Egypt on October 29 to unseat Nasser (each for its own reasons). Eisenhower decided at once to oppose their aggression by promptly obtaining a United Nations Resolution condemning the action and demanding a ceasefire and withdrawal of forces. He was convinced that acquiescing in this blatant violation of the Charter would be a lethal blow to the United Nations. He was not deterred by the alliance, the impending election on November 6, or the regrettable inability to prevent the Soviet invasion of Hungary. His policy succeeded insofar as U.S. economic pressure quickly compelled Britain and France to comply, and Eisenhower’s threat to support sanctions forced Israel to do so in several months. While acting decisively, Eisenhower skillfully countered Soviet efforts to exploit the crisis and moved quickly to mend the allied breach after the withdrawals.

During his presidency, Eisenhower reshaped the armed forces to reinforce his basic strategy and improve their effectiveness. To enhance deterrence, he launched early programs to develop the ballistic and submarine-borne missiles that would ensure an invulnerable retaliatory capacity. The U-2 over-flight program was designed to penetrate Soviet secrecy. Eisenhower also acted to strengthen and streamline the military’s operational effectiveness and through his Defense Reorganization of 1958 to move beyond inter-service rivalries. This innovation placed military operations in a unified command structure — broadly comparable to the command he exercised in World War II — separate from the Army, Navy, and Air Force Services. The Services were now focused on the functions of organizing, training, equipping and supplying the combatant forces made available to the operating commands.

Meanwhile, Eisenhower had sought to negotiate the first realistic arms-control measures to moderate the arms race and enhance stability. He shifted the focus from utopian “complete” disarmament to practical limited measures. At the United Nations in December 1953, he proposed (“Atoms for Peace”) that the United States and the USSR contribute nuclear materials to an International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) which would make them available to other countries for peaceful uses under careful safeguards. At the 1955 U.S.-Soviet Summit, he proposed (in “Open Skies”) reciprocal overflights to provide transparency and reassurance against attack. Later he initiated negotiations to limit nuclear testing. The results were disappointing to Eisenhower, but they included the creation of the IAEA (which still contributes in various ways to nuclear safety), and a legacy for future administrations of negotiating with the Soviets while pursuing containment, the basis for détente, and effective measures for arms control.

Eisenhower’s military and national security legacy as a President thus included eight years of secure peace and a coherent basic strategy that would be sustained for the remaining three decades before the Soviet collapse.

* Inscription, National World War II Memorial, Washington, D.C.