Presidential Papers, Doc#65 Secret To Charles Erwin Wilson, 3 March 1953. In The Papers of Dwight David Eisenhower

Document #65; March 3, 1953
To Charles Erwin Wilson
Series: EM, AWF, Administration Series ; Category: Secret

The Papers of Dwight David Eisenhower, Volume XIV - The Presidency: The Middle Way
Part I: Charting a New Course; January 1953 to April 1953
Chapter 2: "A number of misunderstandings": Party and International Struggles

 

Memorandum for the Secretary of Defense: A recent letter from a friend indicated that we may now be getting close to production on an anti-tank vehicle, relatively light and inexpensive when compared to the tank.1 I understand that it has a revolver-type mounting, firing 120 mm. rockets in quick succession.2

I do not know what the attitude of the Services is on this particular weapon but, to me, it is the type of ordnance development we have long been awaiting.3 Throughout the postwar period, I have been very much concerned over weapon design because it has pointed more and more towards greater cost and complexity. Admittedly, some of this has been inevitable and desirable as in the case of electronics, but there has been little effort to simplify design where it could be simplified and get production and maintenance costs down to a basis that we can afford. This trend has been reflected not only in mounting defense budgets but also in our inability to reduce manpower in the "division slice" which, as I recall, is almost three times the size of that of the Soviets.4 Represented in our manpower figures are elaborate support and maintenance echelons that will never be reduced if we keep designing more and more complicated equipment for field use.

My experience at SHAPE brought out all the more sharply these misgivings as to the trend of our ordnance development. Perhaps some could condone our extravagance with regard to the equipping of United States units, but when we find ourselves exporting in great numbers $200,000 tanks and $750,000 ground support aircraft to all the nations of the free world, it would seem that the error in our ways would be apparent to anyone.

We want to equip our allies for their own defense just as inexpensively as the job can be done. Moreover, we expect them to assume responsibility for maintenance and replacement after a certain period of time. These facts point to the need for maximum simplicity in design. However, if we want to produce simpler and cheaper weapons for our allies, we have got to use such weapons ourselves and include them in our tables of organization. A little economy here would be a blessing!

The tendency toward extravagant design is very apparent in the automotive field. On field trips in Europe, I learned that the units were not at all happy with the performance of the expensive new 2-1/2 ton truck, and they thought the maintenance problems were beyond their capabilities. The same applies to the new jeep, designed not alone for simple, rugged, field operation, but for operation under water as well! If our own people find it difficult to maintain such equipment under field conditions, what are the Turks going to do with it, or the South Koreans?

I think I would be the last one to deprive a fighting man of the best and most modern weapons we can produce. But cost, speed of production and ease of maintenance must all be considered in every decision on military equipment. The Services must face up to reality: our resources are not unlimited, and to strain them unnecessarily for defense, or to waste them, is to jeopardize the very thing we are trying to defend.

1 This letter is not in EM.

2 Eisenhower likely referred to the M-50 Ontos antitank vehicle, armed with six 106mm recoilless rifles, one .30 caliber machine gun, and four .50 caliber spotting rifles (John Quick, Dictionary of Weapons and Military Terms [New York, 1973], p. 334).

3 See Galambos, NATO and the Campaign of 1952, no. 422.

4 In an earlier memorandum to General Gruenther, Eisenhower had discussed the problem of having too many support and too few combat forces in U.S. infantry and armored divisions (see ibid., no. 389).

Bibliographic reference to this document:
Eisenhower, Dwight D. Secret To Charles Erwin Wilson, 3 March 1953. In The Papers of Dwight David Eisenhower, ed. L. Galambos and D. van Ee, doc. 65. World Wide Web facsimile by The Dwight D. Eisenhower Memorial Commission of the print edition; Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996, http://www.eisenhowermemorial.org/presidential-papers/first-term/documents/65.cfm

 


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