<--PREV Doc #94  |  Memorial Commission Home Page  |  First Term Table of Contents  |  Presidential Papers Home Page  |  Doc#  |  NEXT--> Doc #96 Document #95; March 19, 1953 To Winston Spencer Churchill Series: EM, AWF, International Series: Churchill ; Category: Top secret The Papers of Dwight David Eisenhower, Volume XIV - The Presidency: The Middle Way Part I: Charting a New Course; January 1953 to April 1953 Chapter 2: "A number of misunderstandings": Party and International Struggles   [Dear Winston:] I am a bit puzzled as to the real meaning of your recent note to me.1 By no means have I, or my associates, indicated or implied that we are not in agreement with your Government in what you are trying to do in the Canal Zone.2 On the contrary, Anthony and I reached a clear understanding of what we should strive to get under the various alternatives laid down by the staff, and both of us were very clear that the offer we would be making would be so fair to the Egyptians that we hoped it could not possibly be rejected.3 While he was here, I raised one question involving procedure. The question was: "How does the United States get into this consultation?" It was obvious that no one had thought very much on this point and it was recognized a very awkward situation could result for our representative, and, indeed, for the negotiations themselves, if an American should show up without some prior invitation and agreement between the principals, namely, your Government and the Egyptian Government. My point is this: If the United States walks into a conference with you, against the wishes of the Egyptian Government, then the only obvious interpretation would be that our two governments, together, are there to announce an ultimatum. An uninvited guest cannot possibly come into your house, be asked to leave, and then expect cordial and courteous treatment if he insists upon staying. So far as I know, this is the only point that has blocked the initiation of the conference. But until it is ironed out, I do not see how we can possibly get into it. I am sure that Anthony will confirm to you that I expressed exactly these sentiments to him when he was in my office. Please be assured that I have no idea that either of us should be bullied by Naguib. We have objectives in common and they are vital objectives, so vital indeed that I do not think we should be inflexible on procedure.4 I am much interested in what you say about Tito.5 I am glad that you and Anthony have been urging him to improve his relations with some of his neighbors. With warm personal regard, Sincerely 1 Secretary of State John Foster Dulles had enclosed Churchill's letter and a draft reply with a memorandum of this same date (AWF/I: Churchill). 2 "I am very sorry that you do not feel that you can do much to help us about the Canal Zone," Churchill had begun his message of March 18 (see State, Foreign Relations, 1952-1954, vol. IX, The Near and Middle East, pt. 2, pp. 2026-27). For background see no. 82. 3 In talks with Eden and British Ambassador Makins on March 6, Dulles had aired certain questions on the subject of British-Egyptian relations, issues he hoped "would be resolved on the basis of the next draft which Mr. Eden would recommend to his Government and which Mr. Dulles recommended to the President." Eisenhower had agreed to the draft but "pointed out that United States participation in negotiations between Egypt and the United Kingdom arising out of their treaty relationship would have to be brought about through the friendly desire of the Egyptian Government to receive U.S. participation." Eden had expressed confidence that the projected Egyptian role in Middle Eastern defense and need for U.S. military equipment would prompt that government to welcome an American role in the negotiations (Memorandum of conversation, Mar. 6, 1953, Dulles Papers, Chronological Series). 4 Dulles suggested the insertion of this paragraph into the State Department draft (Mar. 19, 1953, AWF/I: Churchill). For Eisenhower's March 24 letter to Naguib, offering to assist his government and the British in their talks but emphasizing that the United States "at no time ever entertained the thought of direct participation in these discussions except in response to your wish," see State, Foreign Relations, 1952-1954, vol. IX, The Near and Middle East, pt. 2, pp. 2034-35. 5 "Tito seems full of common sense," Churchill had written. "He is definitely of opinion that the death of Stalin has not made the world safer, but he believes that the new regime will probably feel their way cautiously for some time and even thinks that there may be division among them." The British had encouraged the Yugoslavian leader to improve his relations with the Italians and the Vatican (State, Foreign Relations, 1952-1954, vol. IX, The Near and Middle East, pt. 2, pp. 2026-27). Bibliographic reference to this document: Eisenhower, Dwight D. Top secret To Winston Spencer Churchill, 19 March 1953. In The Papers of Dwight David Eisenhower, ed. L. Galambos and D. van Ee, doc. 95. World Wide Web facsimile by The Dwight D. Eisenhower Memorial Commission of the print edition; Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996, http://www.eisenhowermemorial.org/presidential-papers/first-term/documents/95.cfm <--PREV Doc #94  |  Memorial Commission Home Page  |  First Term Table of Contents  |  Presidential Papers Home Page  |  Doc#  |  NEXT--> Doc #96

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