Presidential Papers, Doc#1045 Secret To Walter Bedell Smith, 3 September 1954. In The Papers of Dwight David Eisenhower

Presidential Papers, Doc#1045 Secret To Walter Bedell Smith, 3 September 1954. In The Papers of Dwight David Eisenhower

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Document #1045; September 3, 1954
To Walter Bedell Smith
Series: EM, AWF, Dulles-Herter Series ; Category: Secret

The Papers of Dwight David Eisenhower, Volume XV - The Presidency: The Middle Way
Part VI: Crises Abroad, Party Problems at Home; September 1954 to December 1954
Chapter 132: Asia: A "boiling kettle of possible trouble"

Dear Bedell: For some days I have been storing up a few matters regarding which I wanted to write to you. I have felt so pushed during the first ten days of my so-called vacation that I have really neglected bringing to your attention one or two points that concern me very much.¹
The first one is the state of our thinking toward the development of a substitute for EDC. I take it that all of us agree we cannot sit down in black despair and admit defeat.²
It seems to me there are two possible approaches--or maybe even three--(a). Through the revision of the EDC idea by the nations concerned.
(b). Through a meeting of the entire NATO group, with a view of including Germany as an equal partner therein.
(c). Through unilateral agreements with Germany--to which agreements we would, of course, have to get the concurrences of a sizeable number of Western and Atlantic nations.
Please do not have your planners send me a long dissertation; I would merely like to know the direction of attack that appears to them to be the most hopeful and to get the outlines of their thinking.³
Another subject is the Rio Conference, and along with this Foster's suggestion that we send Kemper somewhere else. I have already okayed the latter idea, and I assume that my office has telephoned you today so that Foster's letter to Jimmy Dunn can be sent at once.⁴
Last evening I went over with Bobby Cutler the Security Council's recommendations on South American policy, which I accept.⁵ In connection with this subject, I should like to have some idea of the approach that we intend taking. I am interested in specific objectives and our calculations as to what will be our greatest difficulty.⁶
Still another subject in which I am tremendously interested is Trieste. We have been working on it a long time and my impression is that we have been letting Tito block us, perhaps needlessly. Over a period of many weeks I have been told time and again that it looked as though we were just on the point of securing an agreement, after which there has been nothing but silence.⁷ I think that whatever we do must be done soon, if for no other reason than to provide some counter-balance for the EDC flop.
I know that all of us are concerned about Italy and I personally know how much our friends there have been counting on the enactment of EDC. They must be very low in their minds and we could suffer an irretrievable disaster if things really went wrong. I know that the group in London has been working on this for a long time and I do not mean to complain. I merely mean that the situation begins to look rather grim, and I would hope that we could get our British friends to push a little harder on Tito. Perhaps we could do it ourselves, providing this would not cross wires with others who are working toward the same ends.⁸
Please do not take your own time to answer my questions and to supply the information I seek. I merely ask that the proper sections of your staff prepare for me very short memoranda on these matters so that my own thinking may have the benefit of some specialized knowledge.⁹
With warm regard, As ever

¹ Eisenhower had left for Denver on August 21.
² For background on the defeat of the EDC treaty in the French Assembly see no. 1035.
³ "Keeping in mind the principle objectives of the EDC package, we are considering two alternative approaches," Smith would answer. "The first would bring Germany directly into NATO" after "certain voluntary commitments" undertaken unilaterally as part of the terms of that country's admission; the United States would "move concurrently" to grant sovereignty to West Germany. The second alternative, if the French blocked the first, Smith said, "provides for steps by the US, UK, and Germany (including possibly Benelu [Belgium, Netherlands, and Luxembourg] and Italy) to proceed without French concurrence with German rearmament. . . . These steps might induce a welcome change in the French position" (Smith to Eisenhower, Sept. 10, 1954, AWF/D-H; see also Eisenhower, Mandate for Change, p. 404; and Duchin, "The `Agonizing Reappraisal': Eisenhower, Dulles, and the EDC," pp. 208, 215, 217. For developments see no. 1066.
⁴ The Meeting of Ministers of Finance or Economy of the American Republics at the Fourth Extraordinary Meeting of the Inter-American Economic and Social Council (the Rio Conference) would be held in Quitandinha, Brazil, from November 22 until December 2 (State, Foreign Relations, 1952-1954, vol. IV, The American Republics, pp. 313-64). For the discussion regarding the reassignment of James S. Kemper, Ambassador to Brazil since August 1953, see Memorandum of conversation, Aug. 12, 1954, Dulles Papers, White House Memoranda Series; see also no. 724, and Telephone conversation, Dulles and Hoover, Dec. 2, 1954, Dulles Papers, Telephone Conversations. Dulles had written Eisenhower on August 31, suggesting that Kemper and career diplomat James Clement Dunn, Ambassador to Spain, exchange positions. Kemper "would probably like the change," Dulles wrote, and the United States needed "very much someone of Dunn's ability in Rio for a year or two." Although Dunn had expressed a wish to retire, Dulles had written a personal letter asking him to take the Rio assignment (AWF/D-H). Kemper would resign on December 3 and return to private business, and Dunn would assume the Brazilian position on March 11, 1955 (New York Times, Dec. 1, 4, 29, 1954, Mar. 12, 1955; see also Memorandum of conversation, Eisenhower and Dulles, Dec. 22, 1954, Dulles Papers, White House Memoranda Series).
⁵ The National Security Council had discussed U.S. policy toward Latin America (NSC 5432) at its meeting the previous day (NSC meeting minutes, Sept. 3, 1954, AWF/NSC). To strengthen the security of the hemisphere the NSC had recommended a greater utilization of the Organization of American States, a more intensified concern for Latin American problems at the highest levels of government, and the adoption of stable, long-term trading policies (State, Foreign Relations, 1952-1954, vol. IV, The American Republics, pp. 81-88).
⁶ "We wish to insure that Latin America not only remains on our side," Smith would answer, "but also becomes a progressively stronger element in our grouping." The difficulties, he added, would arise in "(a) convincing the Latin Americans of our very serious interest in their welfare and economic development; (b) persuading them that their progress depends primarily upon their own determination, energy, and willingness to encourage private enterprise; and (c) agreeing to assist them with an ample and elastic loan policy, a determined effort by the executive branch to prevent further trade restrictions, continued technical assistance, and a firm intention to maintain the momentum of the United States economy and thereby inter-American trade opportunity" (Smith to Eisenhower, Sept. 9, 1954, AWF/D-H). For developments see no. 1124.
⁷ This letter was written after Eisenhower had received from Ambassador Luce a letter urging an immediate settlement of the Trieste question (see no. 1048, and Rabel, Between East and West, p. 157). For background on the negotiations see no. 971; Eisenhower, Mandate for Change, pp. 416-19; and Rabel, Between East and West, pp. 153-58. In the second phase of the talks, which had begun in London on June 1, the Italian representative had made clear his position that, among other considerations, any boundary adjustments must be made reciprocally and any solution reached between Italy and Yugoslavia must be provisional and not final. U.S. Ambassador Aldrich had described the Italian attitude as one of "sweet reasonableness," but he cautioned that the negotiations would be "extremely tough" (State, Foreign Relations, 1952-1954, vol. VIII, Eastern Europe; Soviet Union; Eastern Mediterranean, p. 451-54; Campbell, Successful Negotiation, pp. 126-27). The boundary issue continued to deadlock negotiations throughout the summer. In a July 9 meeting with Eisenhower Ambassador Luce had called the outstanding differences between the two governments nothing but "hash marks" on a map, and Ambassador Aldrich, in a letter to Dulles on July 12, had expressed frustration that with so much at stake, the Italians and Yugoslavs were "holding out on what is really [a] question of a few acres" (ibid., pp. 472, 477-78, 483-84, 495-99; see no. 971, and Rabel, Between East and West, pp. 155-57 for the territorial demands). On August 31 Yugoslavian government officials had stated that they could make no further concessions regarding territory or reparations but would accept all other provisions of the Italian proposals--a position the Italians would not accept. U.S. negotiators, headed by High Commissioner to Austria Llewellyn Thompson, were then instructed to seek British collaboration in the preparation of a compromise settlement which would then be presented to both the Italian and Yugoslav governments (State, Foreign Relations, 1952-1954, vol. VIII, Eastern Europe; Soviet Union; Eastern Mediterranean, pp. 511-13).
⁸ Eisenhower would receive a message from Smith on the Trieste stalemate immediately after dispatching this letter (see no. 1047; see also Telephone conversation, Eisenhower and Smith, Sept. 4, 1954, AWF/D). Smith would write again on September 10, informing the President that Deputy Under Secretary Robert Murphy would leave for Europe the next day "in an attempt to push through a final settlement" (AWF/D-H). Smith also would tell Eisenhower that the Yugoslavs were in great need of wheat and were also "greatly worried by their financial problem of converting their short-term liabilities into long-term obligations." The United States had invited the Yugoslavian Finance Minister to Washington for discussions on the issue. "Both the wheat and the financial problem give us a certain leverage on the Yugoslavs," Smith concluded, "which we intend to employ in reaching a Trieste settlement." For developments see no. 1048.
⁹ Smith would send the three brief memoranda cited in the notes above in a top secret cable to Eisenhower on September 10 (AWF/D-H).

Bibliographic reference to this document:
Eisenhower, Dwight D. Secret To Walter Bedell Smith, 3 September 1954. In The Papers of Dwight David Eisenhower, ed. L. Galambos and D. van Ee, doc. 1045. World Wide Web facsimile by The Dwight D. Eisenhower Memorial Commission of the print edition; Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996, http://www.eisenhowermemorial.org/presidential-papers/first-term/documents/1045.cfm

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