Presidential Papers, Doc#114 Memorandum To Legislative Leaders, 30 March 1953. In The Papers of Dwight David Eisenhower

Document #114; March 30, 1953
To Legislative Leaders
Series: EM, AWF, Administration Series: St. Lawrence Seaway ; Category: Memorandum

The Papers of Dwight David Eisenhower, Volume XIV - The Presidency: The Middle Way
Part I: Charting a New Course; January 1953 to April 1953
Chapter 2: "A number of misunderstandings": Party and International Struggles

 

SUBJECT: St. Lawrence Seaway

The consensus of opinion at the Cabinet meeting on Friday was that the Administration should take a stand in favor of the St. Lawrence Seaway.1 The principal reasons are:

a. The Canadian Government intends to move in any event and our interests could badly suffer if we did not take some action to achieve cooperative control.

b. Unless the United States cooperates, Canada will construct the Seaway on Canadian soil, at a cost substantially in excess of the proposed United States location. This will result in increased toll costs to United States shipping.

c. The Canadians propose to construct the Seaway with a 27 foot channel, insufficient to accommodate United States shipping. The American proposal, as provided in the Wiley Bill, contemplates the authorization of a channel of greater depth, which from our point of view is most desirable for both our commercial and defense requirements.

d. The provisions of the Wiley bill reduce the cost to the United States below any other proposal so far submitted.

e. This proposition will certainly be, sooner or later, an economic necessity. We should move on it before some emergency situation might require extraordinary expenditures.

f. The adoption of the final bill depends first on authority given to the State of New York for the construction of a power facility in cooperation with the Province of Ontario. This will probably be provided by a license granted by the Federal Power Commission, a matter now pending.

If there is general concurrence with this attitude, I should like for Senator Taft and Mr. Martin, upon leaving this conference, to announce that the Administration definitely favors the general plan described in the Wiley Bill and will support it.2

1 For many years the United States and Canada had considered building a system of locks and canals that would open the upper St. Lawrence River and eastern Great Lakes to Atlantic shipping. In 1946, during his term as Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Eisenhower had voiced support for the plan; in 1952 he had avoided taking a position on the proposed seaway (see Galambos, NATO and the Campaign of 1952, no. 845). A bill to authorize U.S. involvement in such a project had died in June 1952, when the Senate voted to table it, and afterward Canada resolved to proceed with or without American participation. In late January 1953 Senate Foreign Relations Committee Chairman Alexander Wiley had introduced a measure establishing a St. Lawrence Seaway Development Corporation, to be managed by three presidentially appointed directors. The commission would have authority to construct and operate ship channels at two points on the American side of the U.S.-Canadian boundary, contingent upon (a) assurances that Canada would construct the needed navigation aids on its side of the boundary and (b) closing of an agreement on a joint New York State-Ontario hydroelectric plant near Niagara Falls (in March the Federal Power Commission had the New York application under study). Discussion of the Wiley bill had been postponed at White House legislative meetings of March 16 and 23. On the second date Wiley had urged the Administration to "adopt a strongly favorable attitude" toward the venture (AWF/LM, Mar. 17, 23, 1953).

At the March 27 Cabinet meeting Secretary of the Interior McKay had observed that U.S. support for the seaway would ease negotiations with the Canadians on problems the two countries faced in Alaska and on the Columbia River. Ambassador Lodge had reiterated arguments against the project raised in the last session of Congress but agreed that "under present circumstances" the Eisenhower Administration should endorse U.S. involvement in the seaway. The President remained cautious. Although believing that economic necessity made the seaway inevitable and opposing any Canadian monopoly on development of the Great Lakes, he was concerned about the cost of building the system. Secretary of Commerce Weeks had noted that his memorandum on the subject lacked enthusiasm "because he had been unable to obtain any clear indication of how great an expenditure would be involved." Eisenhower further hesitated to involve the federal government either in a state's plans for power development or in an issue that sharply divided eastern and midwestern ports and opposing transportation interests. Railroad companies bitterly opposed the seaway, and on Sunday, March 29, the President would confer with presidents of the Association of American Railroads, the Pennsylvania Railroad, and the Santa Fe Railway Company (Cabinet meeting minutes, Mar. 27, 1953, AWF/Cabinet).

2 Following Eisenhower's discussion of this memorandum with legislative leaders, Senator Taft told reporters that Senate hearings on the Wiley bill "would go ahead without any recommendation from the White House" (New York Times, Mar. 31, 1953). At the next Cabinet meeting the President would describe the project as "more complicated than he had thought." According to the minutes, "He expressed the belief that the Administration would have to support the Seaway sooner or later, for the Administration cannot always be on the defensive, but he wishes more of the opposition viewpoint to be presented in the Senate hearings before the Administration should take a stand" (Cabinet meeting minutes, Apr. 3, 1953, AWF/Cabinet). For developments see no. 165.

Bibliographic reference to this document:
Eisenhower, Dwight D. Memorandum To Legislative Leaders, 30 March 1953. In The Papers of Dwight David Eisenhower, ed. L. Galambos and D. van Ee, doc. 114. World Wide Web facsimile by The Dwight D. Eisenhower Memorial Commission of the print edition; Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996, http://www.eisenhowermemorial.org/presidential-papers/first-term/documents/114.cfm

 


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