Presidential Papers, Doc#119 Top secret To John Foster Dulles, 1 April 1953. In The Papers of Dwight David Eisenhower

Document #119; April 1, 1953
To John Foster Dulles
Series: EM, AWF, Dulles-Herter Series ; Category: Top secret

The Papers of Dwight David Eisenhower, Volume XIV - The Presidency: The Middle Way
Part I: Charting a New Course; January 1953 to April 1953
Chapter 2: "A number of misunderstandings": Party and International Struggles

 

Memorandum for the Secretary of State: Herewith I return your draft statement on the Bricker Amendment.1 In general, the paper expresses the point of view that I believe to be correct. However, I think that, as a persuasive paper, it is in error in emphasizing certain contentions. Not that I disagree violently with the validity of any single statement--but I doubt the usefulness or appropriateness of the argument that the Resolution would make the President the "servant" of the Congress.2 The probable effect of the Resolution would be, I think, to impede and stifle necessary action in the international field. This in itself is so serious that it is a better argument than that the Resolution would establish a new relationship between the two coordinate branches of Government.

But even if we concede that the traditional relationship would be adversely and seriously upset by approval of the Resolution, I should think that such an argument would be far better used in some place other than at a Congressional hearing. There may be individuals in Congress who are convinced that that body should have a much more influential position vis-a-vis the President, especially in the field of foreign relations.3 Consequently, this argument might be best used before public audiences.

At another place in your paper (page 17), there is the plain implication that, with a different kind of administration, it might be a good thing to adopt such a Resolution. If this is true, then I am for the Resolution. If we must have some amendment to protect our government and our people from what might happen to them under the treaty-making powers of a stupid President and a partisan Senate, then the mere fact that we believe there is no danger during the next four years is not a good argument. All through your paper, you make the point that there exist many kinds of influences in and out of government to maintain necessary balances and protect our people. You show that this has been our history through good administrations and bad administrations for one hundred and sixty years. Then suddenly your paper says ". . . what might, under other circumstances, be a desirable Constitutional Amendment."4

As a consequence of the point just made, there should not be too much emphasis on the contention that the current one is a good administration. Of course, we pray and believe that we are seeking what is good for all the people, that we are not merely working for personal aggrandizement, and that this administration is one of good-will and intent. But the whole argument of your paper should be based upon principle and on Constitutional wisdom, rather than personal ability and wisdom of individuals.5

I have read also the top secret document #50137 from CIA, dated March 31, 1953. It begins to look to me that, if I am to make a speech on this question of peace, I should do it soon.6

1 On March 31 Dulles sent Eisenhower a draft of the statement he would make on April 6 before the Subcommittee of the Senate Judiciary Committee, when he presented the Eisenhower Administration's position on the Bricker amendment to the Constitution (AWF/D-H). For background on the Amendment see the preceding document and no. 59.

2 Dulles had written that if the President could not make an Executive Agreement with any foreign government "except as the Congress may prescribe," then "it would drastically alter our present Constitutional concept of balance of power by making the President in the field of foreign relations a servant of the Congress."

3 The principal proponents of the proposed amendment, besides Bricker, were Senators Dirksen, Watkins, and Jenner, all Republicans.

4 In his conclusion Dulles had written, "The Resolution cannot be adopted . . . except as it wins support through . . . distrust of the United States Senate . . . and distrust of the President. . . . This is no time to evoke fears, even to secure what might under other circumstances be a desirable Constitutional amendment."

5 In a memo of April 3 (AWF/D) Dulles thanked Eisenhower for his "thoughtful study," by which, he said, he would be "guided." Dulles, however, would make no changes in the statement (see State, Foreign Relations, 1952-1954, vol. I, General: Economic and Political Matters, 2 pts. [1983], pt. 2, pp. 1797-1805; Tananbaum, Bricker Amendment Controversy, pp. 87-91; New York Times, Apr. 7, 1953).

In essence, Dulles argued against the adoption of any proposal that would limit the President's power in the field of foreign relations. He promised that the Senate would continue to "advise and consent" in the negotiation of all important foreign agreements. He assured the committee that the Eisenhower Administration would not sign treaties on human rights or on political rights of women, both sponsored under auspices of the United Nations; nor would the Administration urge ratification of the U.N. genocide convention (U.S., Congress, Senate, Committee on the Judiciary, Treaties and Executive Agreements, Hearings before a Subcommittee on the Judiciary, 83d Cong., 1st sess., 1953).

6 See no. 132.

Bibliographic reference to this document:
Eisenhower, Dwight D. Top secret To John Foster Dulles, 1 April 1953. In The Papers of Dwight David Eisenhower, ed. L. Galambos and D. van Ee, doc. 119. World Wide Web facsimile by The Dwight D. Eisenhower Memorial Commission of the print edition; Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996, http://www.eisenhowermemorial.org/presidential-papers/first-term/documents/119.cfm

 


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