Dear
Winston: Just before your letter of April fifth1 reached my desk, I learned that Anthony is to undergo a major operation.2 Please convey to him my warm greetings and my most prayerful wishes for his early recovery. I have a great respect for his wisdom and integrity; the free nations cannot spare his sound counsel in these parlous times.
It would be difficult for me to find a single line in your letter with which I disagree, even if I were minded to look for such an opportunity. The convictions expressed in my former letter to you merely paralleled the old proverb about leading a horse to water. I assume that Naguib wants, above all else, to remain in power in Egypt. To do that, he has to have a large proportion of the population with him. To satisfy the population's intense emotionalism with respect to national prestige, he must appear always to be treated in the world's councils as a complete equal. Consequently, a meeting on his own territory should be arranged, if possible, by his invitation.
If this is to be brought about, then we need really skillful negotiators to get him to realize how big he would look to his own people if he should issue an invitation and both of our governments should accept.
As to the abilities of our own Ambassadors--either yours or ours--in Egypt, I know nothing. They may be quite skillful and imaginative; likewise, they may be the reverse. In any event, our two Ambassadors went to see Naguib and were rebuffed.3 This is the unpleasant fact that must be taken into consideration as we lay plans to go further.
Possibly one way, now, to go about the affair is for your own representative to start negotiations with Naguib and, when there arises in those negotiations the question of additional arms for Egypt--which might in part be provided by us--the question of America's interests and the conditions on which these arms would be furnished, would seem to create a natural opening for an invitation of our representatives to the conference. As quickly as we should receive any kind of intimation of welcome, General Hull would be on his way.4
Our general agreement with you as to the things that ought to be done in that area and our readiness to do our best in bringing these things about, stand just as they did when we so expressed ourselves to Anthony during his visit.5
But we are convinced that if your government and ours should press Naguib with some sort of ultimatum to the effect that he had to come into a conference with the two of us or we would simply walk out and desert the region, then he would have no recourse but defiance. He would realize, of course, that as a result he might eventually go under. But he would calculate that, by acceptance, he would go under without delay.
There is another subject of vital interest to us both and concerning which I have spoken to you a number of times. It is the need, in Europe, for uniform progress on the Common Defense Plan and for greater political and economic unity. In recent weeks I have been consulting with official and unofficial representatives from some of the countries in Western Europe.6 Almost without exception, they have said that a more emphatic public endorsement by Great Britain of these projects would be helpful, particularly in securing the support of most of the Socialist Party in France, which is more or less the key to that country's probable action. Permit me to say again that I should very much like to see you seize some appropriate opportunity to make a major address on the general subject of greater European military and economic unity, stating in your own inimitable and eloquent way the things that you have already announced that Britain is ready to do in support of these purposes. Such might just happen to be the decisive influence.7
