Presidential Papers, Doc#1450 Secret. Personal To Robert Anthony Eden, 31 May 1955. In The Papers of Dwight David Eisenhower

Document #1450; May 31, 1955
To Robert Anthony Eden
Series: EM, AWF, International Series: Eden ; Category: Secret. Personal

The Papers of Dwight David Eisenhower, Volume XVI - The Presidency: The Middle Way
Part VII: "Nothing could be worse than global war"; January 1955 to May 1955
Chapter 15: Searching "for an honorable peace"

 

Dear Anthony: Our recent public statement of satisfaction over the release of four United States airmen conforms, I think, to your suggestion as to what we should do along that line.1

I agree that the three Western powers should have a clear accord among themselves as to their joint attitude on questions which will likely be raised at the Conference. I doubt, however, that it will be possible for me personally to undertake attendance at a preliminary meeting which would have as its purpose the formulation of such joint attitudes.2 It is always an awkward thing for the President to leave this country for more than a day or so, and at this particular time it seems more difficult than is usually the case.

However, it is clear that we must make arrangements that will bring about the desired accord. Possibly Foster and Harold should work on this.

As to the length of the "Summit" meeting, there are several reasons why we do not want it unduly prolonged.3 The first of these is, again, the difficulty I have mentioned above. The second is that long and laborious meetings, discussing substantive questions, will inevitably lead the public to expect concrete solutions to the specific problems that obviously trouble the world. A meeting of a very few days could logically be accepted by the people as an effort to ease tensions and to outline means and methods of attacking the tough problems we have to face. But a prolonged meeting would lead to expectations which cannot possibly be realized either quickly, or in this kind of meeting. Thirdly, we feel that we must be particularly careful that the meeting and the note on which it ends shall neither raise false hopes among our own people nor create despair among the captive nations.

We are, of course, quite ready to take what time is necessary in such a conference to discuss general attitudes and general methods to be followed in the solution of problems. To attempt more than this and at the same time try to devise a final communique that would convince the world that an easing of tensions has actually begun, would, I think, most certainly create confusion. Possibly it might lead the peoples of Eastern Europe to believe that we had finally and irrevocably accepted the status quo with regard to them. This, of course, we must not do.

If necessary, I think I can manage the "clear four to five days" that you believe will be required. But we would want to know that you were prepared to stand with us in preventing the development of long drawn-out, profitless arguments which could have nothing as their purpose except propaganda.4 With warm personal regard

1 For background on the release of the airmen held by the Chinese People's Republic see no. 1448. For the statement see U.S. Department of State Bulletin 32, no. 833 (June 13, 1955), 953.

2 For background on the Geneva Conference see no. 1421. Prime Minister Eden had suggested that Eisenhower meet him in Britain before the first round of top-level discussions. "The proposed programme of talks at the official level and between Foreign Secretaries seems good to me and well planned," Eden wrote. "But I also feel that we should be wise to have a talk ourselves before meeting the Russians" (State, Foreign Relations, 1955-1957, vol. V, Austrian State Treaty; Summit and Foreign Ministers Meetings, 1955, pp. 203-4).

3 Eden did not believe that the "purely exploratory" summit talks should be "dragged out," but he did not want to be tied "too firmly and rigidly to an exact timetable." He had suggested a minimum of four or five days to take advantage of those informal contacts that were often more useful than formal discussions with the Soviets (ibid.)

4 Eisenhower sent this message to Acting Secretary of State Hoover with a note saying that although he preferred to answer Eden "as soon as possible," he would delay until Dulles returned from vacation if Hoover believed it "truly desirable." The State Department sent the message to the American Embassy in London for delivery to Eden on this same day (Eisenhower to Hoover, and Hoover to Aldrich, May 31, 1955, AWF/I: Eden). For developments see no. 1454.

Bibliographic reference to this document:
Eisenhower, Dwight D. Secret. Personal To Robert Anthony Eden, 31 May 1955. In The Papers of Dwight David Eisenhower, ed. L. Galambos and D. van Ee, doc. 1450. World Wide Web facsimile by The Dwight D. Eisenhower Memorial Commission of the print edition; Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996, http://www.eisenhowermemorial.org/presidential-papers/first-term/documents/1450.cfm

 


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