<--PREV Doc #14  |  Memorial Commission Home Page  |  First Term Table of Contents  |  Presidential Papers Home Page  |  Doc#  |  NEXT--> Doc #16 Document #15; February 2, 1953 To Winston Spencer Churchill Series: EM, AWF, International Series: Churchill ; Category: Personal and confidential The Papers of Dwight David Eisenhower, Volume XIV - The Presidency: The Middle Way Part I: Charting a New Course; January 1953 to April 1953 Chapter 1: Developing a spirit of teamwork   Dear Winston: Over the week end, I had your cable referring to our intention of relieving the Seventh Fleet of responsibility for defending China.1 Of course, I have no means of knowing what will be the effect of this order if the Communists are determined to hunt for any excuse in order to justify some indefensible action on their part. Your message made a point of the fact that no great military advantage would result from our decision. This is likely true. But there is a very definite psychological point involved--even self-respect. The United States is in the peculiar position of battling Chinese Communists in Korea; while, at the same time, under the old order, of accepting the humiliating position of defending Communist China against a possible attack. You may be right in your guess that the United Nations will, initially at least, disapprove of our decision. Nevertheless, I am making it quite clear in my statement that we intend nothing aggressive--that we are just tired of being dupes. No one could be more desirous than I of developing a common political attitude among the Western nations with respect to our Asiatic problem. Never will you or your associates find anything but the greatest of sympathy from us in our effort to reach logical, common attitudes and policies in that region. But, to save me, I cannot see why any of our friends have a right to expect of the United States that it maintain such an anomalous attitude as was required of it under the original order. I assure you again that there is nothing belligerent in my feeling--in fact, there is possibly in this whole world not a less belligerent person than I am! This message is nothing but a personal communication. It is not, of course, a part of the diplomatic exchanges between the British Government and the United States Government. But it is my understanding that you and I hope to maintain, even if only intermittently, a personal correspondence, which will provide opportunity to help clarify intentions, and explain reasons for decisions, when this seems appropriate.2 With warm personal regard, As ever 1 The British had received advance word of Eisenhower's intention in his State of the Union address. The President had announced a change in U.S. policy in the Strait of Formosa. Since the outbreak of the Korean War in June 1950, the United States had stationed vessels of the Pacific Fleet in the strait both to prevent a Red Chinese attack upon Chiang Kai-Shek's forces on the island of Formosa and to block Nationalist Chinese forays against the Chinese mainland. "This has meant, in effect, that the United States Navy was required to serve as a defensive arm of Communist China," Eisenhower stated, while Chinese troops waged war against U.N. troops in Korea. "I am therefore issuing instructions that the Seventh Fleet no longer be employed to shield Communist China" (New York Times, Feb. 3, 1953). On Sunday, February 1, British Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden had sent a cable questioning the wisdom of this change, which the British believed would have "unfortunate political repercussions particularly in the United Nations"; it would not likely bring "compensating military advantages" or help bring about a solution to the Korean War (U.S. Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952-1954, 16 vols. [Washington, D.C., 1979-86], vol. XIV, China and Japan, 2 pts. [1985], pt. 1, pp. 136-37). 2 In late March (Dulles Papers, JFD Chronological Ser.) Dulles would cable Winthrop Williams Aldrich, U.S. Ambassador to Great Britain, alerting him to the President's habit of writing personal letters to foreign friends. In those messages, Dulles explained, Eisenhower "expresses himself in ways that might be embarrassing to recipients if they thought that letter was seen by others. We shall however try to take precaution to assure that if these letters affect substance of negotiations or governmental positions our ambassadors concerned get summary for personal guidance." Dulles noted for Aldrich's "strictly personal information" that he was "inclined to think personal exchange of letters initiated by Churchill will increasingly be replaced by use of regular channels." On the Aldrich appointment see no. 31. Bibliographic reference to this document: Eisenhower, Dwight D. Personal and confidential To Winston Spencer Churchill, 2 February 1953. In The Papers of Dwight David Eisenhower, ed. L. Galambos and D. van Ee, doc. 15. World Wide Web facsimile by The Dwight D. Eisenhower Memorial Commission of the print edition; Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996, http://www.eisenhowermemorial.org/presidential-papers/first-term/documents/15.cfm <--PREV Doc #14  |  Memorial Commission Home Page  |  First Term Table of Contents  |  Presidential Papers Home Page  |  Doc#  |  NEXT--> Doc #16

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