Long conference with Foster Dulles, during which I approved certain nominations for foreign posts. These included eventual removal of Nufer from the Argentines. The new government does not look on him with any great favor because they feel he was too friendly with Peron.1
The Secretary and I discussed the whole story of our foreign operations since 1953. We have tried to keep constantly before us the purpose of promoting peace with accompanying step by step disarmament. As a preliminary, of course, we have to induce the Soviets to agree to some form of inspection, in order that both sides may be confident that treaties are being executed faithfully. In the meantime, and pending some advance in this direction, we must stay strong, particularly in that type of power that the Russians are compelled to respect--namely, destructive power that can be carried suddenly and en masse directly against the Russian economic structure. We had likewise to deal with a number of specific problems. Among these were the critical 1953 situation in Iran, the British base in Egypt, the problem in Trieste and the problem in Guatemala, the difficulties in Formosa and in Indo China, and the Korean war.2 In all of these areas, the problem was one either [of] putting out or of preventing fires. In most of them a measurable degree of success was scored, but there have been other unsolved problems that have likewise engaged our attentions, efforts and money. One of these has been the Israel-Arab situation.3
This particular problem has been aggravated by the fact that Britain and ourselves have not seen eye to eye in a number of instances. We have wanted them to make a clear-cut statement about their intentions in Cypress, outlining a program that would be perfectly acceptable to the Greeks, the Cypriotes, and at the same time would protect Western world interests in the Eastern Mediterranean.4 In the same fashion we tried to make Britain see the danger of inducing or pressuring Jordan to join the "Northern Tier" Pact.5 They went blindly ahead and only recently have been suffering one of the most severe diplomatic defeats Britain has taken in many years. Jordan has not only withdrawn from the Pact, but did so under a compulsion of riots, etc., that incidentally, was directed against this nation as well as against Great Britain.6 The Arabs apparently take the assumption that Britain does nothing in the area without our approval. Nothing could be further from the truth. Likewise, they have dilly-dallied with the Cypress situation until now three countries, as well as the island itself, are all excited--namely, Turkey, Greece and Britain.
Another problem has been the French in North Africa. Long ago we tried to get France to make the kind of timely concessions that would have eased the whole situation for years to come.7 As usual, the concern of the French about their so-called empire and its standing in the world was repeated over and over, and in the meantime the situation grew from bad to worse. Now the only answer seems to be one of granting of complete independence, and I much doubt that any of the three countries concerned--Tunisia, Algeria and Morocco--are yet capable of carrying on self-government and operating a viable economy. In the meantime, the French--likewise supposed to be our great friends--have antagonized almost every Arab in North Africa and will probably be hated for centuries.
There is probably no one [in the] world who has the technical competence of Foster Dulles in the diplomatic field. He has spent his life in this work in one form or another, and is a man of great intellectual capacity and moral courage.
Foster's presentation was something as follows, though I write in the first person. Of course, all of the work that Foster does is in my name, since I am constitutionally charged with the conduct of foreign relations. Foster himself has been glad that he could do this because it was his conviction that no man of our times has had the standing throughout the world that seems to be mine.
Whatever prestige I have in this field is, of course, the outgrowth of many factors, but at least if Foster's estimate is in the slightest degree correct, there are two or three conclusions to be drawn that are not too pleasant to contemplate. The first is that if this country, with all its riches and might, and with its foreign relations directed by people so respected throughout the world as Foster and myself, cannot point to a single conclusive sign that the world is actually moving toward universal peace and disarmament, then indeed it would appear that the world is on the verge of an abyss.
Second, to an individual who so earnestly wants to lay aside the cares of public office (a sentiment that I am sure Foster shares), this estimate brings the unhappy suggestion that he must try to carry on regardless of any other factor. Certainly if, with our standing in the world (and because of the corroboration from numbers of friends both abroad and Americans who have travelled abroad, I suspect that Foster's estimate concerning my own position is substantially correct), we are to be succeeded by individuals of less experience, lesser prestige and without the ties of acquaintanceships and even friendships that Foster and I have with many of the world leaders in many parts of the globe, then the question arises, "What will happen?"
It was on a note of this type that Foster left my office after an hour and a half of earnest conversation. What he really means is that he would think it calamitous to our public relations if I should announce that I shall under no circumstances run again for the Presidency. This morning Sherman Adams, for different reasons, expressed some concurrence in the same idea.8
The soup thickens.
