This morning, in two successive appointments, first with Dillon Anderson and second with Arthur Flemming, the question of our mobilization stock pile was raised.1 There seems to be some concern as to whether we should not try to economize by cutting back our five year program, on the theory that in a limited war we could get all the strategic materials we needed, while in an all-out war the thing would be over in thirty to sixty days. I declined to cut back the program for two principal reasons.
(a). The theory of the thirty to sixty day war has nothing whatsoever to back it up. While it is obvious that in thirty to sixty days the two giants in the atomic field might conceivably accomplish a mutual destruction of terrifying proportions, yet this would not in itself necessarily end the war. Wars are conducted by the will of a population and that will can be at times a most stubborn and practically unconquerable element. In ancient times the final siege of Carthage is an example--in modern times the 1940 bombing of Britain and the 1943-44-45 bombing of Germany are others. Another observation under this same heading is that if our nation would suffer the kind of destruction that we know to be possible today, we could, even if considered militarily victorious, be wholly dependent upon reserve supplies for a matter of several years. This would be particularly true if ports and shipping were destroyed, and if the war encompassed some of the areas from which strategic materials come.
(b). The second reason is that I cannot possibly see how the United States can possibly lose anything in storing up imperishable supplies that it does not in itself produce in sufficient quantity. The material resources of the world are constantly being depleted, and at an accelerated pace. The time is bound to come when some of these items will begin to mount sharply in price. Some may even become almost completely exhausted. Only the discovery of substitutes or even changes in the habits or the mode of living of people will provide a long term answer. But the nation that has supplies of presently used scarce materials will obviously have more time to work out this problem than will others. This is the case where the provisioning of war reserves in raw materials does not constitute a drain upon the long term resources of the nation.2
This afternoon the Secretary of State and the former Deputy Secretary of Defense, Robert Anderson, came to see me. Our discussion centered around the forthcoming visit of Bob to the Mid East, where we hope he can make some progress in bringing about a rapprochement between Israel and Egypt.3 He is one of the most capable men I know. My confidence in him is such that at the moment I feel that nothing could give me greater satisfaction than to believe that next January 20th, I could turn over this office to his hands. His capacity is unlimited and his dedication to this country is complete.
Because of this feeling of confidence, the Secretary of State and I have requested him to have the frankest kind of talks with both Nasser in Egypt and Ben Gurion in Israel.4 We feel certain that if a practicable peace treaty could be arranged between these two nations, that our people and our Congress would authorize almost any kind of material aid for the two of them that they could effectively use. But we are convinced that the interests of this country will not be served by attempting to arm one against the other, and we would regard it as tragic if the USSR began to arm one while we undertook to defend the other with weapons and financial support.5 Consequently, we are ready to do anything within reason to bring them closer together and to start between them the cooperative process, particularly in economic matters.
Bob is starting for the Mid East next Sunday.6
