<--PREV Doc #1708  |  Memorial Commission Home Page  |  First Term Table of Contents  |  Presidential Papers Home Page  |  Doc#  |  NEXT--> Doc #1710 Document #1709; January 23, 1956 To John Foster Dulles Series: EM, AWF, Dulles-Herter Series ; Category: Secret The Papers of Dwight David Eisenhower, Volume XVI - The Presidency: The Middle Way Part IX: "Concerning my political intentions"; December 1955 to April 1956 Chapter 18: On "an almost normal schedule"   Dear Foster: I have given preliminary study to your memorandum. I think it contains a good idea; I am certain that that part which stresses the importance of political leadership is absolutely correct.1 Here and there I have scrawled some hasty notes on the paper, but my basic question is something of this sort: When flatly rejecting technical inspection as providing any practicable basis for disarmament, we thereby give to the Russians a great opportunity for hurting us politically.2 Yet another part of the program assumes that we can have a sufficient inspection or knowledge of productive capacity in both countries to insure that the amount of fissionable material in the hands of the international agency will be greater than that possessed by any particular country. In fact, we apparently assume that the proportion would be so great that any individual country would be foolish to challenge the international power.3 These conclusions seem to be somewhat contradictory between themselves. Yet by no means do I think we should give up the idea that you have brought along this far. In spite of all that has been said about the inadequacy of technical inspection as a base for any kind of atomic disarmament, I am not so sure that this is true to the extent that we should reject the whole idea out of hand. If inspection were as thorough, as constant and as widespread as it could be made, and if such a proposal were accompanied by disarmament in easily discoverable means of delivery, it might be a very effective thing indeed. Certainly it would be sufficiently effective that we could better afford to insist upon inspection as a part of every program we propose, rather than to reject it. At least we would avoid giving to the Soviets a world of propaganda ammunition.4 There would be the further advantage that if only general inspection systems were approved, and the results were somewhat less than satisfactory, then the international pool theory becomes an alternative that it seems to me the world would seize upon with great relief and enthusiasm.5 As ever P.S. By this last paragraph I mean that now the only recourse would be to insist on such a large aggregate of material in the international pool that no single state could possibly have a greater amount. 1 In an untitled memorandum, Secretary Dulles had expressed his concern that current trends with respect to nuclear weapons "unless counteracted, could become seriously unfavorable to the United States." The country could be physically endangered, its world strategy questioned, and its moral leadership challenged. Dulles believed that the United States, speaking through the President, should propose a "major and sustained initiative in the political field" that would promote the United Nations, through charter amendments, as an effective agency to preserve peace (Jan. 22, 1956, AWF/D-H). 2 Dulles had doubted the ability of any scientific system of inspection to stop the Soviets from cheating on a nuclear disarmament agreement. "It is highly probable that the Soviet Union will not admit of such thoroughgoing inspection as we would deem necessary for any substantial disarmament on our part," he had written. "Therefore, while we should not relax intensive efforts to find acceptable measures of disarmament, we should, I think, recognize that we are not likely to find in disarmament measures alone an adequate reversal of the current trends with respect to nuclear weapons. . . ." 3 Dulles had recommended that the United Nations, as representative of the world community, have control of "sufficient atomic weapons, and means of delivery, as to overbalance any atomic or other weapons as might be surreptitiously retained by any nation." 4 Eisenhower was arguing that while no inspection system would be perfect, one could be devised that would enable the United States to detect the airplanes and missiles necessary to deliver a nuclear attack. Therefore, he reasoned, it would be better for the United States to take a positive stand in favor of disarmament as long as an effective inspection system was a part of any proposal. 5 For developments see no. 1744. Bibliographic reference to this document: Eisenhower, Dwight D. Secret To John Foster Dulles, 23 January 1956. In The Papers of Dwight David Eisenhower, ed. L. Galambos and D. van Ee, doc. 1709. World Wide Web facsimile by The Dwight D. Eisenhower Memorial Commission of the print edition; Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996, http://www.eisenhowermemorial.org/presidential-papers/first-term/documents/1709.cfm <--PREV Doc #1708  |  Memorial Commission Home Page  |  First Term Table of Contents  |  Presidential Papers Home Page  |  Doc#  |  NEXT--> Doc #1710

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