Presidential Papers, Doc#175 To Chiang Kai-shek, 5 May 1953. In The Papers of Dwight David Eisenhower

Document #175; May 5, 1953
To Chiang Kai-shek
Series: EM, AWF, International Series

The Papers of Dwight David Eisenhower, Volume XIV - The Presidency: The Middle Way
Part II: Settling into "the long pull"; May 1953 to August 1953
Chapter 3: "A time for continued vigilance"

 

Dear President Chiang: Ambassador Koo1 has handed me your letter of April 15.2

The Soviet so-called "peace offensive" has been the object of intensive study by me and my advisers, and our conclusions thus far are very similar to your own. We believe that the Soviet Union has in fact been thrown tactically on the defensive, and that its recent conduct, with typical Soviet inversion, has been advertised as a positive "struggle for peace." In any event, we should be naive to think that the long-term objectives of the Soviet Union have changed, on the basis of the conciliatory gestures made in recent weeks. We have as yet no reason to believe that the ultimate objective of the Soviet Union is anything less than its oft-repeated one of a Communist world ruled by Moscow.

I am certain that the free peoples of the world will accept no such fate. So long as a threat to their freedom and security exists they will be firm in their resolve to remain strong and united, to make whatever sacrifices and to take whatever risks may be necessary to demonstrate their determination to defend their freedom.3 We cannot assume that the threat posed by aggressive Communism has passed, or that it is passing. To the contrary, it appears that the recent Soviet posture is evidence of a change merely in tactics, of indeterminate degree and duration, dictated largely by necessity. I shall certainly consider it to be no more than this, until the Soviet Union demonstrates, by action rather than words, that it has abandoned its plan of world conquest, and that it is willing to join with the rest of the world in building a world community in which all can enjoy the fruits of their labor in peace and security.

The free world is obligated, in the interest of all humanity, to do everything possible to cause the Soviet Union to alter the fundamental objectives which have long guided its actions. And the present "peace defensive" gives us good reason to believe that we are making progress in demonstrating to the Soviet Union the futility of its program for world enslavement. This is not the time for "accommodation" of a sort which would enable the Soviet bloc to achieve by "peace" overtures what it has failed to achieve by other means. It is rather a time for continued vigilance, for greater unity, and for re-dedication to those ideals which have impelled us thus far. Recent events support the belief that the free world has been correct in its determination both to become strong and to exercise its strength with restraint. It is clearly the responsibility of the free world to remain both strong and patient.

This is not to say that peace overtures are not welcome. Any move by any nation which does in fact tend to lessen the tensions under which we live will be universally applauded. The free world would have to answer to all the yearnings of our generation if it obstinately rejected seemingly friendly moves on the part of the Communist bloc, on the basis that the motivation is not clear, or even on the basis that the moves may turn out to be spurious. The opportunity for demonstration of sincerity must be provided; but sincerity must be clearly and consistently demonstrated, step by step, as a requisite to continuing negotiation.

The conclusion of an honorable armistice in Korea is but the first step which the Communists must take in demonstrating sincerity. I can assure you that the United States, in its desire for an end to the hostilities, has not lost sight of the fundamental issues involved in Korea. In my speech before the American Society of Newspaper Editors on April 16, delivered the day after your letter was written, I made it clear that an armistice must be followed promptly by the "initiation of political discussion leading to the holding of free elections in a united Korea."4 I do not intend that we will again participate in endless negotiation which may be used merely as a vehicle for Communist propaganda.

There are many steps which the Communists could take to give substance to their peaceful declarations. I mentioned a few of them in my speech of April 16. The new Soviet leadership, by taking these and similar steps, could change the course of history set by eight post-war years of suspicion and fear. We are waiting to see whether that leadership will have the required vision to grasp this opportunity. I do not consider this to mean that the Communist world has the initiative. It is the free world which has boldly taken the initiative in demonstrating its willingness not only to reduce the heavy burden of armament, given reasonable safeguards, but also to direct its productive energies into channels which will benefit the entire world. I believe that it is not enough merely to convince the Communist leadership of the futility of their plans for world conquest. We must take the lead in offering a program of world betterment which welcomes the cooperation of all people, without recrimination or vindictiveness.

The United States hopes that the Soviet "peace defensive" may be the beginnings of a genuine readiness to resolve the differences which now divide the world. We believe that the other free nations share this hope. But we must be shown by deeds. Until then we will not relax our guard. We are under no illusions that a peaceful and secure world can be attained, so long as large groups of people are not free to speak for themselves and to choose their own form of government. It cannot be attained so long as the Soviet bloc maintains its self-imposed isolation, or so long as it is possible for future aggression to be bred behind a cloak of secrecy.

I am glad to have the benefit of your thinking, and I deeply appreciate your pledge of full cooperation in building soundly for the future.

My wife joins me in extending to you and Madame Chiang our sincere personal regards and highest esteem. Cordially

1 V. K. Wellington Koo was the Republic of China's Ambassador to the United States.

2 Chiang had written to warn the President that Soviet leaders, speaking of peace, were actually reacting to Eisenhower's "integrated anti-Communist policy," and hoping to maneuver the West into a stalemate that would benefit Communism in Korea, in Eastern Europe, and at the United Nations. "It is imperative, I feel, for us to seek ways and means by which we can gradually take away the political and military initiative from the Communist world," Chiang concluded (see State, Foreign Relations, 1952-1954, vol. XIV, China and Japan, pt. 1, pp. 188-89).

3 In late April Chiang's government had agreed not to engage in offensive operations without U

Presidential Papers, Doc#175 To Chiang Kai-shek, 5 May 1953. In The Papers of Dwight David Eisenhower

Document #175; May 5, 1953
To Chiang Kai-shek
Series: EM, AWF, International Series

The Papers of Dwight David Eisenhower, Volume XIV - The Presidency: The Middle Way
Part II: Settling into "the long pull"; May 1953 to August 1953
Chapter 3: "A time for continued vigilance"

 

Dear President Chiang: Ambassador Koo1 has handed me your letter of April 15.2

The Soviet so-called "peace offensive" has been the object of intensive study by me and my advisers, and our conclusions thus far are very similar to your own. We believe that the Soviet Union has in fact been thrown tactically on the defensive, and that its recent conduct, with typical Soviet inversion, has been advertised as a positive "struggle for peace." In any event, we should be naive to think that the long-term objectives of the Soviet Union have changed, on the basis of the conciliatory gestures made in recent weeks. We have as yet no reason to believe that the ultimate objective of the Soviet Union is anything less than its oft-repeated one of a Communist world ruled by Moscow.

I am certain that the free peoples of the world will accept no such fate. So long as a threat to their freedom and security exists they will be firm in their resolve to remain strong and united, to make whatever sacrifices and to take whatever risks may be necessary to demonstrate their determination to defend their freedom.3 We cannot assume that the threat posed by aggressive Communism has passed, or that it is passing. To the contrary, it appears that the recent Soviet posture is evidence of a change merely in tactics, of indeterminate degree and duration, dictated largely by necessity. I shall certainly consider it to be no more than this, until the Soviet Union demonstrates, by action rather than words, that it has abandoned its plan of world conquest, and that it is willing to join with the rest of the world in building a world community in which all can enjoy the fruits of their labor in peace and security.

The free world is obligated, in the interest of all humanity, to do everything possible to cause the Soviet Union to alter the fundamental objectives which have long guided its actions. And the present "peace defensive" gives us good reason to believe that we are making progress in demonstrating to the Soviet Union the futility of its program for world enslavement. This is not the time for "accommodation" of a sort which would enable the Soviet bloc to achieve by "peace" overtures what it has failed to achieve by other means. It is rather a time for continued vigilance, for greater unity, and for re-dedication to those ideals which have impelled us thus far. Recent events support the belief that the free world has been correct in its determination both to become strong and to exercise its strength with restraint. It is clearly the responsibility of the free world to remain both strong and patient.

This is not to say that peace overtures are not welcome. Any move by any nation which does in fact tend to lessen the tensions under which we live will be universally applauded. The free world would have to answer to all the yearnings of our generation if it obstinately rejected seemingly friendly moves on the part of the Communist bloc, on the basis that the motivation is not clear, or even on the basis that the moves may turn out to be spurious. The opportunity for demonstration of sincerity must be provided; but sincerity must be clearly and consistently demonstrated, step by step, as a requisite to continuing negotiation.

The conclusion of an honorable armistice in Korea is but the first step which the Communists must take in demonstrating sincerity. I can assure you that the United States, in its desire for an end to the hostilities, has not lost sight of the fundamental issues involved in Korea. In my speech before the American Society of Newspaper Editors on April 16, delivered the day after your letter was written, I made it clear that an armistice must be followed promptly by the "initiation of political discussion leading to the holding of free elections in a united Korea."4 I do not intend that we will again participate in endless negotiation which may be used merely as a vehicle for Communist propaganda.

There are many steps which the Communists could take to give substance to their peaceful declarations. I mentioned a few of them in my speech of April 16. The new Soviet leadership, by taking these and similar steps, could change the course of history set by eight post-war years of suspicion and fear. We are waiting to see whether that leadership will have the required vision to grasp this opportunity. I do not consider this to mean that the Communist world has the initiative. It is the free world which has boldly taken the initiative in demonstrating its willingness not only to reduce the heavy burden of armament, given reasonable safeguards, but also to direct its productive energies into channels which will benefit the entire world. I believe that it is not enough merely to convince the Communist leadership of the futility of their plans for world conquest. We must take the lead in offering a program of world betterment which welcomes the cooperation of all people, without recrimination or vindictiveness.

The United States hopes that the Soviet "peace defensive" may be the beginnings of a genuine readiness to resolve the differences which now divide the world. We believe that the other free nations share this hope. But we must be shown by deeds. Until then we will not relax our guard. We are under no illusions that a peaceful and secure world can be attained, so long as large groups of people are not free to speak for themselves and to choose their own form of government. It cannot be attained so long as the Soviet bloc maintains its self-imposed isolation, or so long as it is possible for future aggression to be bred behind a cloak of secrecy.

I am glad to have the benefit of your thinking, and I deeply appreciate your pledge of full cooperation in building soundly for the future.

My wife joins me in extending to you and Madame Chiang our sincere personal regards and highest esteem. Cordially

1 V. K. Wellington Koo was the Republic of China's Ambassador to the United States.

2 Chiang had written to warn the President that Soviet leaders, speaking of peace, were actually reacting to Eisenhower's "integrated anti-Communist policy," and hoping to maneuver the West into a stalemate that would benefit Communism in Korea, in Eastern Europe, and at the United Nations. "It is imperative, I feel, for us to seek ways and means by which we can gradually take away the political and military initiative from the Communist world," Chiang concluded (see State, Foreign Relations, 1952-1954, vol. XIV, China and Japan, pt. 1, pp. 188-89).

3 In late April Chiang's government had agreed not to engage in offensive operations without U.S. consultation and approval, thus meeting the conditions the Eisenhower Administration had set for the delivery of military jets to the Republic of China (see ibid., pp. 193-94).

4 On Eisenhower's speech see no. 132. On the course of the negotiations see no. 152.

Bibliographic reference to this document:
Eisenhower, Dwight D. To Chiang Kai-shek, 5 May 1953. In The Papers of Dwight David Eisenhower, ed. L. Galambos and D. van Ee, doc. 175. World Wide Web facsimile by The Dwight D. Eisenhower Memorial Commission of the print edition; Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996, http://www.eisenhowermemorial.org/presidential-papers/first-term/documents/175.cfm

 


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