Dear
Winston: I like to have your letters.
Your latest one to me was on the subject of your possible visit to Moscow. I gave you my frank comments, and these included the views of my principal advisers, such as Foster Dulles and others.1 I did try to make it clear that I recognized very clearly your right to make your own decision in such matters.2 Certainly I share one simple thought with you--this thought is that I would not admit that any consideration of protocol or of personal inconvenience had any slightest weight as compared to a possible chance of advancing the cause of world peace. My own comments to you were addressed solely and exclusively to the possible effects of your projected visit on friends--and others not so friendly.
As of the moment, I am far more concerned in the specific trouble spots of the world. Korea, of course, there still is. Alongside of it we must place in our concern Southeast Asia--with especial emphasis on the new invasion in Laos--and the frustrating situations in Iran and Egypt.3 This makes no mention of the famine conditions in Pakistan and the still unsettled quarrel between that country and India over the Kashmir problem.4
I know that some of our people had talks with your Mr. Butler about a possible new approach to the Iranian affair.5 In my own official family, George Humphrey was very hopeful that he might be of assistance in getting that situation straightened out, but now he tells me that a letter from Mr. Butler rejects the suggestion we had to offer.6 This was the offer involving the suggestion that a number of our major oil companies might buy out British interests and start afresh in that region. Mr. Humphrey reported to me that your Government felt it very unwise to make any further attempts to settle the Iranian problem, even through the expedient of selling out to a group of commercial companies.
Of course I do not know for certain that we here could have made the necessary arrangements to have permitted these companies to go ahead without the risk of prosecution under our anti-trust laws,7 but it is disturbing to gain the impression that your Government now considers the situation absolutely hopeless and believes that it would be preferable to face the probability of the whole area falling under Russian domination than to look for a new approach. We appreciate, of course, your concern for proper respect for contracts in the world; we thoroughly understand your conviction that anything that could be interpreted as additional retreat on your part might set loose an endless chain of unfortunate repercussions in other areas of the globe. Nevertheless, I still regard that area as one of potential disaster for the Western world.
Foster showed me your communication about the Egyptian affair.8 It is possible that I have not thoroughly understood the background in which should be viewed the existing impasse. I was told that some very protracted negotiations between the Egyptians and ourselves, looking toward the supply to them, by us, of a meager quantity of arms, had been held up for a long time pending a satisfactory solution of the Sudan problem. I had understood that by agreement with your Government, we were to proceed with the transfer of a small amount of equipment (finally reduced to about five million dollars worth) upon the satisfactory completion of that agreement. It is my impression that the Egyptians knew of this general intention on our part.
Later, when there began to appear in press reports some intemperate remarks--even threats--by the Egyptian authorities against our British friends, we began to drag our feet on fulfilling our part of the bargain. The Egyptians, of course, have pressed us again and again on the matter, and we get a bit embarrassed because of their right to charge us with failure to carry out an agreement. We can, of course, adopt the attitude that, because of some of their extraordinary and threatening statements, we are compelled to make certain that they do not intend to use these arms against our friends. In fact, it is my impression that we have long since done this. It is, however, quite difficult to refuse even to talk about the matter or to go so far, for example, as to decline to allow the Egyptian officials to see a list of the kind of articles that would be available. I believe that the initial items to be transferred involved only such things as helmets and jeeps.
Now, of course, we can continue to drag our feet for a while. But I do most deeply deplore having gotten into a position where we can be made to feel like we are breaking faith with another government. It is possible that some years ago we may have been too hasty in promising to include Egypt among those countries to whom we would give some help in preparing necessary defense forces, but that is water long over the dam.9
With respect to this particular item, we will at least do nothing further until after Foster has had his talk with Naguib.10 While it is possible that some hopeful break will develop out of that meeting, I must say that I am extremely doubtful.
As of this moment I still think that we have no recourse except to continue the steady buildup of Western morale and of Western economic and military strength. This is the great "must" that confronts us all, but whenever you have an idea--even a piece of one--that might suggest a possibility of us diminishing the burdens that we are compelled to lay upon our collective peoples, please let me know about it. I should certainly like to ponder it.
I hope my comments do not offend--I assure you again I welcome yours.
Won't you please convey to Anthony my very best wishes and the earnest hope that he will soon be returned to full health?11
With warm regard to your good self,12 As ever
