During the course of the day, a number of matters have come to my attention affecting our international situation. I present them to you below, for your informal comment at a convenient time.
(a). You will recall that when we once invited Magsaysay to the United States, he let us know that he could not come unless the visit could be made the occasion of some kind of financial present. To this we could not agree, if for no other reason than the impossible precedent it would establish.1
But there is another outstanding question between the Philippines and ourselves, involving certain of the property to which we have retained title in that country.2 It is possible that the Defense Department has at last come to see that not all of these would be necessary to our interests in the region, and it might be that a return of title to the Philippines would offer to Ma[g]saysay a real reason for coming and might bring both him and his country closer to us. I realize that such places as Olongapo and Clark Field cannot be given up, but I have no doubt that we have other holdings that we are retaining more because of their need in a hypothetical case than because of any established requirement.3
(b). With respect to the military disadvantages we are suffering in Korea because of the Armistice and of our failure to have the Armistice Commission removed from Korea, I wonder whether the time has not come when we should not publicly announce our intention of keeping our forces there equipped with the newest types of weapons, because of the impossibility of supplying spare parts and maintenance for the older types.4
(c). A good many weeks ago we made a firm offer to Egypt to help in the construction of the Aswan Dam.5 I see no reason to change the opinion we then held that the intervention of the Soviets in this proposition would be more or less disastrous. If this is true, I would assume we are attempting to make progress with the Egyptians in the arrangement that we proposed.
What has happened?6
(d). In connection with our secret preparations for the meeting that has been suggested for June 25th and 26th, I should like to make certain that no long formal speeches will be expected of anyone, especially of me.7
(e). After reading a New York Times editorial on the ILO proposition, I am not so sure as I was that a convention would violate our concepts of the proper purposes of an international instrument.8 The editorial implied the convention was nothing but a condemnation of the theory of forced labor, with a commitment on the part of each participating nation to use its own constitutional processes to see that forced labor was not in practice within the confines of that country.
I realize that when our conference on this matter broke up the other morning, that State, Justice and Labor Departments had all agreed to study the matter further. My feeling is that while we must be particularly careful to avoid including improper subjects in international instruments, we must likewise be careful not to discourage the abolition of forced labor and so thereby incur a very bad propaganda defeat.
There is no rush about replying to any of these matters, but I do hope that at your convenience you will take the occasion to discuss them with me further.
