Presidential Papers, Doc#1860 Secret To Bernard Law Montgomery, 2 May 1956. In The Papers of Dwight David Eisenhower

Document #1860; May 2, 1956
To Bernard Law Montgomery
Series: EM, AWF, DDE Diaries Series ; Category: Secret

The Papers of Dwight David Eisenhower, Volume XVII - The Presidency: The Middle Way
Part X: Cracks in the Alliance; May 1956 to September 1956
Chapter 20: Confronting "great risks"

 

Dear Monty: I have read your CPX address with the greatest interest. I was particularly intrigued by the way you approached the subject--looking back rather than forward to a conflict.1

I agree with much you have to say about the need for planning, for approaching our problems of today realistically.2 However, you have one thesis in your paper to which I take exception. It is that the Russians undertook this war knowing that they were going to lose, and that they did this in order to promote Communism. I think this is an unrealistic assumption. These Communists are not early Christian martyrs. The men in the Kremlin are avid for power and are ruthlessly ambitious. I cannot see them starting a war merely for the opportunity that such a conflict might offer their successors to spread their doctrine.3

Another point I raise about your study is that you made no attempt to visualize the true nature of the holocaust that would result from the exchange of "eight thousand nuclear weapons." Presumably the warheads on a good number of these would be hydrogen bombs, and I believe you have far underestimated the degree of destruction that would result.4 I think also that you give more credit than I do to the estimated accuracy with which guided missiles of an intercontinental variety will be operating in another ten years. I believe the main part of the blow in any such hypothetical war would be delivered by the manned airplane, supplemented by guided missiles, rather than the reverse. For our side, this would be almost mandatory because of the great difficulty in getting the exact locations of interior targets in the Soviet Union.

Now with respect to the degree of damage, entirely aside from the material destruction you visualize, I believe there would be literally millions of dead after any such nuclear attack. In such circumstances what does a nation do; what can it do? I realize that the side suffering the lesser damage--in this case the allies--could achieve some restored capacity for action earlier than would the other, and so I do not quarrel with your description of later events.

All of this of course is just by way of giving you some observations that occurred to me immediately after going through your document. I do applaud you for your imagination in tackling the problem and for bringing into focus some of the great needs of our times; that is, intelligence, scientific development, plans and, so far as we can achieve it, central control of some of our forces.

As for next May--please write to me about the turn of the year. It's impossible at this moment to say, on a scheduled basis, where we shall be or what we shall be doing at any given time. But, of course, we'll work something out; and we'll be truly glad to see you.5

With warm regard, As ever

1 Deputy Supreme Allied Commander, Europe, Montgomery had written the President and had enclosed a copy of his address to the sixth annual NATO command post exercises, CPX SIX (Apr. 27, 1956, AWF/N). Montgomery had written the lengthy address as if he were a NATO general in 1969, discussing a three-year war that had occurred in 1966. He expected the West to win the war through the use of sophisticated systems of nuclear power. Nuclear reactors might be fueled, Montgomery suggested, by transport missiles filled with nuclear fuel and fired at Europe from uranium mines in Africa. He also grappled with the problem of transporting adequate food to the Allied armies in Europe: "Pills instead of normal food I am told are not a scientific possibility except for very short periods; the human body needs the bulk." Despite this difficulty, he believed that the problem would "partially solve itself" as the nuclear-powered armies of the future diminished in size ("CPX SIX, Final Address by D/SACEUR," Apr. 27, 1956, AWF/N, Montgomery Corr.).

2 Montgomery had called for more realistic planning to make statesmen and scientists aware of what the military would need to reconstruct the world after a global war. The need, he observed, was immediate and would "require all the wisdom and energies of our politicians, economists and military leaders." In particular, Montgomery believed that NATO needed better intelligence, a centrally-controlled air and missile force, powerful, self-sufficient fighting divisions armed with nuclear weapons and powered with "special fuels of high energy." Another key to Montgomery's strategy was sea power--the ability to track submarines at long range combined with allied fleets of surface and underwater missile-firing ships. He had argued that after widespread destruction of land forces, Western naval superiority would be decisive (ibid.).

3 Montgomery had written that the Soviet Union planned to start nuclear war in order to create chaos and misery so that it could conquer the West by subversion. The Soviets, he said, expected to have enough resources to pull through after the war was over (ibid.). For more on Eisenhower's views on Soviet intentions see NSC meeting minutes, May 10, 1956, AWF/NSC.

4 Montgomery would reply: "As regards the frightful results of some 8000 nuclear weapons, I did indeed paint a very unpleasant picture. But Al [Gruenther] asked me to play it down because he thought it would upset the Germans, and other continental nations!!" (May 7, 1956, AWF/N). Eisenhower would forward a copy of his correspondence with Montgomery to General Gruenther (May 8, 1956, Gruenther Papers).

5 Montgomery had asked if he could spend a weekend with the Eisenhowers at Gettysburg during a visit planned for May 1957 (Montgomery to Eisenhower, Apr. 27, 1956, AWF/N).

Bibliographic reference to this document:
Eisenhower, Dwight D. Secret To Bernard Law Montgomery, 2 May 1956. In The Papers of Dwight David Eisenhower, ed. L. Galambos and D. van Ee, doc. 1860. World Wide Web facsimile by The Dwight D. Eisenhower Memorial Commission of the print edition; Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996, http://www.eisenhowermemorial.org/presidential-papers/first-term/documents/1860.cfm

 


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