<--PREV Doc #1931  |  Memorial Commission Home Page  |  First Term Table of Contents  |  Presidential Papers Home Page  |  Doc#  |  NEXT--> Doc #1933 Document #1932; July 27, 1956 To Robert Anthony Eden Series: EM, AWF, International Series: Eden ; Category: Cable. Top secret The Papers of Dwight David Eisenhower, Volume XVII - The Presidency: The Middle Way Part X: Cracks in the Alliance; May 1956 to September 1956 Chapter 20: Confronting "great risks"   Your cable just received.1 To meet immediate situation we are sending Robert Murphy to London to arrive there Sunday or very early Monday.2 In view of Foster's long trip, I doubt that he will be able to join in these talks, particularly since he could scarcely reach there Monday in any event.3 I shall not take time in this cable to outline for you the trend of our own thinking. While we agree with much that you have to say, we rather think there are one or two additional thoughts that you and we might profitably consider.4 Murphy will be prepared to talk these over with Selwyn Lloyd. We are of the earnest opinion that the maximum number of maritime nations affected by the Nasser action should be consulted quickly in the hope of obtaining an agreed basis of understanding.5 1 Eden's July 27 cable is in AWF/I: Eden. Eisenhower dictated this message after a meeting with Acting Secretary of State Hoover; Andrew Goodpaster telephoned it to the State Department for transmittal at 5:30 p.m. on this same day (Goodpaster, Memorandum of Conference, July 30, 1956, AWF/D; and State, Foreign Relations, 1955-1957, vol. XVI, Suez Crisis July 26-December 31, 1956 [1990], pp. 9-12). 2 Reacting to a U.S. decision (July 19) to withdraw its offer to help finance the Aswan Dam, Egyptian President Nasser had announced the nationalization of the Suez Canal on July 26. In his speech, which he described as an answer to American and British conspiracies against Egypt, Nasser said that an autonomous government agency under the Egyptian Ministry of Commerce would operate the canal. All company assets in Egypt and abroad would be frozen. All employees would continue to discharge their duties under penalty of imprisonment, Nasser said, and shareholders would be compensated. Yearly net income from the canal would finance the Aswan Dam construction, although discussions with the Soviet Union regarding that country's offer of financial assistance would continue (for background see nos. 1759, 1859, and 1946; State, Foreign Relations, 1955-1957, vol. XV, Arab-Israeli Dispute January 1-July 26, 1956, pp. 754-56, 848-53, 861-62, 906-7; NSC meeting minutes, June 29, 1956, AWF/NSC; Memorandum of Conversation, July 13, 1956, Dulles Papers, White House Memoranda Series; U.S. Department of State Bulletin 35, no. 892 [July 30, 1956], 188; Eisenhower, Waging Peace, pp. 30-33; Evelyn Shuckburgh, Descent to Suez: Diaries 1951-56 [London, 1986]; Steven Z. Freiberger, Dawn Over Suez: The Rise of American Power in the Middle East, 1953-1957 [Chicago, 1992]; Keith Kyle, Suez [New York, 1991]; and Diane B. Kunz, The Economic Diplomacy of the Suez Crisis [Chapel Hill, N.C., 1991], pp. 36-76; see also State, Foreign Relations, 1955-1957, vol. XVI, Suez Crisis July 26-December 31, 1956, pp. 1-3). Citing the immediate threat to the oil supplies of Western Europe and the long-term consequences of Nasser's action, Eden had cabled Eisenhower that he and his colleagues were convinced that economic pressures alone would not resolve the crisis. Great Britain "must be ready, in the last resort, to use force to bring Nasser to his senses." He had, he said, instructed his chiefs of staff to prepare an appropriate military plan. The first step was to meet with the United States and France "to exchange views, align our policies and concert together how we can best bring the maximum pressure to bear on the Egyptian Government." Eden asked that Eisenhower send to London someone "at a high level" who could begin discussions no later than July 30. Murphy was Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Eden, Full Circle, pp. 467-80; Selwyn Lloyd, Suez 1956: A Personal Account [New York, 1978], pp. 82-87; Harold Macmillan, Riding the Storm, 1956-1959 [London, 1971], pp. 103-5; and Murphy, Diplomat Among Warriors, pp. 375-81; see also Goodpaster, Notes on Conversation, July 28, 1956; and Goodpaster, Supplementary Note, July 30, 1956, AWF/D). 3 Secretary Dulles had arrived in Lima, Peru, on this same day, after attending the meeting of the American presidents in Panama. 4 Eisenhower had met with CIA Director Allen Dulles and Acting Secretary of State Hoover earlier this same day regarding the canal takeover and the Administration's response. After Hoover had expressed concern that the British would want to "move very drastically," Eisenhower, referring to Egypt and colonialism, said that no nation was likely to permit its people to be held in what amounted to slavery. The United States and many other countries, however, could suffer as a result of Nasser's actions. All three men agreed that NATO should discuss the issue (Goodpaster, Memorandum of Conference, July 27, 1956, AWF/D; see also U.S. Department of State Bulletin 35, no. 893 [August 6, 1956], 221-22). 5 For developments see no. 1935. Bibliographic reference to this document: Eisenhower, Dwight D. Cable. Top secret To Robert Anthony Eden, 27 July 1956. In The Papers of Dwight David Eisenhower, ed. L. Galambos and D. van Ee, doc. 1932. World Wide Web facsimile by The Dwight D. Eisenhower Memorial Commission of the print edition; Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996, http://www.eisenhowermemorial.org/presidential-papers/first-term/documents/1932.cfm <--PREV Doc #1931  |  Memorial Commission Home Page  |  First Term Table of Contents  |  Presidential Papers Home Page  |  Doc#  |  NEXT--> Doc #1933

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