Presidential Papers, Doc#1968 Personal and confidential To Lewis Lichtenstein Strauss, 30 August 1956. In The Papers of Dwight David Eisenhower
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Doc #1969

Document #1968; August 30, 1956
To Lewis Lichtenstein Strauss
Series: EM, AWF, Administration Series: AEC ; Category: Personal and confidential
The Papers of Dwight David Eisenhower, Volume XVII - The Presidency: The Middle Way
Part X: Cracks in the Alliance; May 1956 to September 1956
Chapter 21: "Grave difficulties in the Suez crisis"

 

Dear Lewis: I have spoken to you several times about my hope that the need for atomic tests would gradually lift and possibly soon disappear.1 Yesterday I learned indirectly that Dr. Rabi--for whom I have the greatest respect--entertains such a belief.2

I should like to talk to you about this when you have an opportunity.3 As ever

1 In light of public concern over the dangers of nuclear fallout, the Joint Chiefs had reconsidered the necessity for thermonuclear testing (Twining to Wilson, Apr. 23, 1956, WHO/OSS: [DOD], JCS). In their report to Secretary of Defense Wilson, the JCS had stated that the objectives of the spring 1956 REDWING tests--a series of more than one dozen tests that included the first dropping of a hydrogen bomb from an airplane--were to control radioactive fallout, and second, to improve the quality and effectiveness of American air defense; the tests were not intended "specifically for the purpose of producing bigger `bangs.'" The JCS concluded that nuclear testing was "essential to the security of the United States and the free world." Any moratorium on testing would be dangerous to Western security unless preceded by "universal acceptance of a comprehensive disarmament system which would provide effective safeguards to insure compliance by all nations." For background on the efforts to ban nuclear testing see nos. 726, 873, and 1317; see also Divine, Blowing on the Wind, pp. 18-22, 36-47 and 63-83.

2 On Columbia University physicist Isidor I. Rabi see Galambos, Columbia University, nos. 269 and 325. The concern over nuclear fallout from weapons testing had continued to mount throughout the spring of 1956. In April Democratic presidential candidate Adlai Stevenson had called for a unilateral end to H-bomb testing. The test ban issue continued to be hotly debated throughout the campaign. See Hewlett and Holl, Atoms for Peace and War, pp. 326-50, 361-74.

3 Eisenhower would meet with Strauss on September 4 and September 11. Dissatisfied with the lack of agreement among his principal advisors, Eisenhower would direct Strauss, Stassen, Dulles and Wilson "to work on this problem and not come back until they had a common position to present" (see Goodpaster memorandum, September 14, 1956, AWF/A). On October 23 Eisenhower would issue a comprehensive statement reviewing American policy towards the development and testing of nuclear weapons (see New York Times, Oct. 24, 1956). For developments see no. 2041.

Bibliographic reference to this document:
Eisenhower, Dwight D. Personal and confidential To Lewis Lichtenstein Strauss, 30 August 1956. In The Papers of Dwight David Eisenhower, ed. L. Galambos and D. van Ee, doc. 1968. World Wide Web facsimile by The Dwight D. Eisenhower Memorial Commission of the print edition; Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996, http://www.eisenhowermemorial.org/presidential-papers/first-term/documents/1968.cfm

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