Presidential Papers, Doc#2057 To John Foster Dulles, 1 November 1956. In The Papers of Dwight David Eisenhower

Document #2057; November 1, 1956
To John Foster Dulles
Series: EM, AWF, International Series: Eden

The Papers of Dwight David Eisenhower, Volume XVII - The Presidency: The Middle Way
Part XI: The free world's "sad mess"; October 1956 to January 1957
Chapter 22: On Suez "we do not see eye to eye"

 

The first objective of the United Nations should be to achieve a cease-fire because this will:

(a) Keep the war from spreading.2

(b) Give time to find out what each side is trying to gain.

(c) Develop a final resolution that will represent the considered judgment of the United Nations respecting past blame and future action.3

The United States must lead because:

(a) While we want to do all the things in 1 above, we want to prevent immediate issuance by the United Nations of a harshly worded resolution that would put us in an acutely embarrassing position, either with France and Britain or with all the rest of the world.

(b) At all costs the Soviets must be prevented from seizing a mantle of world leadership through a false but convincing exhibition of concern for smaller nations. Since Africa and Asia almost unanimously hate one of the three nations, Britain, France and Israel, the Soviets need only to propose severe and immediate punishment of these three to have the whole of two continents on their side; unless a good many of the United Nations nations are already committed to something more moderate that we might immediately formulate. We should act speedily so as to have our forces in good order by 5:00 p.m. today.

(c) We provide the West's only hope that some vestige of real political and economic union can be preserved with the Moslem world, indeed, possibly also with India.

Unilateral actions now taken by the United States must not single out and condemn any one nation--but should serve to emphasize to the world our hope for a quick cease-fire to be followed by sane and deliberate action on the part of the United Nations, resulting, hopefully, in a solution to which all parties would adhere by each conceding something.4

We should be expected, I think, to suspend governmental shipments, now, to countries in battle areas and be prepared to agree, in concert with others, to later additional action.5

1 This document was attached to a note to Secretary Dulles: "Just some simple thoughts that I have jotted down since our meeting this morning" (Nov. 1, 1956, AWF/D-H; see also State, Foreign Relations, 1955-1957, vol. XVI, Suez Crisis July 26-December 31, 1956, pp. 924-25). Another copy of the same note to Dulles (AWF/I: Eden) indicates that neither document was sent. The President had met with Dulles at 12:50 p.m.

2 On October 31 Anglo-French air forces had bombed Egyptian airfields. In retaliation, on the following day the Egyptians sank a ship filled with concrete in the Suez Canal, thus halting canal traffic. Israeli forces continued to advance toward El Arish in north central Sinai (State, Foreign Relations, 1955-1957, vol. XVI, Suez Crisis July 26-December 31, 1956, p. 900).

3 On November 2 the United Nations General Assembly would adopt an American-sponsored, cease-fire resolution substantially along the lines proposed by Eisenhower in this document. In a statement to the House of Commons on November 3, Eden would maintain that despite the General Assembly call for a cease-fire, "the police action must be carried through urgently to stop the hostilities" (State, Foreign Relations, 1955-1957, vol. XVI, Suez Crisis July 26-December 31, 1956, pp. 932-33, 946; see also Eden, Full Circle, p. 605; and the following document.

4 For additional comments by Eisenhower see NSC meeting minutes, Nov. 1, 1956, AWF/NSC; State, Foreign Relations, 1955-1957, vol. XVI, Suez Crisis July 26-December 31, 1956, pp. 902-18).

5 Eisenhower would slow shipments of petroleum to Western Europe, allowing only the minimum to maintain NATO reserves. When Under Secretary Hoover commented that in the event of a cutoff of oil from the Middle East, "the British may be estimating that we would have no choice but to take extraordinary means to get oil to them," Eisenhower had replied that "he did not see much value in an unworthy and unreliable ally and that the necessity to support them might not be as great as they believed" (Goodpaster, Memorandum of Conversation, Oct. 30, 1956, AWF/D; Peter L. Hahn, The United States, Great Britain and Egypt, 1945-1956: Strategy and Diplomacy in the Early Cold War [Chapel Hill, N.C., 1991], pp. 231-34).

Bibliographic reference to this document:
Eisenhower, Dwight D. To John Foster Dulles, 1 November 1956. In The Papers of Dwight David Eisenhower, ed. L. Galambos and D. van Ee, doc. 2057. World Wide Web facsimile by The Dwight D. Eisenhower Memorial Commission of the print edition; Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996, http://www.eisenhowermemorial.org/presidential-papers/first-term/documents/2057.cfm

 


Dwight D. Eisenhower Memorial Commission
1629 K Street, NW Suite 801
Washington DC 20006
Phone: 202.296.0004    Fax: 202.296.6464