Dear Anthony: I am sending you by mail a copy of a fifteen-minute talk I made to the American nation last evening.1 Its principal point with respect to Britain and France is that these two nations have long been our friends and, although in this particular instance we believe that they have made a serious error, we certainly shall do our best to sustain those friendships. I do not feel it necessary to provide to you any additional evidence of my own sincere desire to bring your nation and ours ever closer together.
If I may, in the circumstances, comment further on the unfolding situation, I should like to make some observations on possible eventualities involving the Soviets and submit a suggestion for your consideration concerning the Mid-East operations.
With respect to the first point, I have seen a press notice that Bulganin has dispatched to me a letter on the Mid-East difficulty.2 It will probably be very tough. I think the first action we may expect from them is the introduction of a stringent Resolution before the General Assembly this afternoon.
Possibly they will seek some kind of a Resolution that will commit the United Nations to call upon its members for forces with which to intervene in this affair.3 The reason I suspect something of this sort is because I could not imagine anything more embarrassing for our country. It is possible that even, unilaterally, the Russians may assert the right and attempt to send equipment and "volunteers" to Egypt. Of course this would not be possible if you are quickly successful in establishing an effective blockade.4
With respect to my suggestion, I am, of course, ignorant of your minimum objectives and what you expect to do after you attain them. But I am struck by the emphasis you placed in your announcement, as well as in your message to me, on the word "temporary" in your occupation.
As of this moment, I have very sketchy information of actual military developments in Egypt and it appears that you and the French have not yet placed any land forces in the region.5 If, however, the very second you attain your minumum objectives with such forces, I think you could probably ease tension greatly by doing the following: One--instantly call for a cease fire in the area; two, clearly state the reasons why you entered the Canal Zone; three, announce your intention to resume negotiations concerning the operation of the Canal, on the basis of the 6 principles agreed by the United Nations; four, state your intention to evacuate as quickly as the Israelites return to their own national territory, and Egypt had announced her readiness to negotiate in good faith on the basis of the six principles.6 In this way I think the almost universal resentment now apparently and the possibility of long drawn out, dreary guerilla operations would diminish.
This, of course, is gratuitous advice, but it springs from my very great desire to see the United Nations preserved, to keep in proper perspective before all of us the fact that the Soviet Communists are still the greatest menace of the free nations and to start restoring that feeling of confidence and trust between your nation and ours that I believe to be vital to the interests of a just world peace.
Just now I was notified that Nehru has dispatched to me a long communication.7 What he will propose of course is anybody's guess, but it does illustrate how far-reaching may be the reverberations from an act that is intended to be fairly local. I have already had direct and indirect communications from a score of other nations.8
