Dear
Swede: Except for an informal appearance on a "Round-up" telecast from 11 to 12 o'clock on Election Eve, I have finished my campaigning.1 It became too difficult for me to keep in touch with the various items of information that pour constantly into Washington from Europe and the Mid East and at the same time carry on the hectic activities of actual campaigning.
It is not difficult at all to operate efficiently in carrying on Presidential functions from any other point in the United States, if there is opportunity to set up the kind of communications required. But when I am gone from here for a period of eight to twelve hours, or up to two to three days, with no communications available other than commercial telephone, it becomes much more difficult, especially so with a world situation such as now exists.
But there is another reason that I decided to do no more in this campaign. Up until a few months ago, I had set my face determinedly against any campaigning except for three or four television speeches to be given in a Washington studio. Some weeks back, however, a lot of people in the Administration came to believe that the distortions and half truths peddled by Stevenson and Kefauver had to be answered--and that no speaker of ours, other than myself, could gain a sufficient audience to answer them effectively.2
So I took to the speaking trail, first to call the hand of the opponents on some of the wild things they were saying, and secondly, to awaken the American people to the importance of the contest and to the realization that each of them should record his own decision.3
This I think has been done. So in my last evening's talk, in Philadelphia, I confined myself to laying out the approach I have employed since 1952 to the whole problem of foreign relations and how I would approach it in the future if the American people want me to continue.4
Actually, unless I win by a comfortable majority (one that could not be significantly increased or decreased in the next few days by any amount of speaking on either side), I would not want to be elected at all. This is for a few simple reasons, even though I believe that the Stevenson-Kefauver combination is, in some ways, about the sorriest and weakest we have ever had run for the two top offices in the land.5
My first reason is that I still have a job of re-forming and re-vamping the Republican Party. Since by the Constitution this is my final term, my influence in these next four years with my own party is going to be determined by their feeling as to how popular I am with the multitudes. If they feel that my support will be a real asset in the next election they, individually and as a party, will be disposed to go in the direction that I advocate. If, on the contrary, they think that politically I am a rapidly "waning" star, then they would be disposed to take the bit in their teeth regardless of my opinions.
My second reason is that in any event, whether or not we win control of one or both Houses of the Congress, the division is certain to be very close. In almost every project some Democratic help will be absolutely necessary to get it accomplished. Again this strength can be marshalled, on both sides of the aisle, only if it is generally believed that I am in a position to go to the people over the heads of the Congressmen--and either help them or cause them trouble in their districts.6
For these two reasons I think that my only opportunity for doing anything really worthwhile is to win by a comfortable majority. This belief, incidentally, was an additional reason for my deciding to do a bit of travelling in the campaign. It also offered me a chance to prove to the American people that I am a rather healthy individual.
I had planned two more trips--one for last Wednesday when I was going to stop at the airfields in Dallas, Oklahoma City and Memphis, and the other for the last day of the campaign when I expected to stop in Hartford, Connecticut, and Boston, Massachusetts. These I cancelled, mostly because of preoccupation with official business.7
The Mid East thing is a terrible mess. Ever since July twenty-sixth, when Nasser took over the Canal, I have argued for a negotiated settlement.8 It does not seem to me that there is present in the case anything that justifies the action that Britain, France and Israel apparently concerted among themselves and have initiated.
The 1888 Treaty says nothing at all as to how the Canal is to be operated, although it did recognize the existence of the "Concession" dating, I believe, from 1868. I think, therefore, that no one could question the legal right of Egypt to nationalize the Canal Company. And what really became the apparent or legal bone of contention was, "Shall the world's users of the Canal, which is guaranteed as an international waterway in perpetuity, be privileged to use the Canal only on the sufferance of a single nation?"9 Even this, in my opinion, is not the real heart of the matter.
The real point is that Britain, France and Israel had come to believe--probably correctly--that Nasser was their worst enemy in the Mid East and that until he was removed or deflated, they would have no peace. I do not quarrel with the idea that there is justification for such fears, but I have insisted long and earnestly that you cannot resort to force in international relationships because of your fear of what might happen in the future. In short, I think the British and French seized upon a very poor vehicle to use in bringing Nasser to terms.
Of course, nothing in the region would be so difficult to solve except for the underlying cause of the unrest and dissension that exists there--that is, the Arab-Israel quarrel. This quarrel seems to have no limit in either intensity or in scope. Everybody in the Moslem and Jewish worlds is affected by it. It is so intense that the second any action is taken against one Arab state, by an outsider, all the other Arab and Moslem states seem to regard it as a Jewish plot and react violently. All this complicates the situation enormously.
As we began to uncover evidence that something was building up in Israel, we demanded pledges from Ben-Gurion that he would keep the peace.10 We realized that he might think he could take advantage of this country because of the approaching election and because of the importance that so many politicians in the past have attached to our Jewish vote. I gave strict orders to the State Department that they should inform Israel that we would handle our affairs exactly as though we didn't have a Jew in America. The welfare and best interests of our own country were to be the sole criteria on which we operated.11
I think that France and Britain have made a terrible mistake. Because they had such a poor case, they have isolated themselves from the good opinion of the world and it will take them many years to recover. France was perfectly cold-blooded about the matter. She has a war on her hands in Algeria, and she was anxious to get someone else fighting the Arabs on her Eastern flank so she was ready to do anything to get England and Israel in that affair. But I think the other two countries have hurt themselves immeasurably and this is something of a sad blow because, quite naturally, Britain not only has been, but must be, our best friend in the world.
Only a star-gazer could tell how the whole thing is going to come out.12 But I can tell you one thing. The existence of this problem does not make sleeping any easier--not merely because of the things I recite above, but because of the opportunities that we have handed to the Russians.13 I don't know what the final action of the United Nations on this matter will be. We are struggling to get a simple cease-fire and, with it, compulsion on both sides to start negotiations regarding the Canal, withdrawal of troops, and even proper reparations. But the possibility that both sides will accept some compromise solution does not look very bright, and every day the hostilities continue the Soviets have an additional chance to embarrass the Western world beyond measure.
All these thoughts I communicated to Eden time and again. It was undoubtedly because of his knowledge of our bitter opposition to using force in the matter that when he finally decided to undertake the plan, he just went completely silent.14 Actually, the British had partially dispersed some of their concentrations in the Mid East and, while we knew the trouble was not over, we did think that, so far as Britain and France were concerned, there was some easing of the situation.
Just one more thought before I close this long letter. There is some reason to believe that the plan, when actually put into effect, was not well coordinated. It looks as if the Israeli mobilized pretty rapidly and apparently got ready to attack before the others were immediately ready to follow up, using the Israeli attack as an excuse to "protect" the Canal. In any event, British and French troops, so far as I know, have not yet landed in Egypt. Apparently there has been bombing of airfields, nothing else.
If you have any bright ideas for settling the dispute, I, of course, would be delighted to have them. From what I am told, Walter Lippmann and the Alsops have lots of ideas, but they are far from good--about what you would expect from your youngest grandchild.15
Give my love to Ibby and the family. As ever
