Presidential Papers, Doc#2067 Cable. Secret To Nikolai Aleksandrovich Bulganin, 4 November 1956. In The Papers of Dwight David Eisenhower
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Doc #2068

Document #2067; November 4, 1956
To Nikolai Aleksandrovich Bulganin
Series: EM, AWF, International Series: Bulganin ; Category: Cable. Secret
The Papers of Dwight David Eisenhower, Volume XVII - The Presidency: The Middle Way
Part XI: The free world's "sad mess"; October 1956 to January 1957
Chapter 22: On Suez "we do not see eye to eye"

 

I have noted with profound distress the reports which have reached me today from Hungary.1

The Declaration of the Soviet Government of October 30, 1956, which restated the policy of non-intervention in internal affairs of other states, was generally understood as promising the early withdrawal of Soviet forces from Hungary. Indeed, in that statement, the Soviet Union said that "it considered the further presence of Soviet Army units in Hungary can serve as a cause for an even greater deterioration of the situation." This pronouncement was regarded by the United States Government and myself as an act of high statesmanship. It was followed by the express request of the Hungarian Government for the withdrawal of Soviet forces.2

Consequently, we have been inexpressibly shocked by the apparent reversal of this policy. It is especially shocking that this renewed application of force against the Hungarian Government and people took place while negotiations were going on between your representatives and those of the Hungarian Government for the withdrawal of Soviet forces.3

As you know, the Security Council of the United Nations has been engaged in an emergency examination of this problem. As late as yesterday afternoon the Council was led to believe by your representative that the negotiations then in progress in Budapest were leading to agreement which would result in the withdrawal of Soviet forces from Hungary as requested by the government of that country. It was on that basis that the Security Council recessed its consideration of this matter.4

I urge in the name of humanity and in the cause of peace that the Soviet Union take action to withdraw Soviet forces from Hungary immediately and to permit the Hungarian people to enjoy and exercise the human rights and fundamental freedoms affirmed for all peoples in the United Nations Charter.

The General Assembly of the United Nations is meeting in emergency session this afternoon in New York to consider this tragic situation.5 It is my hope that your representative will be in a position to announce at the Session today that the Soviet Union is preparing to withdraw its forces from that country and to allow the Hungarian people to enjoy the right to a government of their own choice.6

1 For background see nos. 2044 and 2055. On this day Soviet troops had attacked cities, towns, and military installations in an effort to crush the Hungarian uprising. The Soviet action followed the announcement by Premier Imre Nagy that Hungary would immediately repudiate the Warsaw Pact, declare its neutrality, and take Hungary's case before the General Assembly at the United Nations (Foreign Relations, 1955-1957, vol. XXV, Eastern Europe, pp. 375-86; Vali, Rift and Revolt in Hungary, pp. 295-305, 364-77).

2 The Soviet invasion marked an apparent reversal of policy. Following the Nagy government's October 30 promise to establish a multiparty system and hold free elections, the Soviet government stated that "socialist nations can build their relations only on the principle of full equality, respect of territorial integrity, state independence and sovereignty, and noninterference in one another's domestic affairs." Recognizing that mistakes had been made in its relations with other socialist states, the Soviet Union announced that instructions had been given "to its military command to withdraw the Soviet Army units from Budapest as soon as this is recognized as necessary by the Hungarian government" (U.S. Department of State Bulletin 35, no. 907 [November 12, 1956], 745-46; State, Foreign Relations, 1955-1957, vol. XXV, Eastern Europe, pp. 342-43). In a speech on October 31 Eisenhower had celebrated the Soviet pronouncement and stated that the Administration had "sought clearly to remove any false fears that we would look upon new governments in these Eastern European countries as potential military allies" (Public Papers of the Presidents: Eisenhower, 1956, pp. 1060-62, Telephone conversation, Dulles and Eisenhower, and Draft Cable, Dulles to Bohlen, Oct. 29, 1956, Dulles Papers, Telephone Conversations, Hughes, Ordeal of Power, pp. 218-22, and Bohlen, Witness to History, pp. 415-19).

3 On November 1, 1956, Nagy had sent a telegram to the Soviets requesting immediate negotiations regarding the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Hungary. Nagy had also informed the U.N. Secretary General of his decisions and asked for major power protection of Hungarian neutrality (State, Foreign Relations, 1955-1957, vol. XXV, Eastern Europe, pp. 368-69; see also Paul E. Zinner, ed., National Communism and Popular Revolt in Eastern Europe [New York, 1956], p. 462).

4 Negotiations between the Soviet Union and Hungary on the removal of Soviet troops had begun in Budapest on November 3; Security Council debate on Hungary had begun on the same day. Debate on the U.S. resolution, which had called upon the Soviet Union to withdraw its forces and cease interference in Hungarian internal affairs, had begun in midafternoon but had been suspended when the council was informed that Soviet-Hungarian military negotiations were scheduled to resume (State, Foreign Relations, 1955-1957, vol. XXV, Eastern Europe, pp. 370-71; New York Times, Nov. 3, 1956; see also Goodpaster, Memorandum of Conference, Nov. 3, 1956, AWF/D).

5 Following the Soviet veto of the United States resolution on November 4, the General Assembly would adopt a resolution calling upon the Soviet Union to withdraw its forces from Hungary and requesting the Secretary General to investigate the situation (State, Foreign Relations, 1955-1957, vol. XXV, Eastern Europe, pp. 392-93; New York Times, Nov. 4, 1956). Recognizing that Hungary was entirely surrounded by Communist or neutral nations, Eisenhower would write: "I still wonder what would have been my recommendation to the Congress and the American people had Hungary been accessible by sea or through the territory of allies who might have agreed to react positively to the tragic fate of the Hungarian people" (Eisenhower, Waging Peace, pp. 88-89).

6 By November 7 fighting in Budapest had ended (although mopping up operations would continue for several more days). The Soviets installed a new regime under the leadership of Janos Kadar and would subsequently execute Nagy. For developments see no. 2082. For Bulganin's response to Eisenhower see no. 2084.

Bibliographic reference to this document:
Eisenhower, Dwight D. Cable. Secret To Nikolai Aleksandrovich Bulganin, 4 November 1956. In The Papers of Dwight David Eisenhower, ed. L. Galambos and D. van Ee, doc. 2067. World Wide Web facsimile by The Dwight D. Eisenhower Memorial Commission of the print edition; Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996, http://www.eisenhowermemorial.org/presidential-papers/first-term/documents/2067.cfm

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