Presidential Papers, Doc#2068 Top secret To Robert Anthony Eden, 5 November 1956. In The Papers of Dwight David Eisenhower

Document #2068; November 5, 1956
To Robert Anthony Eden
Series: EM, AWF, International Series: Eden ; Category: Top secret

The Papers of Dwight David Eisenhower, Volume XVII - The Presidency: The Middle Way
Part XI: The free world's "sad mess"; October 1956 to January 1957
Chapter 22: On Suez "we do not see eye to eye"

 

Dear Anthony: I have both your cables.1 First off, let me assure you that you cannot possibly feel more saddened than I about the temporary but admittedly deep rift that has occurred in our thinking as respect of the Mid East situation. It cannot fail to have some harmful effect upon our joint efforts as we pursue the great objective of a peaceful world.

This morning I have news that your troops have begun landing.2 In a sense this creates a new problem, but I believe that the peace plans under development in the United Nations are sufficiently flexible so that this incident will not completely defeat them.

The big thing now is to prevent the situation from becoming more tense and difficult. It is possible that Nasser, knowing the United Nations is working on a peaceful solution might take the "cease fire" very seriously and temporarily accept the landings without opposition. Thus he would avoid actual military contact until he could see what might develop. It would appear that the basic objective of your own military action would be largely accomplished by the landings themselves, providing no serious fighting or disorder ensues. If no serious fighting came out, I think your position in the area and before world opinion would be tremendously eased.

One way in which serious disorders might be avoided would be keeping troops out of contact with any heavy concentrations of the civil population. In this way you would not get a great police function on your hands which you might not be able to drop easily.

If we could have for the next two or three days a period of relative calm while your troops did nothing but land, we might much more swiftly develop a solution that would be acceptable to both sides and to the world.

I have no doubt that you have thought over all these things most carefully and prayerfully, but I think at the same time that the French, in what has seemed to me to be a rather irrational approach to this whole matter, could be far less restrained and therefore make greater difficulties for all of us.3

As you say, Harold's financial problem is going to be a serious one, and this itself I think would dictate a policy of the least possible provocation.4

In the meantime, no matter what our differences in the approach to this problem, please remember that my personal regard and friendship for you, Harold, Winston and so many others is unaffected.5 On top of this, I assure you I shall do all in my power to restore to their full strength our accustomed practices of cooperation just as quickly as it can be done.

New subject. Since dictating the above, I have been informed that the Soviets have made the move that from the first I feared would be their reaction. I am told that in Moscow they have released a statement to the effect that they are demanding that the United States join them in an immediate military move into the Mid East to stop the fighting. I understand that aside from making the proposal directly to us, they are placing it before the United Nations in the alleged hope that that body will give its sanction to this preposterous proposition.6

I have not yet seen the text of the message so I cannot comment on it in detail.

With warm regard, As ever

1 At the top of this document Ann Whitman wrote "Pres. said events had gone too swiftly. Letter was outdated not to be sent." Eden's cable of November 4 had warned the President that the United Kingdom would not comply with General Assembly Resolution 999. This "Afro-Asian" resolution, which had passed with American support, called upon the Secretary-General to implement an immediate cease-fire in the Sinai and report back within twelve hours. The Prime Minister could accept, however, the Canadian-sponsored resolution (998) passed by the General Assembly at the same meeting. This had set up an emergency United Nations force to be deployed in the area of the canal within forty-eight hours.

Eden's second telegram was a lengthy explanation of the British position. It stressed the temporary nature of any breach between the Americans and British and attempted to justify the Anglo-French military action. Eden claimed that "if we had allowed things to drift, everything would have gone from bad to worse. Nasser would have become a kind of Moslem Mussolini" (Eden to Eisenhower, Nov. 4, 1956; Eden to Eisenhower, Nov. 5, 1956, AWF/I: Eden; for the text of Eden's letters and background on the U.N. resolutions see also State, Foreign Relations, 1955-1957, vol. XVI, Suez Crisis July 26-December 31, 1956, pp. 960-64, 980, 984-86).

2 On November 5 British and French airborne troops had begun landing at Port Said.

3 At the Bermuda Conference in 1953 Eisenhower had remarked that French sensitivity bordered on "an inferiority complex" (no. 597). He had, however, a well-developed theory about the strategic motives behind French policy; see no. 2063.

4 Harold Macmillan was Chancellor of the Exchequer. Eden had written (November 5 cable) that the British would be "happy to hand over" their military position. "No one feels more strongly about this than Harold who has to provide the money" (Eden to Eisenhower, Nov. 5, 1956; AWF/I: Eden). On Macmillan's role see Kunz, The Economic Diplomacy of the Suez Crisis, pp. 131-33; and Macmillan, Riding the Storm, pp. 163-65. For developments see no. 2106.

5 Former Prime Minister Winston S. Churchill.

6 Bulganin had proposed that if "Govts of USSR and USA firmly announce their will to guarantee peace and will condemn aggression," war could be avoided. The joint use of American and Soviet air and naval power under U.N. auspices would provide a "reliable guarantee of termination of aggression" against Egypt (State, Foreign Relations, 1955-1957, vol. XVI, Suez Crisis July 26-December 31, 1956, pp. 993-96. For developments see nos. 2070, 2071, and 2073).

Bibliographic reference to this document:
Eisenhower, Dwight D. Top secret To Robert Anthony Eden, 5 November 1956. In The Papers of Dwight David Eisenhower, ed. L. Galambos and D. van Ee, doc. 2068. World Wide Web facsimile by The Dwight D. Eisenhower Memorial Commission of the print edition; Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996, http://www.eisenhowermemorial.org/presidential-papers/first-term/documents/2068.cfm

 


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