Presidential Papers, Doc#207 To Leslie Cornelius Arends, 25 May 1953. In The Papers of Dwight David Eisenhower

Document #207; May 25, 1953
To Leslie Cornelius Arends
Series: EM, WHCF, Official File 3

The Papers of Dwight David Eisenhower, Volume XIV - The Presidency: The Middle Way
Part II: Settling into "the long pull"; May 1953 to August 1953
Chapter 3: "A time for continued vigilance"

 

Dear Les:1 Thank you for your thoughful letter.2 I have lived through most of the struggle for unification of the Services and know, from firsthand experience, of the misgivings some members of Congress have had in respect to Service "merger" and its alleged concomitants, a single military chief over all the armed forces and an over-all general staff system with command powers. I therefore welcome the opportunity to make clear just what is and is not intended by the new defense re-organization plan now awaiting Congressional approval.3

I suggest this initial thought to your colleagues, for it is basic to this entire problem:

The defense structure is wholly dominated--as indeed it should be--by civilian authority. This is a legal fact. It is also an administrative fact.

You will recall that under the law, as the Congress amended it four years ago, the Defense Secretary was given "direction, authority and control" over the entire organization, and specifically, "direction and authority" over the Joint Chiefs of Staff as a group and over their Chairman individually. In addition, the Secretary of Defense, prohibited by law from being a military man, is designated by statute as the President's "principal assistant" on all matters relating to this department of the Government.4

Moreover, the President's relationship to all elements of the department, military and civilian, is one of direct command, so that his control over the military, as that of the Secretary and superceding his, is untrammeled within the terms of the Constitution and the law.

I need hardly to add that the power of the Congress over the defense establishment, exercised through appropriations, statutes, investigations and Congressonal hearings, exists under our system at all times, and this certainly is not an idle, irresponsible thing easily subjected to the domination of the military or any other element of the Executive Branch.

Frankly, with such a panoply of civilian authority reigning over any would-be military chieftain in the Pentagon, there appears to me to be no reasonable ground for concern that any military person would be able to function in an arbitrary, violent manner, endangering the foundations of unification as firmly established by Act of Congress, as conscientiously administered by the President and Secretary of Defense, operating at all times under the scrutiny of the Congress.

Even, however, were such an outcome a possibility despite these clear-cut civilian controls over all Defense activities, I think any fair appraisal of the reorganization plan will quickly reveal that the plan cannot conceivably accomplish such an end. The plan does not give the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff command powers over the other three members of that body; it does not give him a vote in their proceedings; it does not equip him with a large general staff with command functions; it does not dilute the civilian authority over him; it does not arrogate to him the military planning duties vested by law in all four members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff; it does not make him alone the principal military adviser to the Secretary of Defense, the National Security Council and the President, this duty remaining in all four members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff as prescribed by law. Neither does the Plan greatly enlarge the Joint Staff--the essential pre-requisite to the establishment of the over-all general staff5 (which is also specifically forbidden by the law)--nor does the Plan remove the statutory injunction that the three military departments be separately administered.

In short, just as not one of the prerequisites for the single military commander with a super staff exists today, so none can exist or be established under the proposed reorganization. I wish to add that it is certainly not my intention that such occur. Neither, I assure you, is it contemplated by anyone in authority in the Executive Branch.

The Reorganization Plan, in my judgment, will improve the efficiency of the Defense Department and will also make it possible for the Joint Chiefs of Staff to devote more of their time to their fundamental and grave responsibilities. For these reasons, I am very hopeful that Congress will soon approve it.6

I well recall your strong endorsement of Admiral Radford for the post of Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and, of course, am gratified, as I am sure he will be, to know of your approval of his nomination.7 Sincerely

1 Arends, an Illinois Republican who had served in Congress since 1934, was House party whip and a leading member of the Armed Services Committee. This letter was drafted by White House aides Bryce Harlow and Paul Carroll.

2 Arends's letter of May 20 is in the same file as this document. Facing strong opposition within his congressional district, Arends had requested a letter from Eisenhower in support of military unification. He told Eisenhower that he was "deeply disturbed" with respect to Eisenhower's policy and asked for reassurance (see Persons to Adams, May 22, 1953, ibid.).

3 On April 30 Eisenhower had sent Congress Reorganization Plan No. 6 of 1953, a list of reforms he wished to make in the Defense Department in order to clarify lines of authority, institute "effectiveness with economy," and "improve our machinery for strategic planning for national security." The President announced that in the future the Secretary of Defense rather than the JCS would designate executive agents in unified military commands. He proposed abolishing several statutory staff agencies (the Munitions and Research and Development boards, the Defense Supply Agency, and the Director of Installations) and replacing them with six additional assistant secretaries of defense. He recommended changes in the JCS workload and staff organization "so that the Chiefs, acting as a body, will be better able to perform their roles as strategic planners and military advisors" (see Public Papers of the Presidents: Eisenhower, 1953, pp. 225-38; and Alice C. Cole, Alfred Goldberg, Samuel A. Tucker, and Rudolph A. Winnacker, eds., The Department of Defense: Documents on Establishment and Organization, 1944-1978 [Washington, D.C., 1979], pp. 149-59). The main thrust of the reforms was to centralize authority and to make it more difficult for the services to impede change.

4 For the National Security Act of 1947 and the August 1949 amendments thereto see ibid., esp. pp. 108-9. See also Galambos, Chief of Staff, and Galambos, Columbia University, no. 345.

5 Published criticism of the reorganization plan included a former Air Force secretary's charge that it would lead to a German-style General Staff (U.S. News & World Report, May 8, 15, 1953). For a discussion of this recurring fear see Demetrios Caraley, The Politics of Military Unification: A Study of Conflict and the Policy Process (New York, 1966); see also no. 215.

6 In early June, speaking for the Administration, Arends endorsed the President's proposals, and later that month the House defeated a motion to reject the plan, 235 to 108. With neither House nor Senate disapproving it, Eisenhower's reforms would go into effect at the end of June (U.S. News & World Report, June 12, 1953; Cole et al., Department of Defense, p. 158).

7 See no. 194.

Bibliographic reference to this document:
Eisenhower, Dwight D. To Leslie Cornelius Arends, 25 May 1953. In The Papers of Dwight David Eisenhower, ed. L. Galambos and D. van Ee, doc. 207. World Wide Web facsimile by The Dwight D. Eisenhower Memorial Commission of the print edition; Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996, http://www.eisenhowermemorial.org/presidential-papers/first-term/documents/207.cfm

 


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