Presidential Papers, Doc#2123 Cable. Secret To Guy Mollet, 29 November 1956. In The Papers of Dwight David Eisenhower

Document #2123; November 29, 1956
To Guy Mollet
Series: EM, AWF, International Series: Mollet ; Category: Cable. Secret

The Papers of Dwight David Eisenhower, Volume XVII - The Presidency: The Middle Way
Part XI: The free world's "sad mess"; October 1956 to January 1957
Chapter 22: On Suez "we do not see eye to eye"

 

My dear Mr. Prime Minister: I want you to know that General Gruenther delivered to me the letter which you entrusted to him.1 He also gave me a full account of his conversation with you, and I thank you for the frankness and friendliness with which you have expressed your views.2

As you are doubtless aware, I have, since the very beginning of the present crisis, said that although we felt that the decision to take up arms against Egypt was an error, we were determined to heal the breach and repair as rapidly as possible the temporary damage caused to the Western alliance by recent events. Obviously compliance with the Resolutions of the United Nations is of the essence.3

I wish to take this opportunity to assure you that this is still the firm intention of my Government. The importance of the Atlantic community to us all is undiminished. Indeed, events in Eastern Europe reveal more vividly than could any words of mine, how essential it is, now and for the future, that our association and common purpose be maintained and strengthened. In this respect, the views expressed by General Gruenther, in his last major speech before leaving Europe, correspond entirely with mine.4 We cannot, however, expect all this to happen by itself. The task calls for all our mutual effort and resolve, on both sides of the Atlantic. I have no doubt whatever that we will succeed and that we will continue to follow steadfastly, all together, the road we have traveled since the end of the war, in quest of peace, justice and security in the world.

I feel that we must now look toward the future in order to start moving forward again. I am aware of the heavy strain imposed on Europe's economy by the dislocation of the traditional sources of supply of oil, and I realize that the inevitable shortage will cause hardship through lack of adequate heating and unemployment at the start of a winter.

Our companies are doing their best to mitigate the effects of this shortage. We have been planning urgently in the hope it will be possible soon to take more coordinated actions to alleviate the situation. In the meantime, we will cooperate with the OEEC to the fullest extent possible in its efforts to cope with the problem so that as much oil as possible can be shipped to the countries of Europe by alternative routes. When it is possible to reactivate our Middle East Emergency Committee, it too will work closely with the OEEC on the problem.5

And, of course, none of us can afford to forget that any permanent solution to the fuel problems of Western Europe requires access to the Mid East oil supplies. In turn this means that we must not create such resentments among Mid East governments that they will be unwilling, even at great cost to themselves, to supply Western European markets.6

It is my hope that the situation in the Middle East can rapidly be stabilized, thanks to the efforts of the United Nations in Egypt which you know we are backing in every way. We have been guided throughout this period only by the urgent desire to limit and stop the fighting, and to establish the basis for permanent and just solutions of the problems of the Suez Canal and of Israeli-Arab relations. I feel we must be in a position to exploit to the full the opportunities, which the heroism of the peoples of Poland and Hungary have given us all, and to expose the brutality and vulnerability of the Communist system.7 Soviet imperialism is moving on several fronts and we must mobilize in the United Nations the conscience of the whole world, and not merely of the West, against this imperialism.

I, too, look forward to seeing you again, and will welcome the chance of discussing with you and our British friends many matters of common concern. Much as I would have liked to be able to do this sooner, it was my personal judgment, on reflection, that the best interests of us all required that our meeting be postponed until the circumstances were more propitious. I believe that our talks when they take place will be more productive than they could have been earlier.8

In conclusion, let me say again that I greatly appreciate the spirit in which you have written to me. I am confident that the way will be found to press forward all together with renewed vigor and resolve for the triumph of those values to which our two countries have for so long been dedicated.

With kindest regards, Sincerely yours

1 A State Department draft of this message is in AWF/I: Mollet. Secretary Hoover commented that "The draft seeks to reassure the Prime Minister of our determination to repair as rapidly as possible the damage caused the Western Alliance by recent events" (Hoover to Eisenhower, Nov. 27, 1956, AWF/I:Mollet). Mollet had earlier notified the President that Gruenther would arrive bearing a letter from him (Mollet to Eisenhower, Nov. 19, 1956, AWF/I: Mollet). Gruenther had written the President that he was "embarrassed to serve as a messenger on this level and especially so twice in the same day." (See the preceding document.) "For this extra curricular service by me I trust that you will require all Governmental hot shots to contribute an extra amount to the Red Cross when it conducts its campaign fund next March" (Gruenther to Goodpaster, Nov. 19, 1956, AWF/I: Mollet).

2 Most of the cable containing Mollet's remarks to Gruenther remains classified (Gruenther to Goodpaster, Nov. 19, 1956, AWF/I: Mollet).

3 For background on the U.N. resolutions demanding the withdrawal of British and French forces from Egypt see nos. 2057, 2068, and 2073. On November 7 the General Assembly passed Resolutions 1001 and 1002 creating the United Nations peacekeeping force. On November 24 the Assembly adopted resolution 1120 (XI), which remonstrated against Britain and France for failing to withdraw fully from Egypt and reiterated previous resolutions calling for their immediate withdrawal (State, Foreign Relations, 1955-1957, vol. XVI, Suez Crisis July 26-December 31, 1956, pp. 1053-54, 1192-93).

4 In his last speech as NATO commander Gruenther had warned that the Soviets would be "destroyed" if they attacked the West. But he also noted that the possibility of Western military intervention behind the Iron Curtain was "slight" (New York Times, Nov. 14, 1956). On Gruenther's retirement from NATO see no. 2064.

5 The Middle East Emergency Committee (MEEC) was a cartel of American oil companies given temporary immunity from antitrust laws. The immunity made it legal for them to pool their transportation resources to get the maximum possible amount of oil to Europe to alleviate shortages caused by the closing of the Suez Canal. The OEEC was the Organization for European Economic Cooperation. As late as November 23 Eisenhower had been delaying emergency measures to supply Europe with oil until Britain and France withdrew their troops from Egypt. On that date, when Secretary Hoover informed him that the oil situation in Europe was getting critical, he deferred action on the emergency plans, instructing Hoover to tell the British Ambassador that "the first thing we must all give our attention to is helping out on oil." "But in order to do that," Eisenhower continued, "we must stay 4-square with the UN, so Britain must take some preliminary actions" (Goodpaster memorandum, Nov. 23, 1956, AWF/D).

Three days later, however, the President had decided that the emergency committee should be activated in order to alleviate any shortages before the advent of winter (Goodpaster, Memorandum of Conference, Nov. 26, 1956, AWF/D; see also State, Foreign Relations, 1955-1957, vol. XVI, Suez Crisis July 26-December 31, 1956, pp. 1194-95. By November 28 the United States Maritime Administration, at the request of the Office of Defense Management, had taken eighteen tankers from the reserve fleet for use in ferrying additional oil to Europe (Staff Notes No. 46, Nov. 28, 1956, AWF/D). For background on Eisenhower's actions during the oil shortage see nos. 2057 and 2119. See also Kaufman, Trade and Aid, pp. 87-88.

6 This paragraph was inserted into the State Department draft, presumably at the White House.

7 On the Hungarian uprising and events in Poland see nos. 2044 and 2055.

8 Mollet would visit Washington on February 26-28, 1957. Eisenhower had postponed an earlier summit with Eden and Mollet (see no. 2076).

Bibliographic reference to this document:
Eisenhower, Dwight D. Cable. Secret To Guy Mollet, 29 November 1956. In The Papers of Dwight David Eisenhower, ed. L. Galambos and D. van Ee, doc. 2123. World Wide Web facsimile by The Dwight D. Eisenhower Memorial Commission of the print edition; Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996, http://www.eisenhowermemorial.org/presidential-papers/first-term/documents/2123.cfm

 


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