Dear
Lew: You over-estimate, I think, the severity of our present policy as it affects our British and French friends. The fact is we have not only done a lot of work in preparing to help them solve their problems, but are merely awaiting a sensible move on their part to make the cooperative program public.1
A bit of past history would help you to understand some important factors in the situation.
Beginning last July I was in frequent communication with Anthony Eden, constantly urging him to avoid force in the Suez, at least until there could be brought about a situation where intervention of that kind would be approved, or at least understood, by the world in general and particularly by the populations of the free world.2
After innumerable conferences and communications, we thought we had made him understand that the oil supply of Western Europe, a vital necessity, depended in the long run upon the readiness of the Arab world to sell to Western Europe and upon transportation facilities developed to the point where requirements could be met.
We have been convinced, beyond any doubt, that the one thing that would unite all the Arab populations--even against the official desires of such individuals as King Saud, Nuri3 and the King of Libya--would be the employment of force in the Suez and under a situation where the Arab populations would support Nasser fanatically.
Paranthetically I should remark that we have very strong Arab friends in high places who are just as sick of Nasser as are Britain, France and ourselves.
During Foster's last visit to London the matter was discussed of putting the Suez issue before the United Nations, and Foster came home with the understanding that there would be further conversations on the matter to decide exactly how this should be done.4 Nevertheless before he could reach Washington, the British had inscribed the matter on the United Nations agenda.
Very shortly thereafter there began a complete blackout of news. We had no idea what France and Britain were doing, and this at a time when our intelligence showed that Israel was completing a very extensive mobilization. This latter fact brought about my protests to Ben Gurion, which protests, being public, were naturally known by our British and French friends.5
Nevertheless, invasion occurred and we were forced to do one of two things. Either we had to adhere to our obligations under the United Nations Charter, or we had to destroy that organization. As a matter of principle, only one decision was possible. But there was a concomitant consideration which had entered into all of our presentations to the British from the very beginning of the difficulty. This factor was that in the long run Western Europe's economy could be sustained only by Mid East oil. Consequently, some member of the West had to preserve the kind of relations with the Arabs that would not encourage that emotional people, even though cutting off their own noses to spite their own faces, to destroy the oil industry. In such a procedure they would have been, of course, enthusiastically supported by the Kremlin which, although unable to use the oil itself at this time, would pay a very fine price to see it denied to the West.
That this feeling was not in any sense theoretical or hypothetical is evidenced by the fact that immediately after the invasion and when the the larger pipelines were destroyed, we were able to keep operating the Tapline--with a capacity of 330,000 barrels a day--only on the promise that, for the moment, none of that oil should go to the British and the French.6 Since other allies in Western Europe use much more oil than this, we could make that promise and so do something toward evaluating the situation. In the meantime, we began working here at home and conferring with the controlling officials in the Mid East (and talking behind the scenes with our British friends) to see under what conditions we could openly help them in Europe's fuel and financial difficulties.
Because our first decision to support the United Nations was taken on a matter of principle, we could not abandon that stand. Moreover, we felt that if the British would make some general statement to the effect that "so long as the United Nations is entering the Canal Zone to take control until the Canal can be again operating and a settlement properly negotiated, we are ready to comply with the United Nations on the subject," then we could convince the principal Arab officials that we had stood by principle and were now moving rapidly and with their cooperation to preserve their markets and to prevent suffering in all Western Europe.
In presenting this to the Arabs we felt we had the long-range factor in our favor; namely, that we should avoid forcing the world's oil supply and distribution into new channels, which would tend to become permanent and so damage, for years to come, the oil sales of the Mid East.
We have studied the financial needs of our Western European allies growing out of this crisis and have been exploring methods designed to allow us to move effectively and openly without making us appear hypocritical in Arab eyes, or giving Soviet propaganda the opportunity of saying we were false to our own convictions and beliefs.
At this moment political leaders in Britain understand all this, and are moving as rapidly as they may--in view of the extreme attitude of some of the backbench Conservatives--to bring about cooperative opportunity for us that I have described above.
In the meantime I have publicly announced several times--the most recent one just two days ago--that though we have differed with our friends over a particular international incident, they are still our friends and we are going to help them.
You are quite right in all you say about certain possible results of this whole miserable affair being contrary to our national interest. Of course they are. If not, I should never have worked as hard as I did to prevent them from arising in the first place. But I am quite certain that unless we can restore very soon the Mid East as the principal source of oil supply, there is nothing we can do that will save Western Europe. The fuel requirements of the entire Western world cannot possibly be permanently supplied from North America and Venezuela. Even if we should succeed in keeping Iran on our side but with the remaining Mid East hostile, and should build the great tankers necessary to bring the oil around the Cape of Good Hope, there would elapse a long period during which Western Europe would undergo great privation. When, finally, requirements could be met as to amount, costs would have gone up tremendously.
I have no quarrel whatsoever with the generalities of your telegram. But in a situation such as I describe, the answer can scarcely be found by any one nation, even one so powerful as ourselves, unless there is some readiness on each side of the quarrel to conciliate. We must remain true to our friends, but we must likewise remain on a friendly status with the Mid East oil suppliers. The only other alternative would be a gigantic occupation of the Mid East by military force; in view of France's experience in North Africa and the prior British experience in the Suez Canal Zone, no one in the world could contemplate such a venture with complacency. And I repeat--all of these considerations were called to the attention of the British long before they undertook the invasion that was supposed to stabilize the situation.
Having said all this, I am hopeful that the next two or three days will bring a further public reconciliation of a break which, as between this government and some of our best friends in the British government, has never even occurred.7
So to sum up the matter: if it were merely a question of financing and re-routing of oil supplies that would meet Western European requirements, you would find we are working just as hard and openly as we did to preserve Western Europe under the Marshall Plan. But it is a question also of preserving the cheapest and most plentiful oil supplies that can be obtained in the world.
Incidentally and parenthetically, I should remark that there has been no incident in recent years that has more underlined the necessity of uniting Western Europe into one Federated nation than has this one.
I have written to you very frankly and fully--not only because I respect your judgment highly but because if you have any ideas to communicate to me after reading this letter, I would certainly be pleased to receive them.8
By the very nature of the whole affair, everything in this letter must be regarded as top secret and for your eyes only.
Again my thanks for your wire, and with warm regard, As ever9
