Memorandum of Conversations with Prime Minister Nehru of India, December 17-18, 1956.1
I.
The conversation was general insofar as it affected common problems of India and the United States. It was often specific insofar as it applied to expositions by the Prime Minister of India's problems involving Pakistan, economic development, and so on. It was conducted on a very friendly basis; there were no arguments or even informal debates of any kind.
II. THE MID-EAST
The Prime Minister gave his impressions of the Mid East difficulties, their causes and consequences, and made certain suggestions of what might be done to improve matters.
According to him, the causes of the recent acute disturbances in the Mid East are those as generally accepted by the public and discussed in the newspapers. This applied both to the Canal stoppage and to the Israeli attack.
He seemingly disagrees with most others as to the degree of guilt that rests upon Nasser. At least he said, "Nasser is the best of the group of Egyptian Army officers and others for whom he is the spokesman. Under present conditions, if Nasser were removed there would come into power someone who would be more inimical to the West and more unreasonable in his actions than is Nasser." He agreed that Nasser was immature when he came to power, but he thinks he has come quite a way in the last two or three years.
He understands the provocations under which the French and British reacted, but he thinks their invasion was stupid and cost them much, particularly in the world opinion and prestige. He thinks that a Pan-Arab Confederation, responding to the whims of a Nasser, would constitute an increased danger for all users of the Canal and for all who are interested in keeping Russia out of the Mid East.
He believes that King Saud probably offers the best counter for Nasser if the latter really pushes any attempt to become head of an Arab Confederation.
The non-operation of the Canal is costing India and other Asiatic users more than they can afford and they are anxious to see the Canal again in operation.
I pointed out to him that this would be easily accomplished had Nasser contented himself with blocking the Canal at one point. I quoted as an example of Nasser's instability and impulsiveness his action in sinking some 39 or more vessels in the Canal. The Prime Minister agreed that this was a foolish act, but he repeated that in his opinion Nasser was more of a brake on what the Egyptian junta really wanted to do than he was a spur to drive them on to even more ill-considered activity.
I gave the Prime Minister the complete story of the Aswan Dam negotiations that were finally used as an excuse by Nasser for seizing the Canal Company in late July. He seemed astonished to learn that our original offer had in effect been rejected by Egypt and that the Egyptians had no right to be surprised when our own announcement of loss of interest in the project was made public.2
I told the Prime Minister that I thought he should exert his fullest influence on the Egyptians to make certain that moderation and common sense were substituted for impulsiveness and antagonism so that all of us might cooperate in getting the Canal again in operation. I told him that we had used our influence to temper the British and French and Israeli attitude and would continue to do so.
He agreed that we must make an earnest attempt to settle the underlying grievances in the region.
He spoke disparagingly of Nuri of Iraq, but did not mention the Baghdad Pact as such.3
He brought me a letter from the President of Syria. He did not give me the transmittal note, but made the following statement, "This letter was handed to our Ambassador by the Foreign Minister of Syria, who said that it was sent by the President's direction (or approval)" to Nehru for delivery to me. A copy of the letter is attached to this memorandum.4
While Nehru said he had not read it carefully, he did agree when I spoke to him about it that it is mere repetition of the Arab complaint as voiced by Nasser in some of his speeches. Incidentally, Nehru attempted to absolve the Arab speakers by saying their public figures seemed to get excited when they addressed a crowd and always talked in extravagant terms under such circumstances.
III. HUNGARY
He expressed a considerable sense of horror and shock about the Hungarian situation and said that India had sent at least token help by shipping certain cargoes of food and other supplies to the Hungarian refugees. I told him that his stock had gone up in the United States when he finally made a very positive statement of protest in regard to this tragedy and advised him to repeat that statement either in his television address to the people of the United States or in his press conference, which is to take place on the 19th.5 In addition, I told him that I thought it would be helpful if India would make an offer to take at least a token number of the refugees.
Nehru made some observations concerning the results of the Hungarian affair. He said that it spelled the death knell of International Communism. Hungary, he pointed out, was a State that had been under complete dominion of the International Communists for a period of ten years. Yet in all that time they had made so little progress in converting the people to real Communism that we had the spectacle of an uprising in which people were perfectly ready to be killed rather than submit again to their Communist overlords. He felt this was a terrible shock to the men in the Kremlin and that they would likely have to make a reappraisal of their plans. He seemed to feel that the Communist appeal from now on would be clothed in words and language more likely to appeal to the dissatisfied and needy of the world, while threats and the effort to dominate by force would become less and less.
He felt that by this same action, the standing of Communist parties in every country where they are located would be badly damaged. He said that in many cases prominent men had resigned from the party and others were attempting to apologize with very little success.
He believes that this is a propitious moment, because of this great blunder of the Soviets, for the free world to move in by strengthening the faith and hope of those who would naturally like to live in independence and freedom, but who have been at least partially misled by the Communists' doctrine. He said that there was great significance that Poland was continuing to win, step by step, greater independence from their Moscow overlords.
He summed up his opinion by saying, "Nationalism is stronger than Communism."
IV. COMMUNIST CHINA
He talked about Communist China. He felt that logic demanded that any government controlling six hundred million people would sooner or later have to be brought into the Council of nations. He felt that Chiang Kai-shek and his Army on Formosa were showing the ravages of time and that eventually Formosa would be a weakened area which, almost by force of circumstances, would fall into the hands of the Communists. He asked me how I felt about that region.
I told him that the bill of particulars that the American people held against the Red Chinese included the following:
(a) They were branded by the United Nations as an aggressor because of their invasion of North Korea and the fact that they had never done anything to clear themselves of this stain;
(b) They still hold ten American prisoners in China in spite of their repeated promises to release them. This, I pointed out, was a very sensitive point in America;
(c) They had supported and probably provided part of the forces for the invasion in Northern Indo China in defiance of all international law. In addition, they had operated aggressively against both Laos and Burma.*****6 I told him further that America was disgusted with people who broke their pledged word, as the Chinese had with respect to our prisoners, and that we were very tired of the kind of diplomatic deportment and manner that the Chinese had exhibited over the past several years.
With respect to the Chinese prisoners in our country, I gave him the facts and found that he was aware that the Chinese had refused to allow the Indian Ambassador to inspect our jails to see whether any of the Chinese prisoners incarcerated there for crimes wanted to return to China. I told him we were perfectly ready to send any back that wanted to go.
I told him that, if there was to be any break in the log jam at this moment, I thought the first thing necessary was the release of our prisoners and the next would be the withdrawal of Chinese forces from Korea. I thought a third and very useful thing would be renunciation of force by the Red Chinese in accomplishing any further objectives in that region.
V. INDIA--HER ATTITUDES AND RELATIONS WITH OTHERS
(a) Policy on neutrality. Nehru went to considerable trouble to explain the reasons why India pursued a policy of "neutrality." First he said that he used the word neutrality in its traditional sense as meaning a position of aloofness from power combinations, particularly power combinations that were at war or threatening war between themselves. He made clear that he did not use the word to distinguish between concepts of government based on the dignity of man and those based on dictatorships.
He spoke about as follows: India might, logically, fear attack from two countries only--the USSR and China. Concerning such a possibility it is apparent that either one of these countries would have great difficulty in conducting large conventional operations against India, because of the fortunate location of the Himalayan mountain chain.
He next pointed out that both these countries had vast internal problems and if they attacked anyone, it would logically be a nation that posed either a threat to them or the possession of which would provide great advantage. India fulfills neither of these conditions. He said that if a world war eventuated finally, Russia would be too busy in other areas to attack India.
His next point was that he had with China 1800 miles of common border. He said that if he were to attempt the defense of this border by armed force, it would be such an expensive proposition that India would necessarily fail in its purpose of raising the standards of living and so saving India from [Communism] through internal collapse.
Finally he said if a country is to be an ally of any other in a defensive organization, it must do its military part. He said that India was in no position whatsoever to attempt to arm in proportion to its population and geographical size and therefore any definite alignment by India with the free world would serve only to weaken rather than to strengthen the combination.
(b) Attitude toward socialism. Nehru's attitude is that all countries are a "little bit socialistic"--that there is no such thing as pure free enterprise practiced in any country. On the other hand, we do have the extreme of Communism as practiced in the Soviet Union--and we have the practice of some degree of socialism in all countries. This degree or level of state management in operation is often determined by the conditions prevailing. One of the conditions is that capital must be acquired for industrial development and at times only the government can do this.
In India they do not refer to these two phases of economic development as "socialism and free enterprise." They call them the private sector and the public sector. He said that in his case the public sector was necessarily larger than in the United States and he gave me some books which present in some detail what they consider to be the logical division between these two sectors. However, they overlap. But he did stress the point that they are not necessarily mutually antagonistic. On the contrary he felt that they were mutually helpful. He specifically stated that land ownership and small business would remain in the private sector.
(c) Nehru talked to me a considerable time about Pakistan. He reviewed the historical development that led to partition and is unquestionably bitter at the British for what he believes is their part in promoting the anomalous position of two nations in the Indian sub-continent. He is particularly resentful of the fact that the Pakistani did not obtain independence by their own efforts; they obtained it through the success of Indian nationalism. He described in detail the terrible administrative job that was brought about by partition and particularly emphasized the difficulties that arose out of the migrations of people between the two countries--Hindus moving from Pakistan into India, and Moslems from India into Pakistan.
In spite of this great movement, he said that India never accepted the theory of the organization of states along religious lines. As a proof of this he cited the fact that there are 40 million Moslems in India today and Moslems are represented in his Cabinet. He said these great migrations ceased for a while, but now they have been renewed, not by any movement of people from India into Pakistan, but by the anxiety of the Indians in East Pakistan to leave that country. He says that India is having to absorb these people at the rate of 1,000 a day.
All this creates unrest as well as economic dislocation.
Nehru made a great point of the fact that the Moslems in the Indian sub-continent are not the descendants of invaders. They are merely Indians who were converted to the Moslem faith. He said, "We speak the same language, often we are of the same families, and in nearly all cases we are good friends." He pointed out that when any question except political ones arose, the Pakistani and the Indians appeared to be one and the same people--which he says they really are. But when political questions come up, they are bitter opponents.
He said that there are four outstanding problems between the two states, none of which is considered insuperable:
(1) the division of river waters between Pakistan and India;
(2) the settlement of property claims arising out of the migrations back and forth across the border;
(3) Kashmir;
(4) (the fourth has slipped my mind, but I have the impression that it had to do with the continuing migration of the Hindus from East Pakistan into India.)
The only one of these questions that he thought would cause any real difficulty in settling (and he indicated India was ready to take a very tolerant attitude toward the others) was Kashmir. He talked about Kashmir at length.
His first contention is that the people of Kashmir want to belong to India, although unfortunately I failed to ask him why he had always opposed a plebiscite in the region. He reviewed in detail the original tribal invasions of Kashmir (following upon partition)--the employment of Indian troops to stop the invasions, the establishment of armistice lines--and pointed out that economic and political life has now become crystallized around the existence of this armistice line. The armistice line gives Pakistan one-third the territory and one-fourth the population of Kashmir. He believes that if the United Nations would approve of the status quo as a basis for permanent settlement, both sides would approve, although there would be some grumbling.
Finally, he pointed out, with respect to Pakistan, that the Indians have a popular belief that the Pakistani are ready to launch an attack against India. He cited the newspapers of the area and the work of what he calls fanatics in trying to promote this idea. This is one reason why the supply of arms to Pakistan aroused so much apprehension and even resentment in India.
(d) Goa. Nehru next described the Goa situation.7 He maintained that India would not use force to settle this matter, but he did feel that if Portugal would cease creating new irritations and resentments in India, the thing would work out in the long run on a peaceful basis. He particularly referred to what he called the unjust long-term imprisonment of Indians who simply walked into Goa to protest. He insisted that Goa was of no economic value to Portugal and existed merely to satisfy the Portuguese feeling that it helped to make them an "empire." Here again Nehru's intense reactions to the word "colonialism" were quite evident.
(e) Nehru thought we could be of some help both in the Goa and in Pakistan problems. He thought we should urge Portugal to release the Indian prisoners, one of whom is a member of the Indian Parliament. This he said would be only a gesture, but it would at least show some respect for India. He thought we could help in the Pakistan problem by urging Pakistan to cease using its newspapers (which he says are really state-controlled) to incite the fears of the Indians. They are, apparently, intensively jingoistic. He said that if Pakistan's newspaper propaganda would talk peace instead of war the whole situation would be greatly ameliorated.
VI. SECOND FIVE-YEAR PLAN
Mr. Nehru outlined in considerable detail his aims and objectives in India's Second Five-Year Plan. The First Five-Year Plan was devoted almost exclusively to increasing agricultural productivity; the Second leans more toward industrialization. However, the chief objectives of the First Plan have become sufficiently understood by the Indian people, he hopes, that progress along agricultural lines will continue automatically.
He is particularly interested in a sort of rural "self help" plan. This plan organizes villages into groups for every kind of improvement--health, education, agriculture and general welfare. The reason for the organization is the paucity of instructors. To each village is assigned a young man who has normally had only one year of training. To each ten villages a supervisor with somewhat more training is allocated, and to each hundred a man who is much more advanced in all of these matters. To this latter man is assigned also a staff of specialists in the things they are trying to accomplish. He gave me the number of these organizations that had developed; while I have forgotten the number, I do recall that it was astonishing in its size.
Mr. Nehru sees as his only difficulty in achieving the objectives of the Second Five-Year Plan the shortage of capital. The Plan itself has a "private" and "public" sector, and he feels that capital will be short in both these. He did not hint to me that he was looking for help from the United States, but of course his failure to do so did not mean that he would be disappointed to have long-term, low-interest loans. Attached to this memorandum is one of the three books Mr. Nehru gave me on the Five-Year Plan. This particular pamphlet is a summary of the others.8
VII. SOUTHEAST ASIAN STATES AND INDONESIAN AFFAIRS
We talked at considerable length about this particular subject, but nothing especially new was brought out during the conversations. The one point he made was that he believed we were making a mistake in Laos by demanding that the Government exclude any Communists or Communist sympathizers from the Cabinet as the price of securing from us financial assistance that Laos needs. He pointed out that Laos was in a rather desperate situation. That Government had even inquired from India whether it would supply the money Laos previously expected from the United States, provided Laos should feel forced to go ahead with the plan and include a Laotian from the Communist sector in the Government. He remarked, "Of course we have no money to help them so they will go to one place only, the Communists."
I mentioned Diem (of Viet-Nam) to him several times and remarked that we felt he was doing a good job.9 On this subject Mr. Nehru merely said nothing. I have no idea whether he approves or disapproves of Diem.
He seemed to think that there would be no great, aggressive efforts, within the near future, of the Communists to take over more territory. He rather felt they would move in where opportunities were good and not too costly, but that both China and Russia now had many problems of their own at home and would probably be somewhat less aggressive in efforts toward expansion.
In talking about Indonesian affairs, he had little to say except that he seemed to doubt the formation of a really stable government for a long time to come. This is not so much because of the diverse interests of the various sections of Indonesia--as I understood him--but rather because of some of the animosities arising out of differing religions.
VIII. GERMAN REUNIFICATION
Mr. Nehru emphasized the fear that Russia has of a rejuvenated Germany and expressed the view that the matter would be settled only if a European organization was set up that to the Russian mind would be a guarantee of their own safety. For example, he talked about the establishment of a great neutral belt reaching down through Europe into the Mediterranean. This would include all the present satellite states, as well as Germany. All of this, together with the "officially neutral" states--namely, Sweden, Austria and Switzerland--would, he thinks, possibly be the best answer to the whole works.
I expressed to Nehru my grave doubts that a people as strong and virile as the Germans could ever be successfully treated as neutrals, particularly in view of their long history in Europe and the fact that they are the most dynamic people of the region. He agreed that this might present some difficulty, but he did repeat--and I agreed--that the Russians are honestly fearful of a German resurgence to great power.
IX. INDIAN-AMERICAN RELATIONS
The subject of Indian-American relations was not discussed at great length, but Mr. Nehru expressed the hope that our personal meeting and conversations would open up an additional channel of communication which would, he hoped, make the occurrence of misunderstandings and mutual suspicion less common than heretofore.
While talking on this particular subject, I gave him every chance to bring up the name of Krishna Menon.10 For example, I mentioned that our Ambassador in Moscow, Mr. Bohlen, had spoken in the highest terms of his Ambassador in that city, a man whose name I understood was Menon. He merely said it was gratifying to hear such a good report, but still avoided any mention of the other Menon.
I did get the very definite impression that he was sincere in his hope that understanding between our two peoples and governments would improve. Naturally I expressed the same kind of hope, and tried to show him by every courtesy I could think of that we appreciated the effort he had made in coming to visit us. For example, I directed that he be transported back to London in the Presidential plane--and I had delivered to him in New York the day after he left Washington a farewell letter thanking him again for his courtesy.11
I particularly asked him to do his best to see that his people and his government did not become too excited by the speeches and statements of some of our more irresponsible people who pose as statesmen. He was quite clear in his own mind as to the divisions of authority in our form of government and stated that he himself paid little attention to what some of our more ambitious politicians sometimes said. On the other hand, I gathered that whenever anyone criticized his pet policies (of neutralism, standing-between-the-two-great-power-blocs, Five-Year Plans, violent anti-colonialism), he would always react quickly and in rather extravagant terms.
