Presidential Papers, Doc#2141 To John Foster Dulles, 19 December 1956. In The Papers of Dwight David Eisenhower

Document #2141; December 19, 1956
To John Foster Dulles
Series: EM, AWF, Dulles-Herter Series

The Papers of Dwight David Eisenhower, Volume XVII - The Presidency: The Middle Way
Part XI: The free world's "sad mess"; October 1956 to January 1957
Chapter 23: What is needed is "a calming influence"

 

Dear Foster: I read the long report by Ambassador Hare on his conversations with Nasser.1

I think we should give the Ambassador something that he could convey to Nasser, even if nothing more than an expression of our great satisfaction (yours and mine) that Nasser has spoken so frankly and fully of the matter with which he is now concerned.2

My point is that the more we can encourage bilateral confidence and confidences, the better informed we should be as to the problems in the whole region.

As of this moment I have communications from the President of Syria, the King of Saudi Arabia, and now this long report to you from the Ambassador. It seems to me we have here an opportunity.3

New subject. Attached hereto is a letter I have just received from Paul Hoffman. His ideas are based upon his experience as a member of our United Nations Delegation. I think you will find it interesting reading.4

After the presentation he makes in the first two pages, I was rather astonished at the meagerness of the plan suggested in his three points on page three. Possibly he considers point number one a very important one at this moment.5 As ever

1 Raymond Arthur Hare (B.A. Grinnell 1924), former Director General of the United States Foreign Service, was Ambassador to Egypt. He had spoken privately with Nasser for three hours on December 15. Dulles had sent the President a copy of Hare's cabled report (Greene to Goodpaster, Dec. 18, 1956, AWF/D-H). In the discussion, Nasser had adopted a conciliatory position toward the United States, emphasizing that his most pressing need was to raise Egyptian living standards. Preoccupation with foreign crises, he said, detracted from that goal. He was looking for a period of "trust and confidence" in his relations with the United States, a trust the Eisenhower Administration had begun to build by its actions during the Suez crisis. It was now time, said Nasser, for the United States to "consolidate" that position.

Nasser had also explained that his foreign policy was basically one of nonalignment. Discounting the importance of his relations with the Soviet Union, he told Hare that "Egypt has no secret agreement with it and never even asked what it would do if Egypt were attacked for fear Soviets would impose conditions." There was no mutual policy with the Soviets regarding the Near East, he said, because Egypt desired to "maintain its complete independence of action." Nasser denied charges that he was trying to export the Egyptian revolution to other Arab states and pointed out that most Egyptians had been indifferent about the existence of Israel until 1955, when Ben Gurion's policies had incited their hatred. He was inclined to believe that a settlement was now out of the question, but he would cooperate to reduce tension. Nasser warned, however, that any nation that tried to force peace would "end up by losing out" with both the Arabs and the Israelis.

As Hare was leaving, Nasser had told him that someone had recommended reading Washington's Farewell Address. Hare observed that the address made reference to no "entangling alliances." Hare recounted that Nasser then "laughed (not his chronic nervous giggle) and said `Yes, that is the one'" (Hare to Dulles, Dec. 17, 1956, AWF/D-H).

2 Dulles sent the President (on Dec. 19, 1956) a draft cable to Hare, instructing the Ambassador to "inform Nasser that [the] Department takes satisfaction that he has spoken so fully and, we like to believe, so frankly with respect to the matters you raised with him." Dulles did not mention the President's involvement. The telegram seemed to suggest, however, that Nasser would have to abandon nonalignment as the price for an accomodation with the United States. "The bad turn of events can be dated from the active intervention of the Soviet Union in the area," Dulles wrote (Dulles to Hare, Dec. 20, 1956, AWF/D-H). Dulles informed the President that he had attributed these views to the Department, instead of to the President, "as I doubt it is wise at the present juncture to give Nasser the impression that he is in direct negotiation with you" (Dulles to Eisenhower, Dec. 19, 1956, AWF/D-H).

3 For the letter from King Saud see no. 2147. Eisenhower had exchanged letters with the President of Syria (al-Quwatli to Eisenhower, Nov. 8, 1956; Eisenhower to al-Quwatli, Nov. 12, 1956, AWF/I: Syria; see also State, Foreign Relations, 1955-1957, vol. XIII, Near East: Jordan-Yemen, pp. 594-97).

4 Encouraged by information that Eisenhower was planning to discuss U.S. development programs for underdeveloped nations in his inaugural address, U.N. General Assembly delegate Hoffman had written to advocate a worldwide "Eisenhower Plan" similar to the Marshall Plan (Dec. 17, 1956, AWF/A).

5 Hoffman's letter was most concerned with a proposal for an "inventory" of the needs and resources of the developing world. His point two called for a "modest participation" in a multilateral aid program. In point three, which was not extensively discussed in the letter, Hoffman suggested continuing support for U.N. Technical Assistance Programs (ibid.; see also "Statement by Henry Cabot Lodge, Jr., to the President's Citizen Advisers on the Mutual Security Program," Nov. 30, 1956, AWF/A, Hoffman Corr.).

Bibliographic reference to this document:
Eisenhower, Dwight D. To John Foster Dulles, 19 December 1956. In The Papers of Dwight David Eisenhower, ed. L. Galambos and D. van Ee, doc. 2141. World Wide Web facsimile by The Dwight D. Eisenhower Memorial Commission of the print edition; Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996, http://www.eisenhowermemorial.org/presidential-papers/first-term/documents/2141.cfm

 


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