Presidential Papers, Doc#218 Top secret To Winston Spencer Churchill, 28 May 1953. In The Papers of Dwight David Eisenhower

Document #218; May 28, 1953
To Winston Spencer Churchill
Series: EM, AWF, International Series: Churchill ; Category: Top secret

The Papers of Dwight David Eisenhower, Volume XIV - The Presidency: The Middle Way
Part II: Settling into "the long pull"; May 1953 to August 1953
Chapter 3: "A time for continued vigilance"

 

Dear Winston: The Mid-Ocean Club is perfectly satisfactory to me, especially since it appears that each of us can have a few of his principal people around him.1 I will deem it an honor to share the Mid-Ocean Club with you and our French confrere. Incidentally, I hope that there will be no objection to my bringing along with Mrs. Eisenhower her mother and her woman companion. Could you let me know on this point? Of course, the overflow part of the American governmental delegation will be stationed on our air base in Bermuda.

I earnestly hope to keep my entire official delegation down to something on the order of a dozen to fifteen, but I cannot greatly influence the size of the press, radio, and the photographers sections.2 These people, of course, travel under their own steam and secure their own accommodations without governmental approval. A great proportion of the foreign press representatives stationed in Washington will insist upon going and, of course, the American press will want to be heavily represented. I imagine that they soon will be trying to reserve every hotel in Bermuda for their operations, and I am frank to say that I do not know how we can do anything at this end to control this matter. In fact, it is possible that we would not want to control it for the reason that I should think it would be best for all of us that the entire world was saturated with information that we were enjoying a friendly, informal, and profitable get-together.

I sincerely hope that the meeting will not be too long delayed, but we must wait patiently until the French can make up their minds.3

I appreciate your declaration of support in connection with Panmunjom. Makins has kept you informed of our special problems and I know you understand them. We should have a report from Clark sometime Sunday night.4

With respect to the message to our Ambassador in Moscow, it was not at all any formal representation or appeal of any kind. Our Ambassador was merely instructed to make the observation in connection with other business he was conducting with Molotov that we had, of course, made our final offer at Panmunjom.5

1 See no. 213. Replying on May 30 (AWF/I: Churchill), Churchill would express delight that the Mid Ocean Club suited Eisenhower and that Mamie Eisenhower and her mother would accompany him. Eisenhower would write on June 23, however, expressing regret that circumstances would prevent Mrs. Eisenhower and her mother from making the trip (AWF/I: Churchill).

2 Churchill agreed that the size of the press corps could not be limited.

3 On the French political impasse see no. 213. On May 30 Churchill predicted that the delay in forming a French government might be "considerable." He said that the French-Turkish meetings were scheduled for June 23 or 24 and that he believed the twenty-ninth would be a good date to open the Bermuda conference.

4 On May 25 at the Panmunjom truce talks the U.N. Command had made new proposals on the repatriation of prisoners of war. The latest attempt to break the deadlocked negotiations included establishment of a five-nation custodial commission that would ensure the return of all prisoners "who insist on repatriation to the side to which they belonged at the time of capture." Initial Communist response had been negative, and U.S. Ambassador Bohlen had suggested that in a scheduled private meeting with Soviet Foreign Minister Molotov (May 28) he stress the finality of this repatriation plan. That afternoon Bohlen gave Molotov an unofficial memorandum setting forth the points of the May 25 proposal, describing it as "most serious and important" (see State, Foreign Relations, 1952-1954, vol. XV, Korea, pt. 1, pp. 1091, 1095-97, 1108-11).

In a message Eisenhower received earlier this same day (AWF/I: Churchill) Churchill had mentioned learning from the British ambassador in Washington, Sir Roger M. Makins, that the United States might seek Soviet aid "to help agreement at Panmunjom. . . . I think it would be a pity for the United States to make an approach to Moscow at this juncture and that it would only be taken by them as a sign of weakness," the Prime Minister advised Eisenhower. "You are the overwhelmingly powerful figure in the ring and we are supporting you in your effort to make the Communists accept." Churchill said further that he had thought of writing Molotov to assure him of the peaceful aims of the Bermuda conference.

General Mark Wayne Clark would report to the JCS on May 29 outlining positions Rhee could take during the negotiations and again on June 2 noting a softening of Rhee's approach. Rhee had not mentioned the issue of prisoners, indicating to Clark a wish to "avoid plunging into reckless adventure" (State, Foreign Relations, 1952-1954, vol. XV, Korea, pt. 1, pp. 1112-14, 1132). For developments see no. 232.

5 After receiving this letter and declaring himself satisfied on the subject of Bohlen's instructions, Churchill on May 30 said that he would "send Molotov a telegram on my own responsibility on the lines that I mentioned to you" (see above).

Bibliographic reference to this document:
Eisenhower, Dwight D. Top secret To Winston Spencer Churchill, 28 May 1953. In The Papers of Dwight David Eisenhower, ed. L. Galambos and D. van Ee, doc. 218. World Wide Web facsimile by The Dwight D. Eisenhower Memorial Commission of the print edition; Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996, http://www.eisenhowermemorial.org/presidential-papers/first-term/documents/218.cfm

 


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