<--PREV Doc #232  |  Memorial Commission Home Page  |  First Term Table of Contents  |  Presidential Papers Home Page  |  Doc#  |  NEXT--> Doc #234 Document #233; June 8, 1953 To Alexander Wiley Series: EM, AWF, Name Series The Papers of Dwight David Eisenhower, Volume XIV - The Presidency: The Middle Way Part II: Settling into "the long pull"; May 1953 to August 1953 Chapter 4: Striving for Unity   Dear Mr. Chairman: From the Secretary of State,1 I learn that you have made official inquiry as to the possibility that I may have changed my adverse opinion with respect to the proposed Constitutional Amendment contained in SJ Res. 1.2 I have carefully studied a text described to me as the latest revision of that Amendment, but I find nothing in it to alter my conviction that amending our Constitution in this fashion would hamper the orderly conduct of our foreign affairs.3 This could have serious effects in peace, and could approach disaster in time of war or threatened war. Frankly, it seems to me the 176-year record of the handling of American foreign affairs by the President of the United States and the Secretary of State, with the advice and consent of the United States Senate, is one that will favorably stand comparison with any other similar record in the world. While lawyers can probably concoct sets of hypothetical circumstances under which the present arrangement could lead to real difficulty, yet it seems to me that such an eventuality becomes remote when we consider the safeguards of our system. The members of the United States Senate and the Chief Executive occupy those offices as a result of an elective process that presumably selects the individuals most trusted by the public at the particular time. Consequently, any proposed treaty or agreement that to become effective requires not only the deliberate efforts of the Chief Executive and the Secretary of State, but the approval of two-thirds of the United States Senate, is one that can scarcely become effective over the opposition of public opinion. But even beyond this, it is to be remembered that the domestic effect of any Executive agreement or treaty can be corrected by a Congress at any time by appropriate legislation. On the other hand, to tamper with this process, introducing uncertainties and indecisiveness into the conduct of our foreign affairs, could not fail in the long term to damage the position of the United States in its relationships to other nations. Without going further into details, which I have already discussed with you at length, I assure you again of my conviction that this Amendment is unnecessary and that its inclusion in the law of our land would work to the disadvantage of our country.4 Sincerely 1 On this same day the President had met with Dulles in an off-the-record meeting in the Executive Office. 2 For background on the Bricker amendment see nos. 59 and 118. 3 The revisions to Senate Joint Resolution 1 represented a compromise between Senator Bricker and leaders of the American Bar Association. As amended, the text read as follows: "Section 1. A provision of a treaty which conflicts with this Constitution shall not be of any force or effect; Section 2. A treaty shall become effective as internal law in the United States only through legislation which would be valid in the absence of treaty; and Section 3. Congress shall have the power to regulate all executive and other agreements with any foreign power or international organization. All such agreements shall be subject to the limitations imposed on treaties by this article" (Tananbaum, Bricker Amendment Controversy, pp. 90-91). 4 On June 4 Senate Foreign Relations Committee Chairman Wiley, who himself opposed the amendment, had attended a meeting of the legislative leaders at which the question of Republican support for the resolution was discussed. It was generally felt that there was strong endorsement for the current revisions among Senate Republicans (memorandum, Joseph M. Dodge to Sherman Adams, June 4, 1953, AWF/LM). It came as no surprise, then, when on the same day (June 4) the Senate Judiciary Committee approved the resolution and voted to send it to the Senate for consideration (New York Times, June 5, 1953). This letter to Wiley, drafted by Eisenhower, was never sent. A copy, however, would be sent to Attorney General Brownell on July 6. In a telephone conversation with Brownell on June 23 Eisenhower would say, "I am quite concerned about the complete readiness of the Republican Party to tear us apart" (AWF/D). Bibliographic reference to this document: Eisenhower, Dwight D. To Alexander Wiley, 8 June 1953. In The Papers of Dwight David Eisenhower, ed. L. Galambos and D. van Ee, doc. 233. World Wide Web facsimile by The Dwight D. Eisenhower Memorial Commission of the print edition; Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996, http://www.eisenhowermemorial.org/presidential-papers/first-term/documents/233.cfm <--PREV Doc #232  |  Memorial Commission Home Page  |  First Term Table of Contents  |  Presidential Papers Home Page  |  Doc#  |  NEXT--> Doc #234

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