<--PREV Doc #238  |  Memorial Commission Home Page  |  First Term Table of Contents  |  Presidential Papers Home Page  |  Doc#  |  NEXT--> Doc #240 Document #239; June 10, 1953 To Winston Spencer Churchill Series: EM, AWF, International Series: Churchill ; Category: Cable 7841. Top secret The Papers of Dwight David Eisenhower, Volume XIV - The Presidency: The Middle Way Part II: Settling into "the long pull"; May 1953 to August 1953 Chapter 4: Striving for Unity   From my discussions with Foster about the findings of his recent trip, I am particularly concerned about Egypt.1 While I wish to talk to you personally about this matter in Bermuda, there seems to be a real danger that the situation there will not hold that long without further action.2 I was happy to hear that you agreed with Foster's statement of our position on May 12, 1953 at Cairo.3 He reaffirmed that position in his radio report to the American public on June 1. I fully concur in his views. From Foster's personal observation and from all other reports which reach us, I have come to the conclusion that some step should be made soon to reconcile our minimum defense needs with the very strong nationalist sentiments of the Egyptian Government and people. It appears that it is not possible to conclude a settlement on the basis of Case A in its entirety, despite its desirability from a military point of view.4 As we had agreed when it was thought we might negotiate side by side, there may have to be some concessions which will permit a quick start on withdrawal of UK troops and produce an adequate if not ideal arrangement for maintenance of the Base. Dept of State is sending to Amembassy London a formula which illustrates what we have in mind and which your staff can examine if you so desire.5 To assist further with this problem, if you desired and if it proved helpful with the Egyptians, I would be prepared to assign US technicians to participate in the maintenance of the Base. In addition to the question of maintenance there is, of course, the problem of assuring availability of the Base in time of need. Pending more formal arrangements, a private undertaking by Egypt that the Base would be made available in case of general war to the Arab States and to the Allies of Arab States might serve the purpose. You could invoke your treaties with Jordan and Iraq and we might also be able to utilize our special relationship with Saudi Arabia. Also, on the conclusion of agreement on evacuation and the future maintenance of the Base, Naguib might publicly invite the United Kingdom and the United States to help develop the defense of Egypt, including training and equipping of the Egyptian forces. In response to this initiative, we could jointly negotiate the necessary formal defense requirements of the West, as well as assistance to Egypt. The results of these negotiations could be made public. Meanwhile, as I think you know, Foster, at your request, is presently deferring any arms aid to Egypt. Once agreements of the nature described were reached with the Egyptians, we would be prepared to insist uncompromisingly on their being carried out in good faith. This determination could be made unequivocably clear to the Egyptians. I am sorry to bother you with this before we can talk together at Bermuda but the possible danger from the situation to us all is so much on my mind that I intrude these ideas at this time in accordance with the spirit which has animated our full and frank exchanges of views. 1 On the Dulles-Stassen trip to the Middle East and South Asia see no. 153. 2 For background see nos. 138 and 181. 3 Dulles's cable 2417 of that date summarized several hours of discussions he and Mutual Security Director Stassen had held the day before with Egyptian Prime Minister Naguib and Foreign Minister Fawzi. The Secretary of State had declared that "what happens in Egypt is Egypt's business" and disavowed any U.S. colonial ambitions. He also had spoken frankly of U.S.-British ties and of the strategic importance of the Suez Canal and the military base protecting it. Dulles had expressed confidence that after the departure of British troops Egyptians could be trained to operate the Suez base adequately. He stressed the importance of collective security in the region, arguing that close British-Egyptian ties would greatly discourage Soviet attack. The United States had communicated the substance of these talks to British representatives in Cairo and to Churchill on May 13; Churchill afterward had expressed "great appreciation" for Dulles's public and private remarks on the Suez issue (State, Foreign Relations, 1952-1954, vol. IX, The Near and Middle East, pt. 2, pp. 2065-73). 4 The British had established various alternatives for future military control of the Suez Canal. According to alternative, or case, A, they would turn over the canal to the Egyptians and place their base there under Egyptian control, retaining existing depots and installations for rapid wartime mobilization. Case B envisioned leaving British depots in Egyptian hands and placing a "rather smaller number" of supervisory and technical personnel on base. The British estimated that under case B it would take sixty days to mobilize the base in the event of war (ibid., pp. 1931-34). 5 On this same day Dulles would send two telegrams to the American Embassy in London outlining a proposed compromise settlement under which the British Army would agree to train Egyptian personnel to replace the British at the Suez Canal base. The Egyptians would allow the British to inspect the Egyptian maintenance of the British-owned supplies that would remain at the base, and all British instructions concerning the transfer would be routed through the Egyptian base commander. The Egyptians would promise to respect British ownership of the remaining property, and the British would agree to take no steps inconsistent with Egyptian sovereignty (ibid., pp. 2090-93). For developments see nos. 247 and 297. Bibliographic reference to this document: Eisenhower, Dwight D. Cable 7841. Top secret To Winston Spencer Churchill, 10 June 1953. In The Papers of Dwight David Eisenhower, ed. L. Galambos and D. van Ee, doc. 239. World Wide Web facsimile by The Dwight D. Eisenhower Memorial Commission of the print edition; Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996, http://www.eisenhowermemorial.org/presidential-papers/first-term/documents/239.cfm <--PREV Doc #238  |  Memorial Commission Home Page  |  First Term Table of Contents  |  Presidential Papers Home Page  |  Doc#  |  NEXT--> Doc #240

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