Presidential Papers, Doc#245 Secret To Abdul Aziz Ibn Saud, 15 June 1953. In The Papers of Dwight David Eisenhower
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Doc #246

Document #245; June 15, 1953
To Abdul Aziz Ibn Saud
Series: EM, AWF, International Series ; Category: Secret
The Papers of Dwight David Eisenhower, Volume XIV - The Presidency: The Middle Way
Part II: Settling into "the long pull"; May 1953 to August 1953
Chapter 4: Striving for Unity

 

Your Majesty:1 I was very pleased to receive your cordial letter of May nineteenth delivered by Mr. John Foster Dulles upon his return to this country.2 Mr. Dulles has reported to me on his visit to you, and I am glad that he had the opportunity for an exchange of views on the relations between our two countries.3

Your Majesty has justifiably established a reputation for being a loyal friend in times of adversity as well as in days of happiness and well-being. Our countries have stood together in time of war and we are now making common cause against the evil and godless forces of communism which threaten the world. I have looked upon our friendship as one solidly based upon mutual confidence and respect, and almost immediately upon taking office I had the good fortune to receive a visit from your son, His Royal Highness Prince Faisal.4 I took advantage of his courteous call to express publicly my determination that the relations between the United States and Saudi Arabia and the other Arab countries should be improved and that I would strive toward that improvement. Furthermore, I confirmed the assurances made to Your Majesty by President Truman in his letter of October 31, 1950, and you may be certain that the United States Government will continue to act in accordance with these assurances.5

I was therefore greatly concerned to learn from Mr. Dulles that Your Majesty felt the United States Government had not adequately supported Saudi Arabia during the recent difficulties with the British Government over the matter of Buraimi.6 I have in mind your statement to Mr. Dulles that, if Saudi Arabia and the United States are good friends, as they most certainly are, each should tell the other when he believes him to be wrong and each should support the other when he believes him to be right. I concur fully in this view.

Upon assuming office, it became my duty and that of the Secretary of State to review the whole Buraimi matter before formulating our policy. This was done with great care, and our independent research into the matter led us to the conviction that there were three honestly held claims to the Buraimi area: the claim of Your Majesty and those of the Sheikh of Abu Dhabi and the Sultan of Muscat and Oman. Having in mind the fact that border disputes have been traditionally settled by arbitration in cases where the United States has been involved with its neighbors, my Government adopted the view that the Buraimi problem might properly be settled through impartial arbitration which would, of course, include all relevant fact-finding and investigation on the spot. This procedure was supported in complete good faith and in the firm belief that it would be acceptable to Your Majesty as an honorable and equitable method of solution. While making known to the Saudi Arabian Government our views on this matter, we have not failed to impress upon the British Government our strong feelings that a conciliatory and fair-minded approach is of paramount importance.

It is therefore gratifying for me to know that Your Majesty has agreed in principle with the British Government for settlement of the Buraimi issue through impartial arbitration and that you and Sir Winston Churchill are close to agreement on the terms of reference for the arbitral body.7

I feel confident that, upon careful review of the facts, Your Majesty will conclude that the United States has not failed in its duties as a true friend of Saudi Arabia.

I am grateful that Your Majesty spoke frankly with Mr. Dulles concerning our relations and means whereby they may be strengthened. I am sure Your Majesty will likewise desire that I express my own views to you in the same spirit of frankness. You and I are both old soldiers, and I believe that we shall understand each other fully. Our personal relationship should be a close one so that when something troubles one of us he will write fully to the other in the knowledge that there can never be a problem between us which cannot be solved by prompt and friendly consultation.8

I pray God that He may have Your Majesty in His safekeeping, and that you may be preserved many years for the welfare and happiness of your country. Sincerely

1 King of the Hejaz, Nejd, and dependencies since 1927, Saud had changed the name of his realm to Saudi Arabia in 1932. Forced into exile at the age of ten, he had begun the reconquest of his kingdom in 1901 and had retaken his hereditary capital, Riyadh, the following year. In 1933 Ibn Saud, as he was known outside Arabia, had granted oil-concession rights to an American company. He would die on November 9, 1953, and would be succeeded by his son, Crown Prince Saud.

On June 2 Eisenhower had sent an earlier and less detailed version of this letter, drafted by C. D. Jackson, to Dulles for his approval. Dulles said that "in view of the serious charges the King made to the effect that the United States had not lived up to its obligations," a stronger letter was called for; he returned a new draft for Eisenhower's signature on June 12 (Eisenhower to Dulles, June 2, 1953, and Dulles to Eisenhower, June 8, 12, 1953, AWF/I. A copy of this letter is in State, Foreign Relations 1952-1954, vol. IX, The Near and Middle East, pt. 2, pp. 2541-42).

2 Dulles and Mutual Security Director Stassen had met with King Saud in May 1953 in the course of their trip to the Middle East and South Asia (see no. 153). In his letter of May 19, 1953 (AWF/I), Saud had expressed his satisfaction with the meeting (see State, Foreign Relations, 1952-1954, vol. IX, The Near and Middle East, pt. 1, pp. 96-99, and pt. 2, p. 2540).

3 On June 1 Dulles had reminded Eisenhower and the NSC of the great interest the United States had in Saudi Arabian oil and in the American air base there. Dulles also said that King Saud was "old and crochety" and that relations were strained (ibid., pt. 1, p. 382).

4 Ibn Faisal al-Aziz, second son of King Saud, had been Viceroy of the Hejaz since 1926 and Foreign Minister of Saudi Arabia since 1930. He had met with Eisenhower in March; a memorandum of their conversation is in AWF/I.

5 Truman's letter had assured Saud that the United States was "interested in the preservation of the independence and territorial integrity of Saudi Arabia." Truman had also said that the two countries had "common cause in opposing the godless forces of Communism which are endeavoring to destroy freedom throughout the world" (U.S. Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1950, 7 vols. [Washington, D.C., 1976-80], vol. V, The Near East, South Asia, and Africa [1978], pp. 1190-91).

6 At this time Saudi Arabia was engaged in a boundary dispute with two smaller Arab states over territory and settlements in the vicinity of the Buraimi Oasis. One of the Arab states involved, the sheikdom of Abu Dhabi, was under British protection, and the British were assisting in the effort to thwart a Saudi takeover. The United States, which had close ties to both the British and the Saudis, as well as an interest in the vast oil reserves in the region, had been attempting to persuade both sides to agree to arbitration, but the Saudis, who had forcibly occupied part of the disputed area in August 1952, advocated a plebiscite instead. Since April British forces had been restricting Saudi troop and supply movements (State, Foreign Relations, 1952-1954, vol. IX, The Near and Middle East, pt. 1, p. 382, and pt. 2, pp. 2458-59, 2468-72, 2526-40).

7 King Saud and Churchill had been in communication about the Buraimi question, and the Saudis had recently agreed in general terms that the matter should be submitted to arbitration. The two nations would not agree on conditions and procedures, however, until July 1954 (ibid., pt. 2, pp. 2538, 2543, 2552-53, 2614-15).

8 In his June 28 reply, after thanking Eisenhower for his interest and assurances, Saud would inform Eisenhower that British forces had attacked Saudi subjects on the previous day. Saud complained that his agreement to arbitrate the dispute had been answered by the British with "aggressive acts" and "abominable crimes" and asked Eisenhower to mediate the dispute (ibid., pp. 2544-45). In Eisenhower's reply of July 1 (drafted by Dulles) he expressed his concern over the incident and promised that the United States would look into the matter (AWF/I). Later, however, after it was determined that the attack had been provoked by Saudi agents, the United States continued to urge arbitration (Dulles to Eisenhower, Oct. 26, 1953, Eisenhower to Saud, Oct. 27, 1953, and other papers in WHCF/CF: State Dept.; Smith to Eisenhower, Dec. 8, 1953, AWF/I; State, Foreign Relations, 1952-1954, vol. IX, The Near and Middle East, pt. 2, pp. 2546-73).

Bibliographic reference to this document:
Eisenhower, Dwight D. Secret To Abdul Aziz Ibn Saud, 15 June 1953. In The Papers of Dwight David Eisenhower, ed. L. Galambos and D. van Ee, doc. 245. World Wide Web facsimile by The Dwight D. Eisenhower Memorial Commission of the print edition; Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996, http://www.eisenhowermemorial.org/presidential-papers/first-term/documents/245.cfm

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