Presidential Papers, Doc#247 Top secret. <EM>Memorandum To John Foster Dulles, 16 June 1953. In The Papers of Dwight David Eisenhower
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Doc #248

Document #247; June 16, 1953
To John Foster Dulles
Series: EM, AWF, International Series: Churchill ; Category: Top secret. Memorandum
The Papers of Dwight David Eisenhower, Volume XIV - The Presidency: The Middle Way
Part II: Settling into "the long pull"; May 1953 to August 1953
Chapter 4: Striving for Unity

 

Re: Message on Egypt: I suggest that we try to handle this subject somewhat along the following lines:

"From the Secretary of State to the American Ambassador in London:

"Recently the President sent to the Prime Minister a message concerning the situation in Egypt, and received from the Prime Minister a reply, copy of which you saw while you were in Washington.1 The President believes that conversations on this subject with the Prime Minister will be more effective than continuation of cabled correspondance and the following is given to you as background to assist in reaching understandings.2

"In a separate cablegram the President is sending to you a very short reply for the Prime Minister, and it is expected that you will carry on conversations in amplification of that message, and keep us informed as to the results.3

"For reasons stated in the messages that you have seen, we here believe that the best interests of all of us will be served if British-Egyptian discussions are promptly resumed in Cairo. It is clear that the Prime Minister does not feel as strongly on this point as we do. This difference probably arises from the fact that our official reports regarding Egyptian attitudes do not agree with the London estimate of the situation. Whereas the Prime Minister apparently believes that the Egyptians are weakening in their opposition, we consider that they are merely marking time to see whether there is any hope of resuming negotiations before they attempt a more drastic guerrilla campaign.4

"The Prime Minister's latest message to the President remarked that he had no objection to our advising the Egyptians to take the initiative in resuming discussions.5 Our position is that while we believe that these discussions should be resumed, and while we would be willing to be helpful in making them possible, we are certain that it would be futile to do so unless we have information that the British are prepared to negotiate along the lines suggested by General Robertson.6 Assurances that these suggestions would be accepted rather than to permit another termination of the conversations would give us a reason to make appropriate proposals to the Egyptians even though we would avoid giving to the Egyptians any impression of the British position.

"The Prime Minister's message frequently refers to an `Agreement' between his Government and ours.7 Our understanding of that Agreement is that the negotiators were to have flexibility in making the necessary arrangements, within certain limits. These limits were defined in concrete cases labelled `A' and `B' respectively.8 Our common objective was to secure Case A completely. Our minimum essential requirements were represented in Case B. It was further understood that any combination of Case A and B would be less satisfactory than A, but more than B. If this is the Agreement to which the Prime Minister refers, and if his negotiators have even the limited degree of flexibility indicated above, then we would be prepared to urge the Egyptians to resume the talks.

"We note in Sir Brian's memorandum an apparent misunderstanding of the President's message.9 The `private undertaking' by Egypt on the availability of the Base, which the President mentioned in paragraph 4 of his message, was to be merely an advance assurance from the Egyptians that they would be willing to make public an agreement upon the availability of the Base in the discussions which he visualized in his paragraph 5. We felt that a paragraph 5 type of agreement was better than broader agreement upon a M.E.D.O., which we think we cannot depend on in the near future.10 We agree with Sir Brian on disadvantages of a private undertaking of any duration."11

1 Eisenhower's cable to Churchill, dated June 10, is no. 239. In his reply of June 15 (in State, Foreign Relations, 1952-1954, vol. IX, The Near and Middle East, pt. 2, pp. 2094-96) Churchill described his first reaction to Eisenhower's proposals as one of disappointment. He declared that the Egyptians had not been acting in good faith and that the British had made all the concessions that could reasonably be expected of them. Detecting "signs of greater reasonableness" behind Churchill's "bluster," Dulles advised Eisenhower to ignore Churchill's threats and complaints and concentrate on the "constructive and hopeful" parts of the message (Dulles to Eisenhower, June 15, 1953, AWF/I: Egypt). Winthrop Aldrich was the United States Ambassador to the United Kingdom.

2 Eisenhower was referring to the proposed talks to be held at Bermuda; see no. 242.

3 This message is no. 249.

4 For background on American involvement in the Anglo-Egyptian negotiations, which had reached an impasse in early May, see nos. 54 and 206; see also Dulles to Eisenhower, May 12, 1953, AWF/D-H. On June 1 Secretary of State Dulles had reported to the NSC that Egyptian leaders were organizing forces for guerrilla warfare against the British (State, Foreign Relations, 1952-1954, vol. IX, The Near and Middle East, pt. 1, pp. 379-80).

5 Churchill had said that he would agree to an American effort provided that the Egyptians "were not led to believe that you were whittling us down or prepared to intervene in a matter in which the whole burden, not nineteen-twentieths but repeat the whole burden, falls on us" (ibid., pt. 2, p. 2095).

6 For background on General Sir Brian Hubert Robertson, Commander in Chief of British Middle East Land Forces since June 1950, see Galambos, Columbia University, no. 571. Robertson, who had been conducting negotiations with the Egyptians, had prepared a memorandum that Churchill had sent to Eisenhower along with his letter of June 15. In this memorandum Robertson had stated that the American suggestions for resolving the dispute were quite similar to the Egyptian position and were therefore unacceptable. Robertson had also said, however, that he believed that the British would obtain the essential elements of case A (the most favorable outcome from the British point of view [see no. 239]) if negotiations were not delayed too long and if Churchill could "accept certain concessions of form to pander to Egyptian conceit" (State, Foreign Relations, 1952-1954, vol. IX, The Near and Middle East, pt. 2, pp. 2096-97).

7 See no. 249. Churchill had written that the British had gone "over all this ground before" with the Americans and had "agreed to make a number of concessions to the Egyptian point of view." Churchill added that his object in those discussions had not been "to obtain military or financial aid from the United States," but only to secure "moral support in what we hoped would be a joint approach to the Egyptian dictatorship" (State, Foreign Relations, 1952-1954, vol. IX, The Near and Middle East, pt. 2, p. 2094). On June 15 Dulles told Eisenhower that "Churchill's message spoke of far-reaching concessions on his part, which we fail to identify" (Dulles to Eisenhower, June 15, 1953, AWF/I: Egypt).

8 On cases A and B see no. 239 and n. 6 above.

9 Robertson had been commenting on Eisenhower's message of June 10 (no. 239). We have been unable to locate Robertson's memo.

10 For background on the proposed Middle East Defense Organization (MEDO) see no. 54. On June 1 Dulles had told the NSC that the "old MEDO concept was certainly finished," in part because Turkey, one of the proposed members, "was still greatly feared by the Arab countries which she had once controlled." On July 9 he would add that MEDO was "too complicated, too much like NATO, and it obviously would not work." Eisenhower replied that the United States "must not allow the MEDO concept to disappear entirely from our thinking. It should be reconsidered if at some future time it appeared more practicable" (NSC meeting minutes, June 2, July 10, 1953, AWF/NSC).

11 Dulles would send a slightly revised version of this message to Aldrich on June 17. The Secretary of State inserted into the fourth paragraph (see n. 6 above) a warning that it would be futile to resume the U.K.-Egyptian negotiations "if the British stand firmly on Case A with only `certain concessions of form'" (Dulles to Eisenhower, and Dulles to Aldrich, June 17, 1953, AWF/D-H). For developments see no. 249.

Bibliographic reference to this document:
Eisenhower, Dwight D. Top secret. Memorandum To John Foster Dulles, 16 June 1953. In The Papers of Dwight David Eisenhower, ed. L. Galambos and D. van Ee, doc. 247. World Wide Web facsimile by The Dwight D. Eisenhower Memorial Commission of the print edition; Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996, http://www.eisenhowermemorial.org/presidential-papers/first-term/documents/247.cfm

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