Presidential Papers, Doc#249 Cable 8011. <EM>Top secret To Winston Spencer Churchill, 17 June 1953. In The Papers of Dwight David Eisenhower

Document #249; June 17, 1953
To Winston Spencer Churchill
Series: EM, AWF, International Series: Churchill ; Category: Cable 8011. Top secret

The Papers of Dwight David Eisenhower, Volume XIV - The Presidency: The Middle Way
Part II: Settling into "the long pull"; May 1953 to August 1953
Chapter 4: Striving for Unity

 

Dear Winston: Thank you very much for your prompt response to my recent message on Egypt.1 There are certain passages in your reply which I fail to understand, but I believe it more profitable to leave these for the personal talks we anticipate in Bermuda.

I was interested to note that Robertson feels that agreement might be reached which would retain the essentials of Case A, providing there is reasonably prompt resumption of discussions and that some adjustments are made to meet Egyptian sensibilities.2

As you know, I personally believe that the best interests of all of us will be served if friendly discussions are promptly resumed in Cairo. Obviously, however, it would be worse than futile to resume those talks unless you and I are absolutely clear as to the minimum objectives we hope to attain, and have some reason to believe that these would not be rejected out of hand by the Egyptians. Perhaps our March agreement on the type of base arrangement to be sought, which you mention, would serve the purpose. If my memory serves me correctly, the negotiators were to have flexibility between arrangements which would insure a working Base in peace which would be immediately operable in event of war, and one which would require 60 days for reactivation.3

Won't you please dismiss any thought of us, here, seeming to desert any agreed position or exhibiting weakness. Foster's statements in Cairo and his notification to the Egyptians that they cannot get arms as long as you and they are disagreed should reassure you on this.4 With warm personal regard5

1 For background see no. 247. On June 15 Secretary of State Dulles had sent Eisenhower a draft of this message. Eisenhower divided the draft into the cable sent on June 16 over Dulles's signature (ibid.) and a second message to Churchill, printed here. He sent the revised versions of both cables back to Dulles with a covering note: "Please understand that there is no pride of authorship behind the attached suggestions. Cut them to pieces as you see fit. But if you make any radical changes in the personal message, I should like to see it again before it goes out." Dulles deleted the following sentence from the second paragraph of this message: "If my memory serves me correctly, Robertson's suggestions would result in a plan that would be described as a fairly good combination of Cases A and B." He also added the last two sentences of the third paragraph before sending the cable to Churchill (Dulles to Eisenhower, June 15, 1953, AWF/I: Egypt; Eisenhower to Dulles, June 16, 1953, AWF/I: Churchill).

2 On the negotiating option case A and the Robertson memorandum see no. 247.

3 For details of the agreement reached in March with British Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden see State, Foreign Relations, 1952-1954, vol. IX, The Near and Middle East, pt. 2, pp. 2009-11, 2014-15. Under the terms of this agreement, the negotiators were to be given the "flexibility to work out upon spot and between themselves such arrangements as would meet the desired objectives." They were free to work out a compromise between cases A and B, as Eisenhower notes here.

4 See nos. 181 and 239. In May Dulles had issued a statement that supported the British contention that the disputed Suez Canal base must remain readily available to the Western Powers. Dulles also told the Egyptians that "the US cannot equip Egyptians to fight the British" (State, Foreign Relations, 1952-1954, vol. IX, The Near and Middle East, pt. 1, p. 18; New York Times, May 12, 1953).

5 On this day Dulles told Eisenhower that he had sent the message "substantially as you drafted it with some slight rearrangement" (see n. 1 above). Ambassador Aldrich delivered it to Churchill the morning of June 19. Aldrich reported that he had discussed the Egyptian base negotiations with Churchill as directed in Dulles's cable of June 16 (no. 247). Churchill said that the British still hoped to secure case A from the Egyptians. Summarizing the discussions, Aldrich said: "I found it difficult to get Churchill to concentrate on details of Egypt problem, I believe because of the fact that he expects to discuss the Egypt situation fully with the President when they meet" (Dulles to Eisenhower, June 17, 1953, AWF/I: Churchill; Aldrich to Dulles, no. 6665, June 19, 1953, AWF/D-H). In Churchill's reply (June 19) he thanked Eisenhower, "especially for your final paragraph. I did not mean to suggest anything to the contrary in my cable, as I have absolute confidence in American goodwill and fair play" (State, Foreign Relations, 1952 - 1954, vol. IX, The Near and Middle East, pt. 2, pp. 2098-99, 2101-2). For developments see no. 297.

Bibliographic reference to this document:
Eisenhower, Dwight D. Cable 8011. Top secret To Winston Spencer Churchill, 17 June 1953. In The Papers of Dwight David Eisenhower, ed. L. Galambos and D. van Ee, doc. 249. World Wide Web facsimile by The Dwight D. Eisenhower Memorial Commission of the print edition; Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996, http://www.eisenhowermemorial.org/presidential-papers/first-term/documents/249.cfm

 


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