Presidential Papers, Doc#26 Diary, 9 February 1953. In The Papers of Dwight David Eisenhower

Document #26; February 9, 1953
Diary
Series: EM, Diaries

The Papers of Dwight David Eisenhower, Volume XIV - The Presidency: The Middle Way
Part I: Charting a New Course; January 1953 to April 1953
Chapter 1: Developing a spirit of teamwork

 

This morning we had our regular Monday morning meeting with the Senate and House leadership. The principal subject for discussion was the proposed legislative program.

A tenative schedule was suggested by Senator Taft, who took the State of the Union speech as his basis and worked up a detailed program that he thought would best suit the calendar of the Congress.1 The subjects agreed upon as "must" legislation were:

1. Reorganization Bill--already passed.2

2. Appropriations Bills to reach the Senate not later than May 15.3

3. Hawaiian Statehood Bill.4

4. Taft-Hartley amendments.5

5. Limited extension of controls, allocations, etc., dealing with materials required for defense program and critical defense areas.6

6. Legislation related to submerged lands.7

7. Extension of Reciprocal Trade Act.8

8. Custom Simplification Bill.9

9. Extension of old age and survivors insurance, to cover groups presently excluded.10

10. Extension of bill for temporary aid to schools in critical areas.11

11. Adding of two Commissioners for the District of Columbia.12

This list of course is not an exclusive list, but does lay before the Republicans of both houses a general outline that will be helpful.

A subject that is coming up soon for decision involves the Reciprocal Trade Agreement with other nations. In our present law is a so-called "escape" clause, which provides that under certain conditions, the Federal Trade Commission may recommend an increase in our tariffs and upon the approval of the President, such increase go instantly into effect.13

The case presently to be decided involves brier pipes--just plain smoking pipes. It is inconsequential insofar as the volume of imports is concerned and the number of people engaged in the business of making pipes here in the United States.14 However, it is a very important case from the standpoint of establishing attitude and future policy, and I am informed by the Secretary of Commerce that the whole world--as well as the American Congress--will be watching the decision.

So far as fulfilling the conditions for the application of the escape clause, this particular case is clear cut. On the other hand, our whole policy of collective security among the nations of the free world depends on an ability of these other nations to make a living. This means that they must have the ability to export and since the United States consists of by far the greatest single market in the world, it means that we must be quite ready and willing to import items where these do not seriously damage our economy.

Specifically, the kind of items that we should like to import are those where a great deal of hand labor is involved and where these items are not essential to the workers in our economy, particularly in time of war. This type of essential item we would far rather make here at home. (I am not discussing here the essential raw materials that we need from abroad. In this category we need especially those items in which our own production is inadequate.)

Consequently, the question at issue is to decide between the letter and intent of the law on the one hand, and the clear damage that will be done to some of our allies by such compliance.

The law provides also that certain officials, among whom I think are the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of Labor and the Director of Mutual Security, must all advise the President as to their convictions in such a matter, and I have a suspicion that without exception they will recommend that the tariff remain at the 50 to 75% rate that now exists.15 To avoid the increase would manifestly be to the best interests of the United States as a whole.

However, the entire Reciprocal Trade law expires in a very short time and we have to depend upon a Congress--part of which is not sympathetic to Reciprocal Agreements--to re-enact it. Consequently, to decline to grant the increase, when the case is so clear-cut as to comply with legal conditions, would probably provoke the Congress and might result in a failure to re-enact the Law.

On the other hand, approval would hurt the morale of our allies far more than it will hurt them economically.

Again, we come up against the whole question of the ability of a free government to continue functioning in spite of pressures from groups inside the body politic, where these pressures are created by immediate self-interest. Numbers of our writers of today believe, indeed strongly urge, that free government can continue to exist only as the central authority--in our case, the federal government--assumes a stronger and stronger role in directing the economic processes of the country. By exercising a stronger authority over the economy, these writers mean bureaucratic rather than purely legislative control. In this way they would hope to get away from the group influence, to which an elected official is so sensitive, while at the same time they would preserve the general forms of free government and individual liberty through the dependence of the bureaucrats upon the Congress for appropriations.

Thinking of this kind leads to a greater and greater dependence upon the so-called "Regulation" Commissions, most of them having a combination of legislative, executive and judicial functions.

The Congress has at times referred to some of these Commissions as an "Extension of Congress." This would be an accurate description if their functions were limited to legislative action and their decisions always subject to approval by the Executive. This is not the case, and I would not be surprised that a very strong argument could be made against the functioning of some of them, on constitutional grounds. In any event, in the degree that we depend more and more upon the Regulatory Commission, we are departing from the system laid down in our Constitution, a system that groups all functions into three categories and keeps these mutually independent of each other. Since America has always believed that this functional dispersion of power is equally important with the geographical dispersion accomplished by the reservation of all powers to the states and to the people, except where such power is especially granted to the central authority by the Constitution, it follows that in the degree that we depend upon the Regulatory Commission, we are threatening the individual liberties and the entire system of free government that they established.

Of course, we well understand that whereas in the early days of our Republic, the "liberal" was any individual who pled for less government in our daily lives, we have come to the point in the past thirty or forty years where the present-day liberal is the man who demands more and more government in our lives, claiming that only in this way can the mass of the individuals be protected against the greed and lust of the predatory few. Individuals of this school shout their undying hatred of the "practitioners of special privilege" but the fact is that the only special privilege that could possibly exist under the systems that they advocate, would be the high ranking bureaucrats of Washington.

Admittedly, masses of people have suffered under the injustices inflicted by people controlling means of production, not only in our civilization but in past ones. However, individual fortunes come and go; shirt-sleeves to shirt-sleeves in three generations is almost an accepted characteristic of modern civilization. But once an all-powerful and self-perpetuating government has fastened [won] onto the people, then exploitation of the masses will revert again to the kind practiced by the Hitlers and Napoleons of the past--and indeed, as it is practiced by Stalin today.

All of this, of course, is not provoked by a mere instance of the "briar pipe" case, but that case is indicative of what goes on in a democracy. It points up the need for the people to be constantly on the job of reminding all of us what these trends--or the accumulation of a sufficient number of these instances--can eventually mean. If we do this seriously and persistently enough, we should be all right.

1 For the principal points of Eisenhower's address see no. 14. The "program" outlined here appeared in much the same form in the next day's newspapers (New York Times, Feb. 10, 1953). For the President's later reflections on this legislative agenda see Eisenhower, Mandate for Change, pp. 195-96.

2 On Friday, February 6, the Senate had passed a bill granting Eisenhower authority (along lines originally set forth in the Reorganization Act of 1949) to create new executive agencies or alter those already established, such plans to go into effect sixty days after submitted to Congress unless either House or Senate by absolute majority passed a resolution disapproving them. Earlier that week conservative Republicans in House and Senate committees had proposed amendments that would have permitted passage of a resolution of disapproval by only a simple majority of members in attendance. Budget Director Joseph M. Dodge's appeal for an extension of Truman's powers had helped persuade House members to reject the proposal, 389 to 5; in the Senate, Taft had led efforts to defeat the same amendment in committee. Five days after Eisenhower made this diary entry, he received a second interim report from the President's Advisory Committee on Government Organization, which he had established on November 30, 1952, under Nelson A. Rockefeller (Galambos, NATO and the Campaign of 1952, no. 1020; Harvey C. Mansfield, "Federal Executive Reorganization: Thirty Years of Experience," Public Administration Review 29 (July-Aug. 1969), 332-45; and Peri E. Arnold, Making the Managerial Presidency: Comprehensive Reorganization Planning, 1905-1980 [Princeton, 1986], pp. 162-65). For developments see no. 155.

3 In the appropriations package Senator Taft included authorization for the foreign-aid program. By the middle of the month, House Republicans had cut $1.5 billion from the first appropriations bill, with most of the reductions (61 percent) in defense expenditures. Meanwhile, the May 15 deadline postponed any discussion of tax cuts in the House Ways and Means Committee (New York Times, Feb. 10, 11, 17, 1953). For developments see no. 773.

4 In early March the House Interior Committee approved Hawaiian statehood and narrowly defeated an Alaskan statehood bill. In May a Senate committee voted to link the Alaskan and Hawaiian issues. Believing Alaska underpopulated and unprepared for entry into the Union, Eisenhower opposed statehood for that territory (New York Times, Feb. 26, Mar. 4, 10, 11, May 13, 15, June 23, July 2, 4, 7, 1953).

5 The Labor Management Relations Act of 1947 had imposed new rules on labor unions and their officials; labor leaders wished to see the statute amended if not repealed. During the campaign Senator Taft, one of the original authors of the act, had demanded a pledge from Eisenhower that he would support no "weakening in the basic structure of the law" (Reichard, Reaffirmation of Republicanism, p. 143; see also Galambos, NATO and the Campaign of 1952, nos. 635 and 936, n. 3). Once in office, Eisenhower called for "prompt action in revising" the act, and Taft, chairman of the subcommittee that would conduct hearings on the matter, himself proposed sixteen changes. Eisenhower and the committee he appointed to study the issue would fail, however, to agree on a specific program for many months (Eisenhower, Mandate for Change, p. 196; New York Times, Feb. 1, 1953; Reichard, Reaffirmation of Republicanism, pp. 143-45). For subsequent developments see no. 397.

6 Fulfilling a campaign promise repeated in his State of the Union address, Eisenhower had issued an executive order suspending federal controls on all wages and salaries and many consumer goods. At the end of June, as legislation expired, Congress would renew the Defense Production Act for two more years; like its predecessor, the measure would authorize stockpiling of critical resources and provide loans for and set priorities in key defense industries.

7 For background on the dispute over custody of the natural resources in the seabed within the U.S. three-mile statutory limit, a question of special interest because of the vast oil deposits known to lie there, see Galambos, NATO and the Campaign of 1952, nos. 773, 841, 871, 892. Before leaving office, President Truman by executive order had consigned rights to tidelands oil to the Navy for use as a fuel reserve. Within a week of Eisenhower's February 9 legislative meeting, however, Attorney General Brownell would announce his opinion that under existing legislation, Truman's order did not effectively create an offshore naval preserve. In early March the House would begin debate on a quitclaim, or title transference, measure, passed April 1, which gave the states developmental rights to submerged lands within their historic offshore boundaries. Senate opposition to the bill would produce a filibuster, and in late April the President sent an open letter to Senator Clinton P. Anderson explaining his support for the measure and requesting speedy action. On May 5 the Senate approved a quitclaim bill with variations that the House soon afterward accepted by a vote of 278 to 116 (New York Times, Feb. 17, 25, Apr. 2, 25, May 6, 14, 1953; Public Papers of the Presidents: Eisenhower, 1953, pp. 58-59. See also Eisenhower, Mandate for Change, pp. 203-8).

8 For the importance Eisenhower placed on mutual trade among free nations see Galambos, NATO and the Campaign of 1952, no. 590, and in this volume nos. 287, 293, and 341. The Trade Agreements Extension Act of 1951 (one of a series of acts renewing legislation first passed in 1930 and due to expire on June 12, 1953) authorized the President to raise or lower tariffs on imported foreign goods within a 50 percent range of 1945 rates, reducing them in exchange for like concessions abroad. Reciprocal trade treaties regularly contained an escape clause permitting the United States to revoke concessions; the trade statute stipulated that no rate reduction on a foreign commodity would continue in effect if lower rates caused or threatened "serious injury to the domestic industry producing like or directly competitive products" (U.S., Statutes at Large, vol. 65, p. 73). American manufacturers believing themselves threatened were to petition the U.S. Tariff Commission (see, for example, n. 14 below).

Eisenhower sought extension of the act for one year. A week following the February 9 legislative meeting, at a conference held in Geneva, Switzerland, the thirty-three nations that in 1947 had signed a General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs would ask the United States to take the lead in a general lowering of tariff barriers (New York Times, Feb. 2, 20, 22, 1953; see also Eisenhower, Mandate for Change, pp. 208-11). For developments see no. 170.

9 The Public Advisory Board for Mutual Security had strongly urged such a measure. "Many goods take longer to pass through customs than it took Columbus to discover America," the group stated. When the bill stalled in committee, Eisenhower would press for action (see no. 250), and he would sign the Customs Simplification Act of 1953 on August 8 (New York Times, Mar. 5, 6, July 14, Aug. 9, 1953).

10 During the campaign Eisenhower had acknowledged the federal government's rightful role in maintaining the social security system but had not proposed enlargement of coverage (see Galambos, NATO and the Campaign of 1952, no. 946). Now, however, Eisenhower proposed an expansion of the system. In spite of some Republican opposition, in August the Administration would introduce a bill making coverage mandatory for some 6.5 million workers (including domestic employees, self-employed farmers, farm workers, and professional persons) and offering optional coverage to an estimated 4 million clergy and employees of state and local government (see Carolyn L. Weaver, "The Social Security Bureaucracy in Triumph amd in Crisis," in The New American State: Bureaucracies and Policies since World War II, ed. Louis Galambos [Baltimore, 1987], pp. 67-73).

11 Since 1950 Congress had appropriated aid to local authorities in "federal impact" areas, where the influx of military families and children of other government personnel strained school systems. On March 28 Eisenhower would sign a measure increasing the aid for the current fiscal year. On August 8 Eisenhower would sign a two-year extension providing $174 million (more than the President had recommended) for that purpose (New York Times, Feb. 20, Mar. 3, 29, July 9, 1953).

12 The Senate was considering a bill to enlarge the number of commissioners from three to five, but the measure failed. In March the President would name a Washington-New York lawyer and Eisenhower Republican, Samuel Spencer, as one of the three commissioners; in February 1955, when Eisenhower named Robert E. McLaughlin District Commissioner, he nominated a Washington lawyer, George E. C. Hayes, to serve as Public Utilities Commissioner--the first black to serve in the District government (New York Times, Feb. 10, Mar. 26, Apr. 3, 1953, Feb. 13, 1955; Journal of the Senate of the United States of America, 83d Cong., 1st sess., 1953, p. 791).

13 See n. 8 above.

14 About sixteen hundred Americans were involved in making brier pipes; pipes imported into the United States during 1951 were valued at $400,000. On December 22, 1952, acting on a petition from the American Smoking Tobacco Manufacturers Association, the Tariff Commission had recommended raising duties (rates stood as high as 76 percent) on imported pipes valued under five dollars a dozen. The Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act gave the President sixty days to consider the recommendation. If he declined to accept it, the statute required him to write explanatory messages to the chairmen of the Ways and Means and Finance committees. Eisenhower complied on February 18, turning down the proposed increase while putting off a final decision until the commission had studied the issue further (New York Times, Feb. 19, 22, 1953; see also no. 33). In November Eisenhower would decide that increased duties on pipe imports would not improve conditions in the domestic industry, and he would disapprove the Tariff Commission's recommendation (Eisenhower to Milikin, Nov. 10, 1953, and other papers in WHCF/CF: Trade Agreements and Tariffs--Briar Pipes).

15 The 1951 act required the President, in negotiating reciprocal trade agreements, to "seek information and advice . . . from the Departments of State, Agriculture, Commerce, and Defense, and from such other sources as he may deem appropriate" (U.S., Statutes at Large, vol. 65, p. 73).

Bibliographic reference to this document:
Eisenhower, Dwight D. Diary, 9 February 1953. In The Papers of Dwight David Eisenhower, ed. L. Galambos and D. van Ee, doc. 26. World Wide Web facsimile by The Dwight D. Eisenhower Memorial Commission of the print edition; Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996, http://www.eisenhowermemorial.org/presidential-papers/first-term/documents/26.cfm

 


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