Presidential Papers, Doc#291 Top secret To Charles Erwin Wilson, 1 July 1953. In The Papers of Dwight David Eisenhower

Document #291; July 1, 1953
To Charles Erwin Wilson
Series: EM, AWF, Administration Series: JCS ; Category: Top secret

The Papers of Dwight David Eisenhower, Volume XIV - The Presidency: The Middle Way
Part II: Settling into "the long pull"; May 1953 to August 1953
Chapter 5: "So much to do in the world"

 

Memorandum for the Secretary of Defense: I wish the newly-appointed Chiefs of Staff,1 before assuming their official duties, to examine the following matters:

(a) our strategic concepts and implementing plans,

(b) the roles and missions of the services,

(c) the composition and readiness of our present forces,

(d) the development of new weapons and weapons systems, and

resulting new advances in military tactics, and

(e) our military assistance programs.

I do not desire any elaborate staff exercise. As a result of this examination, I should like a summarized statement of these officers' own views on these matters, having in mind the elimination of overlapping in operations and administration, and the urgent need for a really austere basis in military preparation and operations.2

This examination should be made with due regard for the basic national security policies stated in NSC 153/1.3 While I do not fix any arbitrary budgetary or personnel limitations as a basis for this study, it should take into consideration our major national security programs for the fiscal years 1954 and 1955, as outlined in NSC 149/2, Part II.4 With reference to our national policy expressed in pars 8b and 20-25, NSC 153/1,5 the views of the Secretary of the Treasury and the Director of the Budget should be obtained.

Such an examination should provide a fresh view as to the best balance and most effective use and deployment of our armed forces, under existing circumstances. What I am seeking is interim guidance to aid the Council in developing policies for the most effective employment of available national resources to insure the defense of our country for the long pull which may lie ahead.6

For the purpose of carrying on this examination together, wherever it may take them, I want you to arrange the duties of these officers so that, beginning as early as possible in July and prior to undertaking the responsibilities of their new offices, they can give to the examination full-time, uninterrupted attention, freed of all other duties.7

1 On Eisenhower's JCS appointments see no. 166. Eisenhower assembled the incoming chiefs at the White House to present them with this memorandum on July 14 (Watson, History of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 1953-1954, p. 17; State, Foreign Relations, 1952-1954, vol. II, National Security Affairs, pt. 1, p. 394).

2 In the spring the President had announced plans to place military spending on a steady, or long-term, basis. The Administration's fiscal year 1954 budget trimmed defense spending as part of Eisenhower's comprehensive program of government economy (see no. 197).

3 Eisenhower had approved this "Restatement of Basic National Security Policy" on June 10 (State, Foreign Relations, 1952-1954, vol. II, National Security Affairs, pt. 1, pp. 378-86). NSC 153 declared the principal threats to the United States to be the "formidable power and aggressive policy" of the Soviet-led Communist world and the "serious weakening of the economy of the United States that may result from the cost of opposing the Soviet threat over a sustained period." The basic problem facing the United States, according to this paper, was striking a "proper balance between the risks arising from these two threats." Among military actions to maintain U.S. military strength, NSC 153 listed the capability of inflicting massive damage to Soviet war-making capacity, continental defense, stronger civil defense, scientific research and development, adequate long-term materiel reserves, continued limited mobilization "for as long as necessary," and internal security "through methods consistent with the maintenance of a vital and democratic society" (see also n. 5 below).

4 For an early draft and succinct statement of NSC 149, which reviewed defense policies and programs and established an expenditure limit of $40 billion for FY 1955, see ibid., pp. 281-87. Discussion of military spending cuts in the early Eisenhower Administration had led JCS Chairman Bradley to warn that the "resultant forces would be lacking in overall combat efficiency, sustaining power, and mobilization capability." He wrote further that Eisenhower's indicated reductions "would in FY 1955 eliminate our capability to oppose Communist forces in any new local wars that might occur, except at the expense of other commitments" (Bradley to Wilson, Mar. 19, 1953, CCS 370 [8-19-45], Sec. 40. See JCS 1800/201, Mar. 19, 1953, and JCS 1800/205, June 3, 1953, ibid.; see also Watson, History of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, vol. V, 1953-1954, pp. 63-64).

5 Paragraph 8b stated the objective of maintaining a "sound and strong economy based on free enterprise." Paragraphs 20-25, discussing maintenance of the economy, set forth the goals of balancing the federal budget as rapidly as world leadership permitted, postponing lower taxes as long as the Korean conflict continued, eliminating waste and overhead in government, minimizing government controls and federal expenditures for nonessential programs, and sustaining a "high level of economic activity at relatively stable price levels" (State, Foreign Relations, 1952-1954, vol. II, National Security Affairs, pt. 1, pp. 381, 383).

6 While the JCS undertook a reassessment of defense ends and means, another group, organized in May under the direction of the NSC, had been reexamining U.S. security-policy alternatives. Under the code name Project Solarium (for its original quarters in the White House sunroom), this committee had met in plenary sessions in late June and would issue a final report in September; see ibid., pp. 323-28, 349-54, 360-66, 388-93, 397-440, and Watson, History of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, vol. V, 1953-1954, pp. 11-14, 21.

7 The JCS appointees would work on this assignment through July and into August, unofficially reporting to Secretary of Defense Wilson on August 8 and presenting their conclusions to the NSC at its August 27 meeting (which Eisenhower did not attend). They concluded that U.S. defenses were generally "sound and adequate." They saw "no reason to believe that our combat readiness or overall military power will be materially increased in the immediate future by the advent of new weapons or tactics except perhaps in the atomic field. Any across-the-board reduction in the military budget," they warned, "would result in an almost equal reduction of overall security." Believing that the United States was badly overextended, they recommended consideration of troop redeployments from Japan, Korea, and Western Europe, placing first priority on the protection of the continental United States. They would, moreover, dispense foreign military assistance with caution, demanding "appropriate contribution or concession in return." Eisenhower's new JCS members noted that any significant strengthening of the Armed Forces would require full mobilization (and, Secretary Humphrey commented, a controlled economy). They advised planning swift, massive retaliation in the event of an enemy strike and recommended formulating and clearly stating a U.S. policy on the use of atomic weapons (see Watson, History of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, vol. V, 1953-1954, pp. 18-20; State, Foreign Relations, 1952-1954, vol. II, National Security Affairs, pt. 1, pp. 444-54; and Stephen Jurika, ed., From Pearl Harbor to Vietnam: The Memoirs of Admiral Arthur W. Radford [Stanford, Calif., 1980], pp. 320-22). For developments see no. 471.

Bibliographic reference to this document:
Eisenhower, Dwight D. Top secret To Charles Erwin Wilson, 1 July 1953. In The Papers of Dwight David Eisenhower, ed. L. Galambos and D. van Ee, doc. 291. World Wide Web facsimile by The Dwight D. Eisenhower Memorial Commission of the print edition; Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996, http://www.eisenhowermemorial.org/presidential-papers/first-term/documents/291.cfm

 


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