Yesterday, the 12th, I had luncheon with our retiring Ambassador to Great Britain, my good friend Walter Gifford.1 He wanted to give me several suggestions and some of them I think to be rather valuable.
First, he expressed the complete conviction that Winston Churchill is no longer a real power in the Conservative Party--certainly not its real leader. He is more tolerated than obeyed. Walter says there is no question of Winston's personal popularity as a Britisher, but it is well understood in all circles that he has grown sufficiently old that he is really stretching--if he has not outlived--his usefulness.
This fact creates a very awkward situation because his Cabinet has to bear both the burdens of government and the additional one of pretending that Winston is the boss.
Again I am reminded of how hard it is for older men to retire and accept the inevitable verdict of passing years. I have watched this over my life, and I continue to pray that I, in my turn, will not fall victim to the same human failing. So far I have not wavered as I tried earnestly to step down and out when I came back from Europe in 1945, believing that the experiences of the immediately preceding years may have taken a much greater toll out of me than I even suspected. Next, when I left the office of Chief of Staff I again tried to keep out of active work, but finally succumbed to the arguments of the Trustees of Columbia University. Incidentally, I thoroughly enjoyed that work as quickly as I got over the initial feeling of strangeness. Having settled there and having already informed the Trustees that at the age of 65 I would insist upon getting out, I had the NATO position thrust upon me and I had to go back to Europe. Mamie and I discussed this long and soberly, and she was personally so bitterly disappointed that for a while she considered remaining in the United States while I went over to Europe. Once we got to Europe Mamie liked her house and her circle of friends and had a nice time. We did, however, hope that the NATO tour would be our last stretch of active service and twice I suggested to individual trustees of Columbia that they find some way of putting me on the inactive list and not counting upon my returning there for duty after the NATO tour should be over.
Of course, after being there less than a year, the pressures from political figures became so great that again I was persuaded that I had a duty to turn to another task, that of offering myself as a political leader to unseat the New Deal-Fair Deal bureaucracy in Washington.
So here I am--and the reason for reciting the record to date is that if I do finally succumb to the same kind of thing that now seems to rule my great friend Winston, I will at least have a record that for a period I had somewhat better sense.
The next thing that Walter wanted to tell me about yesterday was the confusion that reigned in London for a time created by the unfortunate manner of naming his successor.2
About a year ago I visited London and during the course of my visit there Walter told me that as soon as a new administration came into Washington, he was determined to retire as Ambassador to Great Britain. With this knowledge, I of course was interested in the task of selecting a completely acceptable and useful successor. We started this job shortly after the election in early November and it was not long before we determined that all things considered, Winthrop Aldrich would be our best bet.3 This selection was made on the most confidential basis, but to our consternation it was soon public knowledge in New York City--and indeed, throughout the nation.
Foster Dulles considered this situation so embarrassing that he felt he would have to make a prompt public announcement of the fact that we intended to nominate Winthrop Aldrich when the new administration should take over. I agreed, but did put in my word of caution that Walter Gifford would have to be protected in every possible way. I was very greatly concerned that he should not be embarrassed, not only because he is an able American citizen and had done a good job in London, but because he was also my good friend. Having said this, I promptly dropped the matter from my mind.
Actually, it turned out that Walter received from Foster Dulles a letter one morning informing him that a change would probably be made (something that Walter, of course, already knew since he had himself made the decision) and that afternoon Foster called Walter to inform him that the announcement of his successor would have to be made promptly because of unfortunate leaks here at home.
Walter acted promptly to put a proper appearance on this kind of emergency action, and had a story published in the New York Times to the effect that he was going to retire promptly on January 20th.4 The next thing that happened was the immediate announcement from the United States of the intended appointment of Winthrop Aldrich. This upset the British government very badly--and I must say most understandably. As Anthony Eden pointed out in his informal protest to Walter Gifford, this meant that Britain was being subjected to pretty rough treatment when there was no effort made to get the usual "agreement." He said that with this precedent, any small nation could pursue the same tactics and if Britain should protest, they could argue that since the United States had done this and Britain had accepted it, no real objection could be made.
To guard against any such development as this, I am going to advise Anthony, when I see him next month, to lay the blame for this whole unfortunate occurrence squarely on me. He will have the logical explanation that my lack of formal experience in the political world was the reason for the blunder. Actually, I was the one who cautioned against anything like this happening, but manifestly I can take blame without hurting anything or anybody, whereas if the Secretary of State would have to shoulder it his position would be badly damaged.
Walter apparently moved earnestly to repair the damage done and it will probably be quickly forgotten. However, it left a very deep resentment in him and I must say I don't blame him. On the other hand, it is quite clear that Foster intended no insult or discourtesy. On the contrary, he has a great admiration, just as I do, for both Walter and our British friends. He simply was thrown off balance by a leak that should never have occurred, and he apparently decided that it would be a greater affront to the British if they read about our intended action in the newspaper than if they received notice, rather abruptly, through our Ambassador. However, the final mistake made was that when Foster telephoned Gifford--apparently on the afternoon of November 29th--he failed to ask the Ambassador, as a personal favor, to notify the British government of the whole unfortunate occurrence and to say that the "agreement" would be sought as soon as possible and that our intended appointment would be subject to the receipt of such "agreement."
Gifford pointed out that the real importance of this occurrence was a feeling on the part of the British, at that time, that the new administration intended to be pretty rough with them and with our other allies. They are, of course, very sensitive indeed and are watchful for every affront to their dignity and rights. Beyond this, they feel that they should have something of a special position with us because of our close partnership during World War II.
This, I think, is only logical because it is quite clear that unless the English-speaking peoples of the world can live relatively close together and can set something of a model for the necessary cooperation among free peoples, then we are truly in for desperate trouble. However, no such special relationship can be maintained or even suggested publicly. In public relationship all nations are sovereign and equal. This means that on the personal and informal basis we must find a way of agreeing with our British friends on broad objectives and purposes. Thereafter, each must pursue its own detailed methods of achieving these purposes. Some hurt feelings will occasionally be inevitable--but as long as our hearts are in the right places and both sides are reasonably intelligent, we should be able to work for the common aim of a free and secure world based upon common sense among nations and decent respect for each other.
Out of the November incident one conclusion seems inescapable--namely, that Winthrop Aldrich should be warned to keep his mouth shut when he has knowledge of any official subject which is not public knowledge. The whole difficulty arose out of his impatience and his naive supposition that the people he talked to in New York would keep his confidence. If he should be guilty of that kind of thing in his present office, he would quickly lose his usefulness.
Walter Gifford's final recommendation to me was to promote Julius Holmes to Ambassador and assign him to a fairly important post. I assured him I already had this in mind, but believed that Aldrich would need Holmes in London for a few months. After that we would find a proper post for him, because he is a most able and devoted career man.5 Moreover, there is nothing New Dealish about him.
