<--PREV Doc #319  |  Memorial Commission Home Page  |  First Term Table of Contents  |  Presidential Papers Home Page  |  Doc#  |  NEXT--> Doc #321 Document #320; July 15, 1953 To Mohammed Naguib Series: EM, AWF, International Series: Egypt ; Category: Cable. Top secret The Papers of Dwight David Eisenhower, Volume XIV - The Presidency: The Middle Way Part II: Settling into "the long pull"; May 1953 to August 1953 Chapter 5: "So much to do in the world"   Dear Friend: I was happy to receive through Ambassador Caffery your letter of July 11 together with the suggestions contained in the new formula of your Government regarding the Suez Canal Base.1 The assurances which you convey of Egypt's readiness to play her full part in furthering the military strength and economic and social stability of the Middle East are particularly welcome. The proposals advanced by your Government constitute a significant step forward although in some respects they leave certain difficulties unsolved. I believe I must state to you in all candor that I find certain points adversely affecting the security interests of my own country. These points deal with the future availability of the Base and the duration of any agreement between you and the United Kingdom. I have no doubt that both of these questions present to you certain political problems. Nevertheless, I am sure you would like to know that it is in my own view that the security of Egypt itself could not help but be affected should there be an unfortunate recurrence of global warfare or of enemy attack on areas other than those lying inside the Arab States. I would hope you could take this factor into account. I also feel that the limitation of three years leaves insufficient time on which to base sound strategic planning in this troubled world.2 Lord Salisbury, the Acting Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs for Great Britain has been here for discussions on a number of problems including the one to which your letter refers. I thought it advisable to make him aware of your proposals and our views thereon which include the above points.3 My assessment of this situation is that your views and those of the British Government are not now so far apart. It is my belief that the next step should now be taken through a resumption of contact between your Government and the British representatives in Egypt. Sir Brian Robertson, who attended the talks here, should be returning to Cairo shortly and, so we are informed, will be available to discuss the situation.4 As part of an overall solution, I am prepared to see firm commitments entered into between our Governments to assist you in your plans for Egypt's economic development and in the strengthing of your armed forces to discharge their increased responsibilities. I have been assured that the United Kingdom is also willing to help. I am prepared to authorize Ambassador Caffery to enter into discussions on these matters. I would hope we could arrive at an understanding which would be simultaneous with the signature of the Base agreements between yourself and the United Kingdom. The details could be worked out later at the conference mentioned in your proposals.5 I look forward to news of progress in Cairo. I shall maintain my keen interest in the achievement of a solution which corresponds to the enduring interests of the three countries. This message brings to you personally my very best wishes as well as my high hopes that we can move forward together in closer association for the best interests of both our peoples.6 1 For background on Eisenhower's involvement in the dispute between Egypt and the United Kingdom see no. 297. Naguib's letter and the Egyptian proposals are in State, Foreign Relations, 1952-1954, vol. IX, The Near and Middle East, pt. 2, pp. 2113-17. Naguib had said that the British must agree to evacuate their personnel, except for a minimum of technicians, who would wear civilian clothes and who would stay for a limited period of time, from the Suez bases. The United States and the United Kingdom also had to agree to provide Egypt with military and economic assistance; these agreements had to be firm and binding, and they had to be reached "simultaneously with the signing of agreements on evacuation and the future of the base." Naguib concluded by warning Eisenhower that these points did "not represent a bargaining position and any attempt to treat them as such" would convince the Egyptians that their "earnest desire for a prompt, honorable and peaceful settlement" was not reciprocated. The State Department drafted this reply to Naguib, and Eisenhower sent it out with only a few revisions (Dulles to Eisenhower, July 15, 1953, AWF/I: Egypt). 2 Naguib's proposal had specified that the Suez base should be made available to Egypt's allies, or to the allies of Egypt's allies, "in case of attack upon any Arab Nation." The British wanted the base to be available to them whenever they wished. Naguib had also demanded that the agreement be limited to three years; the British wanted the undertaking to remain in force indefinitely, or until an effective regional security organization had been established (with outside help) (State, Foreign Relations, 1952-1954, vol. IX, The Near and Middle East, pt. 2, pp. 2114, and vol. V, Western European Security, pt. 2, pp. 1632-33, 1636, 1677-78). 3 In the State Department draft of this letter this sentence originally read, "I thought it advisable to give him a copy both of your proposals and our views thereon. . . ." Minutes of Salisbury's meetings with American officials on July 11 and 14 are in ibid., vol. V, Western European Security, pt. 2, pp. 1631-40, 1675-86. Salisbury had maintained that the British would not compromise on the essential issues involved, because "further concessions would mean giving away everything" (ibid., p. 1683). Dulles, who feared the unsettling effects of guerrilla warfare and possible British reprisals against the Egyptians, had urged flexibility. 4 In June Eisenhower had urged that talks between the British and the Egyptians be resumed (see no. 247). General Robertson, who had been conducting negotiations for the British, had suggested to Dulles in Washington that the idea expressed in this paragraph should be included in Eisenhower's message to Naguib (State, Foreign Relations, 1952-1954, vol. V, Western European Security, pt. 2, p. 1680). 5 See n. 1 above. For the details of the aid program see State, Foreign Relations, 1952-1954, vol. IX, The Near and Middle East, pt. 2, pp. 2146-47. Naguib had proposed that upon the conclusion of an Anglo-Egyptian agreement regarding the Suez Canal base, Egypt would invite the Americans and the British to confer on defense plans and economic problems of mutual interest. American impatience over the slow pace of the negotiations would later prompt Dulles to propose that economic aid be granted to Egypt without waiting for the dispute to be resolved (ibid., pp. 2114, 2157-63, 2165-66). 6 Eisenhower apparently added this final paragraph to Dulles's draft. The Anglo-Egyptian discussions would resume on July 30 (ibid., pp. 2125-26), but no solution would be reached by the time Eisenhower met with Churchill in December. For further developments see no. 622. Bibliographic reference to this document: Eisenhower, Dwight D. Cable. Top secret To Mohammed Naguib, 15 July 1953. In The Papers of Dwight David Eisenhower, ed. L. Galambos and D. van Ee, doc. 320. World Wide Web facsimile by The Dwight D. Eisenhower Memorial Commission of the print edition; Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996, http://www.eisenhowermemorial.org/presidential-papers/first-term/documents/320.cfm <--PREV Doc #319  |  Memorial Commission Home Page  |  First Term Table of Contents  |  Presidential Papers Home Page  |  Doc#  |  NEXT--> Doc #321

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