<--PREV Doc #401  |  Memorial Commission Home Page  |  First Term Table of Contents  |  Presidential Papers Home Page  |  Doc#  |  NEXT--> Doc #403 Document #402; September 5, 1953 To Francisco Franco y Bahamonde Series: EM, AWF, International Series The Papers of Dwight David Eisenhower, Volume XIV - The Presidency: The Middle Way Part III: The Space Age Begins; October 1957 to January 1958 Chapter 6: Building strength when there is "no perfect answer"   My Dear Generalissimo: Thank you for your kind and friendly letter of August twenty-second which Ambassador Dunn has brought to me.1 I have long had a close interest in the negotiations which have been proceeding between our two governments, and I am grateful indeed to have received from you your personal views regarding them and the agreements which are now so close to completion.2 As you have observed the negotiations have suffered delays from time to time and we share your regret that this should have been so. It would be equally regrettable if there should develop from this fact, or from the detailed considerations which have necessarily been involved in some of the agreements, any sense of mistrust or suspicion regarding the broad objectives of the arrangements between our two nations which we both desire. The many details which are incorporated, not only in the Technical Agreement and Technical Schedules of the Defense Agreement but also in articles of both the economic and military aid agreements, spring from considerations which have arisen within my Government during past years and it may be helpful to you if I should mention some of these briefly in order that you may better understand some of the problems which confront us here.3 For example, as I am sure our negotiators have explained to your representatives, a considerable portion of the economic and military aid agreements which we have been discussing, and which we have negotiated with a number of other countries, arise from the stipulations included in legislation passed by our Congress.4 Similarly, many of the details in the Technical Agreement and the Technical Schedules, are necessary to such arrangements in order that our military services may be able to obtain the necessary appropriations from the Congress for the implementation of the agreements themselves. We realize that the variety and number of these details are frequently burdensome in negotiations such as those we have been engaged in and, realizing this, we have at all times endeavored to avoid raising any points which were not considered essential. I have noted in your letter the reference to the necessity for the early preparation of aerial defenses, a concept which as you know we share, and your observation that the equipment in full of Spain's land forces can take place at a later stage.5 We stand ready, as the provisions of the first article of the Defense Agreement indicate, to do our best with respect to military end-item assistance to your country, having in mind the necessary priority that must be given in this day to air defenses. I have referred to your observation regarding the equipment in full of Spain's land forces, however, since in all frankness I must say that we are not able to undertake more in this repect than is provided in the Defense Agreement.6 We are, as you know, interested in improving the equipment of Spain's military and naval forces and we intend to do our best within the existing priorities and limitations in the face of world-wide threat of aggression and our resulting international commitments. In this same respect I have also noted your view that the whole structure of the agreements will not have been completed until there has been added at the proper moment an appropriate annex concerning the details of our aid toward the equipping of Spain's forces. I believe that some discussions regarding the details of such aid have already taken place between our representatives and I can give you every assurance that these will be pursued with a view to completing the programming of both military and economic aid in order that we may reach mutually satisfactory agreement with regard to such aid during the current fiscal year which runs from July 1, 1953, through June 30, 1954. This is our established practice and we would expect to follow a similar course with respect to the continuation of these programs over the period of the next several years as agreed between us and subject, as you understand, to appropriations by the Congress. Ambassador Dunn is bringing this letter to you, and will also bring with him the few remaining considerations we have regarding the agreements now pending between our two governments. After careful study and consideration of the agreements and our remaining thoughts about them, which Ambassador Dunn will now be able to convey to the Foreign Minister, I feel confident that our representatives will be able to conclude and sign all the agreements without further delay.7 In closing I wish to take the opportunity to say that I share your confidence that the arrangements which are about to be completed will open a new phase of friendship and cooperation not only between our military services but between our two nations, and I look forward to the further development of these close relations in the years ahead. With assurances of my highest respect and esteem, Sincerely8 1 James Clement Dunn, former ambassador to France, had been appointed by Eisenhower as ambassador to Spain on February 27 (for further background see Galambos, NATO and the Campaign of 1952, nos. 577 and 709). Dunn had brought Franco's letter, dated August 22 (AWF/I), with him when he returned to Washington for consultation regarding delays in the Spanish base negotiations. Secretary Dulles explained (in a September 2 memorandum to Eisenhower) that in the President's absence he had opened the letter and would, after giving it his "personal attention," draft a suitable reply. The next day he forwarded Franco's letter and this draft reply, which had been approved by FOA Director Stassen and Assistant Defense Secretary Nash (ibid.). 2 Franco's letter is in State, Foreign Relations, 1952-1954, vol. VI, Western Europe and Canada, pt. 2, pp. 1950-51. For background on U.S. relations with Spain and the issue of military bases see Galambos, NATO and the Campaign of 1952, no. 240. In a March letter to Dunn (drafted by the State Department) Eisenhower had expressed his desire for "an early successful conclusion of the current negotiations with our Spanish friends." He asked that Dunn emphasize to Spanish officials that placing U.S. troops on their soil in the defense of Western Europe would secure the defense of Spain itself and that the U.S. government was prepared to make "substantial expenditures of both money and equipment" for the use of the bases. Eisenhower saw the completion of these negotiations as the first step toward a new relationship with Spain, even though "differing political traditions" could make the transition "long and difficult" (Eisenhower to Dunn, Mar. 21, 1953, and other papers in WHCF/CF: State Dept.; see also State, Foreign Relations, 1952-1954, vol. VI, Western Europe and Canada, pt. 2, pp. 1922-23). Franco had written primarily of his desire for completion of the negotiations and his fear that further delay could produce "an atmosphere of mistrust or suspicion." 3 The three bilateral agreements included a defense agreement allowing the United States "to develop, maintain, and utilize for military purposes" areas and facilities agreed upon by both governments in return for military assistance for Spain, an economic-aid agreement, and a mutual defense assistance agreement. For complete texts see U.S. Department of State Bulletin 29, no. 745 (October 5, 1953), 436-42. 4 On August 7 Eisenhower had signed the Mutual Security Appropriations Act, which reallocated for FY 1954 $125 million that Congress had previously appropriated for economic and military assistance to Spain. Also, $101 million from funds approved for the continuation of the Mutual Security Program was earmarked for additional assistance (State, Foreign Relations, 1952-1954, vol. VI, Western Europe and Canada, pt. 2, p. 1949). 5 Franco had agreed that the armies could be equipped later, but he would not accept delay in assuring "aerial defense in view of the lightning swiftness of such aggressions." 6 The defense agreement provided for the improvement of Spain's military forces "to the extent to be agreed upon in technical discussions," conditioned by "the international commitments of the United States, . . . the exigencies of the international situation," and Congressional appropriations (U.S. Department of State Bulletin 29, no. 745 [October 5, 1953], 436). 7 Ambassador Dunn and the Spanish Foreign Minister would sign the three agreements in Madrid on September 26, nineteen months after the beginning of negotiations. The first military installation would officially open on September 23, 1956, almost three years later (New York Times, Sept. 27, 1953; Theodore J. Lowi, "Bases in Spain," in American Civil-Military Decisions: A Book of Case Studies, ed. Harold Stein [Birmingham, Ala., 1963], p. 698). For further developments see no. 466. 8 Eisenhower added this final sentence and the complimentary close to the State Department's draft (State, Foreign Relations, 1952-1954, vol. VI, Western Europe and Canada, pt. 2, p. 1957). Bibliographic reference to this document: Eisenhower, Dwight D. To Francisco Franco y Bahamonde, 5 September 1953. In The Papers of Dwight David Eisenhower, ed. L. Galambos and D. van Ee, doc. 402. World Wide Web facsimile by The Dwight D. Eisenhower Memorial Commission of the print edition; Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996, http://www.eisenhowermemorial.org/presidential-papers/first-term/documents/402.cfm <--PREV Doc #401  |  Memorial Commission Home Page  |  First Term Table of Contents  |  Presidential Papers Home Page  |  Doc#  |  NEXT--> Doc #403

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