Presidential Papers, Doc#423 Secret To Joseph Laniel, 20 September 1953. In The Papers of Dwight David Eisenhower
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Doc #424

Document #423; September 20, 1953
To Joseph Laniel
Series: EM, AWF, International Series: France ; Category: Secret
The Papers of Dwight David Eisenhower, Volume XIV - The Presidency: The Middle Way
Part III: The Space Age Begins; October 1957 to January 1958
Chapter 6: Building strength when there is "no perfect answer"

 

Dear Mr. President:1 I appreciated very much your message conveyed to me through Ambassador Dillon, and while I was disappointed that it was not possible for you to visit the United States at this particular time, I fully understand and appreciate the reasons why you deemed it inadvisable.2

I was most encouraged to hear through Ambassador Dillon that both you and M. Bidault believe the situation now propitious for the French Government to move ahead quickly toward ratification of the EDC and that both of you now are concentrating your efforts to bring this about this year.3 You should remain confident of the continuing wholehearted support of the United States for the EDC concept, which sprang from French vision. It has always been our hope that this great project, which holds the promise of such magnificent permanent benefits for Europe, would come into being at the earliest possible time.

I know that you were encouraged by the results of the September 6 elections in Germany.4 In all our efforts to consolidate the foundation for a new Europe, I believe that perhaps the most important element is the state of mind with which the three Western nations who played the greatest part in defeating Hitler's Germany during the last war now approach their relations with the new Germany. Fortunately, the recent elections have demonstrated that contrary to the Weimar Republic, the Bonn regime has struck roots; in the four years since the first Bundestag elections, the forces of democracy and common sense have grown considerably in strength, and the new voters have overwhelmingly supported the center forces dedicated to European cooperation, and rejected the extremes of right and left. It is our responsibility both to develop this situation for the common good and to strengthen it further. Therefore, it is most urgent that in all our relations with Germany we be guided by a new spirit of friendship and trust and that the last vestige of a spirit of occupation disappear.5

We are not blind to history, and we know the difficulties this presents for the French people. But, we also know that the spectre of a Germany rapidly increasing its strength outside the ties of Western European unity would cause France even greater concern. Hence, we are confident that the leaders of France will not miss this historic opportunity for a Franco-German rapprochement which now offers itself, but which will certainly fade away if not seized resolutely and promptly.

Finally, Mr. President, I want to wish for you the utmost success in your approach toward the solution of France's problems and the realization of the common aims of the Western nations, an approach which to me reflects statesmanship and courage in the highest degree and is in keeping with France's traditions as a world leader.6 Sincerely

1 Laniel, who had been Prime Minister of France since June 27 (see no. 261), had served in the cavalry and artillery during World War I and in the Resistance after the fall of France in 1940. Since 1945 he had held a number of government positions, including those of vice-president of the National Assembly (1946-47), minister of posts, telegraphs and telephones (1951-52); and minister of state (1952). The State Department sent a cable version of this letter to the American Embassy in Paris, along with the instruction that it was not to be made public and that its purpose was "to be helpful and also to nail down a bit the verbal statements to you by . . . Laniel . . . with respect to pushing forward with EDC and [the] necessity for real Franco-German rapprochement" (Smith to Dillon, Sept. 20, 1953, AWF/I: France; see also MacArthur II to Carroll, Sept. 19, 1953, and other papers in WHCF/CF: State Dept.). For background on the continuing effort to ratify the EDC treaty see nos. 297 and 315.

2 Laniel had recently decided to postpone his planned trip to Washington so as not to jeopardize the chances for French ratification of the EDC treaty. Laniel felt that a visit at this time might give rise to charges of undue American pressure. Dillon had called the State Department to relay Laniel's decision to the President (State, Foreign Relations, 1952-1954, vol. V, Western European Security, pt. 1, pp. 807-8, and vol. VI, Western Europe and Canada, pt. 2, pp. 1381-84).

3 For background on Eisenhower's relationship with Georges Bidault, French Minister of Foreign Affairs since January 8, 1953, see Galambos, NATO and the Campaign of 1952, nos. 304 and 658. Dillon's September 16 cable said that Bidault had told him that "France should ratify EDC prior to the end of the year" and that he would work full-time to achieve this result. On the following day Dillon informed the State Department that Laniel also was determined to have the French government ratify the treaty (State, Foreign Relations, 1952-1954, vol. V, Western European Security, pt. 1, pp. 802, 807-8).

4 Adenauer's political party had been victorious in the recent German elections (see no. 405).

5 See Anne-Marie Burley, "Restoration and Reunification: Eisenhower's German Policy," in Reevaluating Eisenhower: American Foreign Policy in the 1950s, ed. Richard A. Melanson and David Mayers (Urbana, 1986), pp. 236-38, for a recent assessment of Eisenhower's motivation in regard to this policy.

6 Laniel's reply, which was cabled to the White House on October 8, is in State, Foreign Relations, 1952-1954, vol. V, Western European Security, pt. 1, pp. 820-21. Laniel reassured Eisenhower that the French government's commitment to ratification was "binding." He explained "the political facts" that did not permit the French government to neglect anything in regard to what were considered by public opinion indispensable guarantees, under penalty of a parliamentary defeat the consequences of which would have been disastrous and incalculable." "Once these guarantees are obtained," he said, the French government would "do everything possible to hasten and facilitate the decision." For developments see no. 457.

Bibliographic reference to this document:
Eisenhower, Dwight D. Secret To Joseph Laniel, 20 September 1953. In The Papers of Dwight David Eisenhower, ed. L. Galambos and D. van Ee, doc. 423. World Wide Web facsimile by The Dwight D. Eisenhower Memorial Commission of the print edition; Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996, http://www.eisenhowermemorial.org/presidential-papers/first-term/documents/423.cfm

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