Presidential Papers, Doc#424 Personal and confidential. <EM>Eyes only To Walter Bedell Smith, 21 September 1953. In The Papers of Dwight David Eisenhower
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Doc #425

Document #424; September 21, 1953
To Walter Bedell Smith
Series: EM, AWF, International Series: Korea ; Category: Personal and confidential. Eyes only
The Papers of Dwight David Eisenhower, Volume XIV - The Presidency: The Middle Way
Part III: The Space Age Begins; October 1957 to January 1958
Chapter 6: Building strength when there is "no perfect answer"

 

Dear Bedell: I am sorry that I was not in Washington today to discuss the MIG incident with the entire staff.1 I realize that the recommendations sent to me had the unanimous support of my shrewdest and most knowledgeable advisers on such matters; however, I must confess I was not convinced. I have the feeling that the decision recommended to me--and which I approved--follows the ritualistic, and will likely have no other effect than just to start an argument as to the ethics of the case.2

Perhaps I should pause to say, here, that I well realize I can be very wrong. If I didn't realize this, I would have decided according to my own instinctive reaction rather than as I did.

Having expressed this much distrust of the decision we made, I hasten to add that since we did not do anything startling or different we should expect no startling results--either advantageous or adverse. My own solution made no hit with anybody and, of course, I must make the further admission that it was merely shooting from the hip.

But my reaction was:

(a). Like all the rest of you, I agree that we had to pay the $100,000 in this case.

(b). The MIG plane is no longer of any great interest to us that I know of, and consequently we are not anxious to have this one--and certainly I cannot see why we want any more of them.

(c). Having paid $100,000, I would have withdrawn the offer.

(d). Next, I would have notified the Communists that we had no interest in the MIG plane, and if they wanted to send a pilot down and take it back, that would be all right with us.

The advantages, as I see them, of this course of action would have been to stand before the world as very honorable people, maintaining that while we had not been guilty of real violation of the Armistice, we were anxious to avoid any implication of violating its spirit. As a consequence of this desire, we not only redeemed our pledge to pay the $100,000, but we likewise were ready to return the ship to the Communists.

Of course, someone would argue that you could not possibly explain to the American people the expenditure of $100,000 for something we did not want. My own reply to that one would have been that we were letting the offer stand until we could find out if there were any signs on the other side of someone taking up our offer, well knowing that if we did, we would get certain technical information concerning the latest types in use, and then let it go.

Over and against this disadvantage of explanation at home would have been, in my opinion, a tremendous gain in propaganda value in almost every other country.

There is, of course, no reason for writing this except to give you personally some inkling of the reasons and considerations that flashed through my mind when I heard about the matter. If we are to win the propaganda war--and I think it most important that we do--we have got to be alert for every opportunity to produce unusual results. The normal and the routine are not good enough, and I do not for a moment believe that the defection of this one North Korean will encourage any others to come in.

You will recall that in World War II, when we gave the French some P-40's, two of the pilots defected at once and went back to France with our planes. This did not stop us from giving more to the French. Some months ago a Polish pilot came into Denmark with a plane, and I believe one also came in to Yugoslavia. These incidents are so scattered and so infrequent as to have little significance.3

Of course, if MIG planes start coming in to us by the hundreds, I will eat crow, but knowing the Communists I would gamble that there will be little if any more of this. Their methods of punishing people through torturing their families are too well known and too effective to give rise to any great hope that we are going to wreck the Communist Air Force in this fashion.

If we get accused of violating the spirit of the Armistice, and this argument makes any headway with neutrals and even some of our friends, I think we will experience a defeat in this so-called psychological warfare.

This note is for no official action whatsoever. I am merely trying to put my personal thoughts before you--as my old comrade and associate--so that when next we meet we may discuss these matters in an effort to develop a sort of pattern, or at least a conviction, that will possibly help us in the future. As for the current one, we have made our decision, we will make it stick and we will do the best we can with it. I think it goes without saying that I hope you and C. D. and Radford are completely correct in your estimate.4 As ever

1 In April General Mark W. Clark, U.N. Commander in Korea, had announced the offer of fifty thousand dollars to any Communist pilot who would fly an operational combat aircraft to South Korea. The first pilot to do so would also receive a fifty-thousand-dollar bonus. The offer, including detailed instructions for reaching South Korean airfields, had been printed in leaflets published in Chinese, Korean, and Russian and dropped from U.N. planes over North Korea. On the morning of September 21 a North Korean pilot flew a MIG-15 jet fighter into Kimpo Airport, near Seoul, and asked for asylum. Claiming no knowledge of the reward, the pilot in a subsequent statement to newsmen spoke only of his desire to leave Communist North Korea and study in the United States (State, Foreign Relations, 1952-1954, vol. XV, Korea, pt. 2, pp. 1510-12; New York Times, Sept. 21, 22, 1953).

Eisenhower had flown from Washington early on this same day to speak first at the Eastern States Exposition in West Springfield, Massachusetts, and later that evening at the "Forward to `54" dinner in Boston.

2 The majority of those participating in the discussion earlier this same day had favored authorizing Clark to affirm the validity of the April offer, heightening the psychological impact on the Soviets. "The President," according to a memorandum by Special Assistant Robert Cutler, "wanted to be sure that the matter had been carefully thought out; doubted if more pilots would now come forward . . . [;] wanted to be sure that the State Department was sure of its position as to the armistice and international law; [and] said he would support the decision . . . if made and carried out." Later this same day an Air Force spokesman would announce that the award would be paid even though the government had not yet decided what to do with the plane (ibid.).

3 For background on U.S. aid to the French in World War II see Marcel Vigneras, Rearming the French, U.S. Army in World War II, ed. Kent Roberts Greenfield (Washington, D.C., 1957). On March 5 and May 20 Polish pilots had flown their MIG-15s to the Danish island of Bornholm and asked for political asylum. Also, in May, according to reports from Yugoslavia, a Soviet pilot had wandered over that country and bailed out after his plane had caught fire. The pilot in this instance was repatriated (New York Times, Mar. 6, May 21, 23, June 3, 1953).

4 In a September 23 memorandum to Eisenhower, Smith would explain, "so that you will not think too ill of my judgment," that he had supported only payment of the reward because the "good faith of the United States was involved." He also suggested that the pilot might be persuaded to reject the reward; then, as a "ward" of the National Committee for a Free Asia, he could receive "the technical education he wishes . . . to the extent of the reward which he would otherwise have received." Eisenhower would write at the bottom of the memorandum, "Now we're clicking" (AWF/D-H). In a telephone conversation with Secretary Dulles on the twenty-third, Eisenhower would suggest the payment of the reward "under some sort of trusteeship," the return of the plane, and the withdrawal of the standing offer (Dulles Papers, White House Memoranda Series). The next day the Defense and State departments would withdraw the April inducement and offer to return the MIG-15, then dismantled and stowed aboard a cargo plane for shipment to the United States, to its rightful owner (New York Times, Sept. 25, 1953). On October 9, in a telephone conversation with Dulles, Secretary Wilson would express his fear that the United States "would be in trouble" if the one hundred thousand dollars were not paid. Dulles responded that the President "had become excited about this" and had proposed the establishment of a trust for the pilot "so that it would not be blown on `wine, women and song.'" Dulles, in a subsequent telephone conversation with the CIA deputy director for operations, would comment: "We do not feel strongly, but it would be nice to make clear that he did not come for money and it would not be desirable to give him $100,000 to spend foolishly" (State, Foreign Relations, 1952-1954, vol. XV, Korea, pt. 2, pp. 1527-28). The MIG would be flown for study to Wright Patterson Air Force Base in Ohio on January 6, 1954; the pilot would enter the University of Delaware the following fall (New York Times, Jan. 7, Sept. 18, 1954).

Bibliographic reference to this document:
Eisenhower, Dwight D. Personal and confidential. Eyes only To Walter Bedell Smith, 21 September 1953. In The Papers of Dwight David Eisenhower, ed. L. Galambos and D. van Ee, doc. 424. World Wide Web facsimile by The Dwight D. Eisenhower Memorial Commission of the print edition; Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996, http://www.eisenhowermemorial.org/presidential-papers/first-term/documents/424.cfm

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