<--PREV Doc #433  |  Memorial Commission Home Page  |  First Term Table of Contents  |  Presidential Papers Home Page  |  Doc#  |  NEXT--> Doc #435 Document #434; September 28, 1953 To Chiang Kai-shek Series: EM, AWF, International Series: Formosa ; Category: Personal and confidential The Papers of Dwight David Eisenhower, Volume XIV - The Presidency: The Middle Way Part III: The Space Age Begins; October 1957 to January 1958 Chapter 6: Building strength when there is "no perfect answer"   Dear Mr. President: I have been following closely the international efforts which have been under way for some time to bring about a solution of the serious problem created by the presence of the Chinese irregular forces in Burma.1 I am confident that you share my concern that these efforts be successful. I am now writing to you personally regarding this matter because I feel that the time has come when concrete results must be produced if this problem is to be resolved at all. While recognizing that there are limits on the degree of influence which your Government exercises over the forces in Burma, I feel that this fact should not deter you from utilizing your influence to the maximum to bring about immediately the evacuation of as many of the irregular forces as possible and to make clear that those who remain will not have your sympathy or support. Unless such concrete results can be achieved, I fear that a situation will be created which the communists will not fail to exploit to their advantage and to the detriment of both your Government and the Burmese Government. I am also writing today to the Prime Minister of Burma expressing my concern that current international efforts toward resolving this problem not fail and urging him to recognize the practical limitations to the action which the Chinese and other Governments can take to resolve the problem.2 You may be assured that the United States will continue to strive for an early solution of this problem acceptable to all Governments concerned, but in doing so it must rely on the sincere and wholehearted cooperation of such Governments. In the light of the close and cordial relationships which exist between our two Governments, I am confident that I can count on your full cooperation in this matter.3 Sincerely 1 In 1950 seventeen hundred Nationalist troops, driven out of China by the Communists, had taken refuge in eastern Burma. According to the Burmese government, in a complaint filed with the U.N. General Assembly on March 26, the force, which by then had grown to twelve thousand, had committed acts of aggression and "depredations against the civilian population." Ambassador Lodge had called the Burmese action "entirely justified" and explained that the United States, acting as intermediary, had engaged in "a vigorous effort" to resolve the controversy. The Assembly passed a resolution on April 23 comdemning the hostile acts of the troops, characterizing any assistance to them as contrary to the U.N. Charter, and calling for negotiations among those directly concerned to bring about their "immediate withdrawal" (U.S. Department of State Bulletin 28, no. 723 [May 4, 1953], 663-64; State, Foreign Relations, 1952-1954, vol. XII, East Asia and the Pacific, pt. 2, pp. 85-86). A committee including delegates from Burma, Nationalist China, Thailand, and the United States had begun meetings in Bangkok on May 22 and had drafted a preliminary plan for evacuation a month later (State, Foreign Relations, 1952-1954, vol. XII, East Asia and the Pacific, pt. 2, pp. 104-5). By September Burma and the Nationalist Chinese had substantially settled on a method of evacuation but could not agree on the number of troops involved. Burma had stipulated the withdrawal of five thousand troops in thirty-five days, a number and deadline the Nationalists would not accept. As a result of this impasse, Burma had withdrawn from the four-nation committee. 2 Secretary Dulles had drafted this letter to Chiang and the response to Burmese Prime Minister Nu, who had written Eisenhower on September 12 to give him "a correct perspective of the situation prevailing, and a true appreciation of Burmese feelings." After reviewing the history of the situation and the hardships the troops had imposed on the Burmese, he expressed the fear that the Nationalists were not sincere in their proposals for evacuation and added, "The greatest difficulty we encounter is to meet the argument that the Chinese are defying the United Nations as well as world opinion because the United States of America does not wish them really to leave Burma" (ibid.). In the President's response to U Nu (September 28), he wrote, "I am indeed aware of the importance of a solution to this problem, and I have been most anxious that the efforts being made to help your country resolve it should prove fruitful." He affirmed his belief that Chiang's intentions were sincere and asked that the Burmese understand that "while a limited group [of Chinese nationals] appears to accept repatriation there is little more that can be done, either by President Chiang or through international action, to force the remainder to join an evacuation movement." Eisenhower then denounced allegations that the U.S. government had opposed the repatriation effort, saying that these charges were "designed merely to sow dissent and suspicion between our two nations" (ibid.). 3 Chiang would reply on October 8 that his government had "made and will continue to make sincere efforts in trying to influence as many men from Burma as possible to Taiwan." Although reiterating that the majority of the forces were not under Nationalist command but "inhabitants from various border regions," he had arranged for the evacuation of two thousand men and their dependents, he wrote, and would "not maintain any relation with, or give support to, those who failed to respond to our persuasion." He told the President that the Burmese Air Force had been bombing evacuation points, placing the evacuation officials in "an indignant mood" and making repatriation "well-nigh impossible" (AWF/I: Formosa [China]). On November 27 the Political and Security Committee of the General Assembly would receive a report from the Joint Committee in Bangkok that 1,103 troops and 175 dependents would be airlifted to Formosa (U.S. Department of State Bulletin 30, no. 758 [January 4, 1954], 32-33). For further developments see no. 818. Bibliographic reference to this document: Eisenhower, Dwight D. Personal and confidential To Chiang Kai-shek, 28 September 1953. In The Papers of Dwight David Eisenhower, ed. L. Galambos and D. van Ee, doc. 434. World Wide Web facsimile by The Dwight D. Eisenhower Memorial Commission of the print edition; Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996, http://www.eisenhowermemorial.org/presidential-papers/first-term/documents/434.cfm <--PREV Doc #433  |  Memorial Commission Home Page  |  First Term Table of Contents  |  Presidential Papers Home Page  |  Doc#  |  NEXT--> Doc #435

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