Dear
Al: I have your memorandum and its attached clippings.1
You were no more disturbed than I about premature and vague talk about the future intention of America to reduce her forces in Europe--and elsewhere in foreign stations. I am all the more annoyed because, forseeing the kind of difficulty that has arisen in the event that there was any careless talk, I gave specific orders in the Cabinet that there should be none of this.2 However, some people have more trouble in controlling their tongues than they do their wives.
As you and I know, the American idea from the very beginning was that we hoped to assist the free world--especially those parts immediately exposed to the threat of future aggression--to achieve a reasonable posture of defense. Realizing that this could not be done by any individual nation operating alone, and realizing also that morale was equally important with the volume of available military strength, we undertook several things:
a. To help restore the economic strength of these nations so that they could make a living and produce a proportionate share of the necessary military strength;
b. To assist further by helping to provide necessary military equipment, especially the types and amounts needed for initial or capital investment.
c. Realizing that the provision of this kind of military strength would require some little time, we undertook to strengthen our own garrisons in certain exposed spots. In this way we hoped both to help local morale and to supply the actual minimum forces needed while our allies were building up their own strength;
d. We would provide in those areas naval and air bases and a sufficient amount of these types of mobile forces to be of immediate help in emergencies. Moreover, both the troops and these bases were a physical pledge that in time of trouble we would instantly rush reinforcements to the affected areas.
e. To assist in providing means and methods for greater unification --especially economic and military cooperation for unification --among our allies.
From the very beginning, some of our troop dispositions were visualized as temporary or emergency measures. I think none of us has ever believed for an instant that the United States could, over the long term (several decades), build a sort of Roman Wall with its own troops and so protect the world. Not only would the ultimate cost be excessive; equally important is the adverse reaction that inevitably springs up in any country where foreign troops are stationed. This applies to American troops probably more than any other, and the reasons are not to be found merely in the deportment of the troops. To the natives, American troops are representatives of the richest and most powerful nation on the earth, and consequently remind the native that he is unable to solve all of his national problems by himself.
Of course we know the difficulty that arises out of American scale of pay and prerequisites. It is only the wealthy people in any of these foreign nations that have as much money to spend as the American private--another reason for resentment.
In addition, we have our own political situation at home. Our people would become restive under any idea that we would have to keep our own troops stationed abroad indefinitely.
You and I have long known all of this; and the considerations I have outlined are not dependent upon the advent or effectiveness of "new" weapons. Both you and I thought it proper for us to make certain that governments understood these facts; we did not deem it necessary to go around the countryside talking publicly about them. In view of the misapprehensions and the apprehensions that have arisen due to some unguarded talk, I suppose that we shall have to counteract what has happened with reasoned and thoughtful statements.
However, in all honesty, we cannot allow anyone to get up and protest that we are going to keep troops in Europe forever.
Love to Grace and, of course, all the best to yourself. As ever
