Presidential Papers, Doc#529 Top secret To Clare Boothe Luce, 7 November 1953. In The Papers of Dwight David Eisenhower

Document #529; November 7, 1953
To Clare Boothe Luce
Series: EM, AWF, DDE Diaries Series ; Category: Top secret

The Papers of Dwight David Eisenhower, Volume XIV - The Presidency: The Middle Way
Part III: The Space Age Begins; October 1957 to January 1958
Chapter 7: Beef and Budgets

 

Dear Mrs. Luce: Almost the entire story of the potentialities of the Italian situation is clearly stated in your first paragraph in the sentence, "If it (the Cominform Left) gains only 4% more from the Center to Right parties by the next elections, the President of Italy will be required by the Constitution to call upon a Cominform leader to form the next government." Consequently, I jump immediately to your Section VIII.1

Going on to other things that you feel the United States can do to delay the encroachment of Communism, I assure you first that, so far as I know, we have no intention of weaseling on our October eighth decision on Trieste.2 Because there were some unexpected reactions, there has been a corresponding amount of delay, coupled with some confusion, in trying to get things on the rails again. Specifically, we did not expect the enthusiastic official and public reaction from the Italian side. This unquestionably made Tito feel that he had to react adversely and much more vehemently than he otherwise would have. But whether or not the Italian attitude affected him, a situation has been created where we must observe sufficient caution that we do not almost force Italy and Yugoslavia into even deeper trouble in order to save face on one or both sides. However, I think the State Department is moving as rapidly as it can to correct the current situation.3

It is difficult for me to discern how the United States can take "decisive leadership in worldwide measures to solve the over-population problem."4 As I see it, there are only two approaches. The first is to distribute better the population that now exists, and the second is to encourage birth control in those areas where economic levels will not support the current birth rates.

The second of these runs instantly into important religious objection, especially on the part of the Catholic Church; while the first presents a solution that can be only gradually effective.

So far as this government is concerned, we fought through the entire Congressional session last year to obtain authority for admitting additional immigrants on an emergency basis during the next two years. While we were largely successful, the bitterness of the fight and the restrictive amendments added to the original bill indicate that the United States itself will not measurably increase, over a period of time, its established normal quotas for immigrants.5

In many other countries where natural resources are ample and the area is under-populated, physical conditions are such as to frighten prospective immigrants. Only some months ago a group of Italian immigrants in Brazil--or some other South American country--insisted on returning to their own country because the areas in which they were settled did not have modern utilities, roads, and services for "civilized" living. (Shades of our pioneer ancestors!)6

There is another comment to be made with respect to projects for relieving population pressures through emigration. I recently read that there is no single modern instance in which the population of any country--other than Ireland--was ever diminished by this means. While I cannot vouch for the accuracy of this statement, it is clear that if real relief from its over-population problems is to be obtained for a country such as Italy, there must leave its shores in one year not only a number equivalent to the expected natural increase but, in addition, make a dent in the current surplus. Without reciting all the difficulties in the way of such large movements, it still seems clear that the salutory effect, if any, would be most gradually felt.

As to the stabilization of world currencies and the liberalization of trade policies throughout the world, these will be major efforts of the United States in the coming months.7 Again, of course, results will not be spectacular; even if we are successful in having enacted in the law some of the measures that we believe desirable, the effect for a time will be more psychological than material.

In a way it seems odd that of all the countries in which we have been opposing Communism, we have had less success in Italy than in any other. The entire area of Western Europe, including Italy, has experienced a great rise in economic activity during the last few years and a great part of this result has come about because of American help. Yet every new report from Italy bears evidence of an increasing resentment against us and increased respect for the Soviets. This I suspect comes about because in the average mind the American is rich, pampered, spoiled, and, in spite of all his advantages, is socially and culturally little better than a barbarian. Some of this kind of criticizing--as least as applied to isolated cases--may be accurate, and for this we can only have regret and hope that the populations that think themselves wiser and more sophisticated will get things in better perspective. But the constant complaints from abroad of the failure of the United States to cooperate and of its lack of understanding give to our people, who feel that after all they have been rather generous, an added excuse for embracing isolationism.

So while I accept in its general sense your argument that the United States must give to Italy increased concern and interest--to say nothing of money--I believe also that a great burden of responsibility rests upon the leaders in those countries. Just as we here have to precede every projected action with a long campaign of information and education, so must they try to mold public opinion instead of merely pleading existing public opinion as an excuse for inaction.

You are quite right in your assumption that we want accurate, truthful, unvarnished opinion and fact reflected in Ambassadorial reports. But in addition to information as to the material, moral, and political assistance we should give either clandestinely or publicly,8 it would also be useful to know what kind of pressure we should put on these governments to do something themselves.9 Sincerely

P.S. With all the best to Harry--You are really going good--according to all the travellers.10

1 On November 3 Ambassador Luce had written the President with her "own estimate of the Italian situation." Italy, she said, was "in a state of acute crisis." She predicted events that were "bound to have grim and widespread consequences for U.S. Foreign Policy" (AWF/A). She also described the political elements in Italy and in section 8 suggested ways in which the United States could use "urgent delaying action" to help restore the programs of the centrist parties and thus reduce "the march of Communism." A portion of her letter following this paragraph has been deleted from the source.

2 For background see no. 457. Mrs. Luce believed that a Trieste settlement would be "the most effective delaying and supporting action we could now take to strengthen pro-Western Italian political elements." She predicted the Italian government's fall if the United States and Great Britain "renege on the . . . decision, or chisel or stall too long in implementing it."

3 Although the Yugoslavian government had proposed negotiations among the four involved nations, the Italian government had refused to meet until Italian forces occupied Zone A in accordance with the October 8 decision. Attempts by the Soviet Union to bring the matter before the Security Council and prolonged rioting in Trieste further delayed efforts to negotiate an agreement. By the end of the year, however, Italo-Yugoslav tensions had been reduced; both countries had withdrawn their troops from the border and agreed to enter negotiations (Rabel, Between East and West, p. 153; Eisenhower, Mandate for Change, pp. 414-15). For further developments see no. 915.

4 This recommendation was the second in Mrs. Luce's list of suggested ways to reduce the power of communism in Italy.

5 For background on the Refugee Relief Act see no. 328.

6 On July 1 dissatisfied Italian immigrants had stoned the Italian Consulate in San Paulo, Brazil, demanding that the government pay for their return to Italy (New York Times, July 2, 1953).

7 For recommendations regarding world currencies and trade see no. 292.

8 These last four words ("either clandestinely or publicly") appear in a copy of this letter in AWF/A. They had been deleted from the source.

9 Eisenhower would send this "unnecessarily long letter" to Under Secretary Bedell Smith. The message had, he said, "really only one purpose . . . to get over to her in roundabout fashion that it would be a good thing to analyze and specify what Italy could do for herself as well as to point out what we must do in the situation. I think it would be wrong to try to get such a thing done by direct instruction, but I would have some hope that she would get the point of this letter. However, if you disagree," he concluded, "just let me know and I shall probably burn the letter" (AWF/D). A note at the bottom of this document reads, "Text verbally approved by Gen. Bedell Smith 11/9/53."

10 Luce's husband was publisher Henry Robinson Luce. For further developments see no. 1048.

Bibliographic reference to this document:
Eisenhower, Dwight D. Top secret To Clare Boothe Luce, 7 November 1953. In The Papers of Dwight David Eisenhower, ed. L. Galambos and D. van Ee, doc. 529. World Wide Web facsimile by The Dwight D. Eisenhower Memorial Commission of the print edition; Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996, http://www.eisenhowermemorial.org/presidential-papers/first-term/documents/529.cfm

 


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