Presidential Papers, Doc#573 Top secret To Joseph Morrell Dodge, 1 December 1953. In The Papers of Dwight David Eisenhower
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Doc #574

Document #573; December 1, 1953
To Joseph Morrell Dodge
Series: EM, AWF, Administration Series: Dodge 1955 Budget ; Category: Top secret
The Papers of Dwight David Eisenhower, Volume XV - The Presidency: The Middle Way
Part IV: "Pushing ahead along the broad center"; December 1953 to March 1954
Chapter 8: A world "racing toward catastrophe"

 

Memorandum for the Director of the Bureau of the Budget: With respect to your memorandum of November 30th, 1953, subject "Status of the Fiscal Year 1955 Budget," I note first that you are disturbed by the planned absence from the city of several of the departmental heads during the coming weeks.1 I think that these absences are unavoidable, but I think also that this fact should not be allowed to impede progress or the speedy development of our budget figures. This means, of course, that responsible heads must either make final decisions (which decisions must be approved by the Director of the Bureau of the Budget and by me) before their departure, or they must delegate authority to the next senior in their department to make whatever decisions may be necessary.2

As far as the Defense budget is concerned, I do not believe--and have often stated in Cabinet and Security Council meetings--that any planned change in so-called "defense strategy" would be immediately reflected in great changes in the '55 budget.3 It requires a long time to adjust training systems, organization, equipment contracts and other things to changed ideas in the realm of strategy.

In this situation I have advised the Secretary of Defense that to achieve real savings at an early date in the Defense Department, he will be required, as I see it, to establish personnel ceilings in each service that will place everything except a few units on an austerity basis. I believe that the divisions, combat units, and air squadrons in Korea should be kept up at full strength. I believe that all other units can be safely reduced by a definite percentage.

Likewise, the Strategic Air Force (at least that part of it that would be expected to carry out instantly any retaliatory operation), together with certain interceptor squadrons, should be kept at full strength. But I believe, on the other hand, that practically all supporting units, schools, detachments of all kinds of civilian duty, can safely be reduced by a definite percentage. The Navy and the Marines, except for their units that must necessarily be kept on an emergency basis, must help also. In fact, it is my opinion that under the insistence of the Secretary of Defense, the Air Force has already done much in this regard. But I really believe that we have no excuse for planning to keep the Defense establishment for 1955 at a 3 million 500 thousand plus basis. We are no longer fighting in Korea, and the Defense establishment should show its appreciation of this fact and help us achieve some substantial savings--and without wailing about the missions they have to accomplish. If they put their hearts into it, they can make substantial savings in personnel with little damage to the long term efficiency of the establishment.4

I also believe that an examination of all the facts will indicate the possibility of definite savings in FOA.5

This memorandum has no distribution except for the paragraph dealing with the absence of important department and agency heads from Washington and the measures to be taken to insure the rapid formulation of the budget. This paragraph will be abstracted in my office and sent to the Secretary of State, the Secretary of the Treasury, the Secretary of Defense and Governor Stassen. I think this covers the group that will be absent from the city. If not, please give my office a ring and we will prepare an extra copy for whoever may have been left out.

1 Dodge had written Eisenhower on November 30 (AWF/A: Dodge 1955 Budget), expressing his concern about progress on the budget, which was scheduled for completion by the end of the year. Noting that Dulles, Wilson, Humphrey, and Stassen would soon depart for mid-December meetings of the NATO Council in Paris, Budget Director Dodge worried that in their absence Defense and FOA figures would not be available for review at the NSC's December 15 session. His own staff had been in close contact with budget planners in the Pentagon. There was concern that "because of substantial service disagreements," the JCS would fail to provide a budget by the mid-December deadline. "Firm guidelines or instructions on the preparation of the military budgets are not apparent at the working level," Dodge wrote the President. The budget bureau was concerned that the Administration would have an unsatisfactory deficit "unless offset by material reductions of expenditures in the Department of Defense and the FOA. At this time there is no assurance that these will be forthcoming in an amount sufficient to put the Administration even within reach of at least a balanced Cash Budget."

2 See no. 577.

3 For background see nos. 291 and 471. On December 11, in JCS 2101/113 (JCS to Wilson, Dec. 9, 1953, AWF/A), the JCS would respond to a directive Wilson had given them in mid-October to reconsider military strategy in light of policies established in NSC 162/2. Wilson would forward the statement to Eisenhower that same day, praising it as "an excellent study" that would "materially assist us in the final preparations for the 1955 budget as well as in the progress which we hope to make in the years ahead." The JCS argued in favor of a "global regroupment of U.S. military means," urged exploitation of the U.S. superiority in atomic weapons "to the maximum," supported an "integrated and adequate" continental defense, and opposed precipitate withdrawal of troops from their European and Far Eastern deployments. The service chiefs agreed by 1957 to reduce the total strength of the armed forces to 2.815 million men (army, 1,000,000; air force, 975,000; navy 650,000; marine corps, 190,000). See also Watson, History of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, vol. V, 1953-1954, pp. 26-32, 67-69, and below.

4 On December 4 Wilson would authorize FY 1955 strengths averaging 3.225 million men and ending the year at 3.167 million. A week later, reacting to what he considered high JCS budget requests based on JCS 2101/113 (see above), Wilson reduced strength authorizations. After further discussions that included strong army objections, the services finally agreed to lower FY 1954 end strengths to 3.327 million and to establish those for FY 1955 at 3.029 million--army, 1.162 million; air force, 970,000; navy, 682,000; and marine corps, 215,000 (ibid., pp. 67-68).

5 In mid-December, FOA Director Stassen would estimate FY 1955 FOA expenditures at roughly $5.9 billion. Figuring the carry-over from FY 1954 at about $1 billion more than did Stassen, Dodge would set likely FOA outlays at approximately $5.1 billion (NSC meeting minutes, Dec. 16, 1953, AWF/NSC).

Bibliographic reference to this document:
Eisenhower, Dwight D. Top secret To Joseph Morrell Dodge, 1 December 1953. In The Papers of Dwight David Eisenhower, ed. L. Galambos and D. van Ee, doc. 573. World Wide Web facsimile by The Dwight D. Eisenhower Memorial Commission of the print edition; Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996, http://www.eisenhowermemorial.org/presidential-papers/first-term/documents/573.cfm

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