After Mr. Churchill and I came to the Mid Ocean Club, we went along to my sitting room where we talked about a number of general subjects.1 The only specific point that I volunteered for discussion was the course of action the United States proposed to follow in the event that the Armistice in Korea was broken by the Reds (I made it clear that what I was talking about was a massive attack, not a mere incident of some description).2 I informed him of our intention to strike every military target in the region, but to avoid useless attacks upon civilian centers. I also informed him that we intended to use every weapon in the bag, including our atomic types. To all this he agreed, stating that they were already on official record as approving our idea of refusing to confine the war to the area south of the Yalu.
We also discussed recognition of Red China. He told me that he had originally opposed it, but now their existing relationship with Red China had gotten to be sort of a habit. He said he would certainly always vote with the United States on this issue, as he preferred the United States as an ally over Red China, of whom he said voluntarily, "I hate."3
At 1:30 I went to the Prime Minister's suite for luncheon, with no one else present. He talked about the possibility of a meeting with the Russians.4 He first expressed the hope that his friends of the free world would not think him so stupid that he would blindly walk into a Russian trap. He had no intention of proposing a conference which would probably result only in embarrassment and loss of prestige by the Western nations. He clearly realizes that the Russians are ready to use any trick to discredit the West; to gain the propaganda advantage in the world; and, above all, to make impossible, or at least to impede and delay, the approval of EDC and of EPC.5
In talking to him about this subject, I stated the Secretary of State and I had talked about it only casually; that our minds were not crystallized on any particular conclusion; and that we are most certainly ready to listen to all sides of any argument applying to it. I went on to explain that in spite of this lack of definite conclusion, that I was instinctly against the continuation of talk about a meeting, without having one. I said that this kind of procedure tended to serve the Russian objectives almost as well as a prolonged acrimonious and futile meeting itself. By such talk they encourage the French to avoid acting on EDC (and Winston agrees with us that France is the key to the situation at the moment) while at the same time it keeps the entire free world upset and even somewhat divided. As a result of this kind of thing, it was my thought that if we decided that we should accept the Russian invitation for a Foreign Ministers' meeting of the four powers, that we should promptly specify time and place and announce our readiness to be there.
Winston said that he agreed with this and believed that Anthony did also. His suggestion was January 14th, and I said I would make it at least ten days earlier. He thought this would be feasible and agreeable.6
I further ventured the opinion that we should not allow ourselves to be dissuaded from such a decision by any French plea that they likely would not have a government at that time. The damage to us of continued talk about a possible four-power agreement on some of the critical questions, with nothing being done, is too great to permit positive action constantly to be postponed and evaded by such excuses.
While Winston's deafness sometimes makes one uncertain that he has gotten the full implication of a statement, he agreed also to this thought. I understood from him that this was one of the points he had wanted soon to discuss, although there was nothing said about the procedures as to the way in which it would be approached in the three-power talks.
Winston had much to say about the need for Washington and London to coordinate and crystallize their views whenever they had common interests in any spot in the globe--for example, India, Egypt, Iran--and then present a solid front, bordering, as I understood it, almost on an ultimatum to the third party to the dispute.7
I expressed the hope that it was possible that on occasion such an approach was the wisest particularly when we were sure that our own solution would be approved by world opinion as just, equitable and even considerate. But I expressed the further hope that in many cases I thought such an approach would be fatal. If the third party in the dispute (which would always be the weaker one, and, in addition, the one which could plead violation of sovereignty) had the slightest semblence of argument on its side, it now had the United Nations to which to appeal. It would be impossible for us to prevent a complete airing of the entire dispute before that body, and we could be made to look like rather arbitrary imperialists in many cases. Consequently, I suggested that each case ought to be studied and handled on its own merits--on the theory that the approach used should be the one best suited to the particular circumstance. It was plain to see that Winston didn't like this idea particularly, but it is my own opinion that it would be too much like writing a blank check to make such an agreement in advance of the knowledge of the details of the proposal. Of course I suppose that a complete failure to reach a previously agreed upon position would be a safeguard, but I think that just as a matter of principle, we should be very careful about engaging in this kind of a partnership.
He made one point that he did not document, and it is possible that I misunderstood him. I gathered from one of his statements that he thought it sometimes impossible for the British Foreign Office to talk freely with us concerning important problems because of our tendency to grow annoyed, if not angry. I deprecated any such idea and suggested that at one of our meetings (bipartite) that he and I take the occasion to tell our staffs, jointly, that we expected between them the freest and fullest kind of discussion and argument, even in those cases where they found it impossible to reach an agreement.8
I am not sure just what he had in mind, but he expressed his admiration of the way I used to treat Bedell Smith, my wartime chief of staff. He said that he was in my headquarters one day when Bedell Smith argued heatedly with me about something, but that I not only allowed him to argue, but seemed to urge him to continue. He thought the argument was a quite notable one, and then said I made a decision which to his amazement instantly settled the proposition and every action of Bedell's was that he had gotten his own way--which he had not. I assured him that this was the accepted American practice in this kind of work, and I hoped our joint staffs could operate in somewhat the same way.
