Presidential Papers, Doc#718 [<EM>Memorandum</EM>], 8 February 1954. In The Papers of Dwight David Eisenhower

Document #718; February 8, 1954
[Memorandum]
Series: EM, AWF, DDE Diaries Series

The Papers of Dwight David Eisenhower, Volume XV - The Presidency: The Middle Way
Part IV: "Pushing ahead along the broad center"; December 1953 to March 1954
Chapter 9: Fending off "the reactionary fringe"

 

I telephoned to the Secretary of Defense to tell him of Chairman Saltonstall's anxiety about the plan for sending 200 technicians into Indo China.1 Chairman Saltonstall says that the opposition in the Senate Committee is so great that it may effect [sic] appropriations for the area. He believes this opposition would diminish if there were an unequivocal statement on the part of the Administration that the technicians will be removed from Indo China by June 15th, regardless of French capacity to meet the requirement.

I instructed Mr. Wilson to devise the necessary plan, even if it meant the hiring of technicians under the Aid Program to replace the Air Force technicians in Indo China.2

Mr. Wilson said that he had one or two other ideas to explore, but that he would communicate with Senator Saltonstall as soon as practicable to give him the assurances he seeks.3

1 For background on the American efforts to assist the French in Indochina see nos. 352 and 597. Attempting to bring about a successful conclusion to the war, the French had adopted a new and more aggressive strategy (see no. 722) requiring greater mobility and striking power. These requirements were accentuated by developments in northwest Vietnam, where a large French garrison at Dien Bien Phu had been surrounded by Vietminh forces equipped with artillery and antiaircraft weapons. Early in January the French had requested airplanes and aircraft mechanics in order to keep their tenuous air supply link to Dien Bien Phu open. With some misgivings, Eisenhower decided to give the French ten additional B-26 light bombers and to send 200 U.S. Air Force mechanics to "assist the French Air Force in the training of French personnel in the maintenance of C-47 and B-26 aircraft" (State, Foreign Relations, 1952-54, vol. XIII, Indochina, pt. 1, p. 1007). The Air Force mechanics were to be used only at bases where they would not be exposed to combat and could not be captured by the Vietminh. Eisenhower's order was based on the assumption that the mechanics might have to remain in Indochina until June 15, when French technicians would become available.

When the subject came up at the National Security Council meeting on January 8, Eisenhower said that there "was just no sense in even talking about United States forces replacing the French in Indochina." He described himself as "bitterly opposed" to such a course, since American involvement would result in the Vietnamese transferring "their hatred of the French to us." "This war in Indochina," he declared, "would absorb our troops by divisions!" (NSC meeting minutes, Jan. 11, 1954, AWF/NSC). After word of the proposed actions had leaked to the press, Eisenhower decided to try to head off potential opposition to the move by consulting with key members of Congress. At the legislative leaders' meeting of February 8, Republican Senator Leverett Saltonstall, chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee, told Eisenhower that JCS Chairman Arthur Radford and Deputy Secretary of Defense Roger Kyes had been unable to convince his committee of the wisdom of providing the technicians to the French. Eisenhower replied that he, too, was reluctant to send ground forces into Indochina, and had therefore reduced the number of mechanics from the 400 originally requested by the French. The President added that his inclination was to use Nationalist Chinese forces to help fight the Vietminh, but that the risk of Communist Chinese intervention was too great. Eisenhower stressed that aiding the French was necessary: "My God, we must not lose Asia--we've got to look the thing right in the face" (Hagerty Diary, Feb. 8, 1954, Hagerty Papers). The meeting concluded with the agreement that Eisenhower would remove the U.S. military technicians by June 15, replacing them with civilians if necessary, and that the congressional leadership would try to win support for the President's actions (State, Foreign Relations, 1952-54, vol. XIII, Indochina, pt. 1, pp. 937-38, 942-43, 947-54, 966-68, 983-85, 998, 1002-7, 1023-24). See also telephone conversation, Eisenhower and Walter Bedell Smith, February 3, 1954, AWF/D; New York Times, Jan. 27, 1954; Joint Secretariat, The History of the Joint Chiefs of Staff: The Joint Chiefs of Staff and the War in Vietnam, 1 vol. to date [Wilmington, Del., 1982-], vol. I, History of the Indochina Incident, 1940-1954 [1982], pp. 281-83, 286, 323-24, 339; Lloyd C. Gardner, Approaching Vietnam: From World War II Through Dienbienphu, 1941-1954 (New York, 1988), pp. 166-71; David L. Anderson, Trapped by Success: The Eisenhower Administration and Vietnam, 1953-1961 (New York, 1991); James R. Arnold, The First Domino: Eisenhower, the Military, and America's Intervention in Vietnam (New York, 1991); and George McT. Kahin, Intervention: How America Became Involved in Vietnam (Garden City, N.Y., 1987), pp. 44-45.

2 At the February 8 legislative leaders meeting, Senator Saltonstall had said that congressional fears of American involvement would not be aroused by using civilian mechanics instead of military personnel. Eisenhower had explained that military personnel were necessary for the time being because it would have taken too long to recruit and transport civilians to Indochina (State, Foreign Relations, 1952-54, vol. XIII, Indochina, pt. 1, pp. 1023-24).

3 For developments see no. 722.

Bibliographic reference to this document:
Eisenhower, Dwight D. [Memorandum], 8 February 1954. In The Papers of Dwight David Eisenhower, ed. L. Galambos and D. van Ee, doc. 718. World Wide Web facsimile by The Dwight D. Eisenhower Memorial Commission of the print edition; Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996, http://www.eisenhowermemorial.org/presidential-papers/first-term/documents/718.cfm

 


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