Presidential Papers, Doc#72 Personal and confidential To Bernard Mannes Baruch, 10 March 1953. In The Papers of Dwight David Eisenhower

Document #72; March 10, 1953
To Bernard Mannes Baruch
Series: EM, AWF, Administration Series ; Category: Personal and confidential

The Papers of Dwight David Eisenhower, Volume XIV - The Presidency: The Middle Way
Part I: Charting a New Course; January 1953 to April 1953
Chapter 2: "A number of misunderstandings": Party and International Struggles

 

Dear Bernie:1 Thank you very much for sending me the memorandum by Mr. Lubell.2 It is intriguing and appealing. It puts into definite words and into concrete recommendation an idea that I have frequently heard discussed but never in terms of practical suggestion.

The point not mentioned by Lubell in his memorandum--a point which was an essential part of your own Atomic Energy Control Plan3--is the method to be applied by the world in determining the actual "butter-gun" ratio in effect in any particular country. In a nation such as ours this is fairly easy to determine because of the openness of our processes. The hearings and debates in Congress provide a very accurate estimate, even without the use of expert analysts.

I do not mean to be hunting for defects in the idea, but I do mean that any peace proposal of today must contain, as an essential part, the provisions that will make enforcement possible.4

I have been looking forward to talking with Mr. Lubell, but I have not yet had that privilege. So when you communicate with him, won't you please ask him for a little bit of additional explanation on the point I raise?

His idea comes at an opportune moment, not only by reason of Stalin's death, but because we here have been earnestly seeking for a dramatic approach to this whole question of peace and disarmament.5 This morning I cannot go into the details of the various projects we have been discussing, but I do assure you that it is a very lively issue with this administration.

A somewhat different thought prompts a reference to a particular paragraph in his letter, which reads:

". . . The need to stand guard against this possibility sets up tremendous problems for us. As only one illustration, take the matter of government controls under conditions short of war. Such controls clash violently with our free market habits. Yet to hew blindly to the doctrines of the free market, regardless of the risks of war, would actually help invite aggression."6

The one word that I think makes this paragraph completely correct is the adverb "blindly." Assuming the indefinite extension of a period of strain and tension, I feel that measurable abandonment of our accustomed economic practices would bring in its wake consequences that could be most significant and permanent. I definitely believe that the preservation of individual liberty requires what we generally refer to as a free economy. We can for short periods, and must in great emergencies, apply specific controls to this whole economy to make certain that the over-riding needs of the state are satisfied ahead of any other consideration whatsoever.

But to accustom our population to living indefinitely under such controls will gradually bring a new conception of the relation of the individual to the state--a conception that would change in revolutionary fashion the kind of government under which we live.7

In this problem I think that eternal watchfulness and study are indicated. I readily agree with Mr. Lubell that if we blindly adhere to past habits, we can eventually get into a most sorry mess. On the other hand, if we blindly trust to legal controls for long periods and under conditions short of real emergency, we will likewise grievously suffer.

This is already too long a letter, but I do want to hear a bit more about the particular point I raised.8

With my warm personal regard, As ever

1 Eisenhower often consulted with his longstanding friend and veteran public servant, who in mid-January had sent memoranda on wage and price controls and government restrictions on gold sales (see Galambos, NATO and the Campaign of 1952, nos. 25, 864, 1009, and 1049).

2 Samuel Lubell (B.S. Columbia 1933), Polish-born newspaperman and author of The Future of American Politics (New York, 1952), had written Baruch on March 7 (AWF/A) outlining an arms-reduction plan that he believed both the United States and the Soviet Union might adopt without fear of political repercussion or relative military decline. He described his idea as promoting "butter over guns": by terms of the treaty Lubell proposed, the signatory powers would agree to limit military spending to a percentage of their total budgets smaller than that allocated to domestic economic improvements and social outlays. "By fixing ceilings upon the proportion of a nation's resources that can be devoted to war preparations," he explained, "we would hope to bring about a simultaneous demobilization of all the economies of the world, freeing immense resources which are now being channeled into destructive purposes, into elevating living standards everywhere." Lubell argued that the "strongest single internal political pressure in Russia today is the hunger of the people for better living conditions." In a cover letter (AWF/Diaries) Baruch described Lubell as one "of whom you have heard me speak" and commended the memorandum as worthy of Eisenhower's "deepest consideration."

3 The Acheson-Lilienthal Plan, later the Baruch Plan, for international nuclear control and disarmament was formulated in the spring of 1946 (see Galambos, Chief of Staff, nos. 902 and 917; see also Baruch, Baruch: The Public Years [New York, 1960], pp. 360-81).

4 Baruch's memoir of government service included the similar view that "disarmament agreements which rest on nothing more than treaty pledges are meaningless. They are worse; they are invitations to disaster. Only when disarmament can be effectively supervised and enforced by international authority--only when we have devised a reliable system of inspection and control--only then can we safely ground our arms" (Baruch, p. 266).

5 Having ruled for twenty-nine years, the Soviet Premier suffered a stroke March 1 and died the evening of March 5, Moscow time. At the March 4 National Security Council meeting the President and others had discussed "whether and how the announcement of Stalin's illness could best be exploited for psychological purposes." Lubell's memorandum argued that Stalin's demise offered just the "dramatic moment" needed for the unveiling of a new peace plan. "Even if the Soviets reject the idea, as must be expected," Lubell wrote, "the announcement of America's readiness to disarm along these lines would have an enormous psychological impact on the whole world." Eisenhower referred to Lubell's plan in the first NSC meeting after Stalin's death (NSC meeting minutes, Mar. 5, 12, 1953, AWF/NSC; Lubell to Baruch, Mar. 7, 1953, same file as document).

Upon the Premier's death Eisenhower in an unusually terse, one-sentence message had tendered "official condolences" to the Soviet government. The Voice of America afterward stressed the President's statement of sympathy for the common Soviet citizen (New York Times, Mar. 6, 1953).

6 "In our case, of course, our gravest risk stems from the gap between our normal peacetime ways and the mobilization that war requires," Lubell wrote. "No nation could think of winning a war against us if we were mobilized. An aggressor could only reason that he might win in the period of time before we mobilized" (Lubell to Baruch, Mar. 7, 1953, same file as document).

7 See no. 26.

8 For further developments see no. 304.

Bibliographic reference to this document:
Eisenhower, Dwight D. Personal and confidential To Bernard Mannes Baruch, 10 March 1953. In The Papers of Dwight David Eisenhower, ed. L. Galambos and D. van Ee, doc. 72. World Wide Web facsimile by The Dwight D. Eisenhower Memorial Commission of the print edition; Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996, http://www.eisenhowermemorial.org/presidential-papers/first-term/documents/72.cfm

 


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