Presidential Papers, Doc#785 Top secret To Winston Spencer Churchill, 19 March 1954. In The Papers of Dwight David Eisenhower

Document #785; March 19, 1954
To Winston Spencer Churchill
Series: EM, AWF, International Series: Churchill ; Category: Top secret

The Papers of Dwight David Eisenhower, Volume XV - The Presidency: The Middle Way
Part IV: "Pushing ahead along the broad center"; December 1953 to March 1954
Chapter 9: Fending off "the reactionary fringe"

 

Dear Winston:1 I have pondered over your letter.2 You are quite right in your estimate of my grave concern at the steady increase in methods of mass destruction. Whether or not the specific possibilities of devastation that you mention are indeed demonstrated capabilities, the prospects are truly appalling.3 Ways of lessening or, if possible, of eliminating the danger must be found. That has been my principal preoccupation throughout the last year.

It was after many weeks of thinking and study with political and technical advisers that I finally reached the conclusions which we talked over at Bermuda and which were embodied in my eighth of December address to the United Nations Assembly.4 As you are well aware, that plan was designed primarily as a means of opening the door of world-wide discussion--with some confidence on both sides--rather than as a substantive foundation of an international plan for the control or elimination of nuclear weapons. But honest, open technical discussions on an internationally supported plan to promote peaceful uses of this new science might lead to something much more comprehensive.

Since last December, we have been following up this matter as actively as its technical character permits. Foster had two or more talks with Molotov when they were at Berlin.5 We have a draft plan which, after consultation with your people and those of two or three other countries, will, I expect, be transmitted to the Soviet Union through diplomatic channels, as agreed, probably next week.6

While there have been some indications that the Soviets might want to confuse the issues with extraneous political matters, on the whole it is encouraging that they so far seem prepared to accept businesslike procedures.

In its entirety the problem is one of immensity and difficulty, as you so graphically stated. But I repeat that I deem it important to make a beginning in an exchange of views, which, as you suggest, could open up new and more hopeful vistas for the future.

I doubt whether the project on which we are engaged would, at this moment, be advanced by a meeting of heads of government. In fact, I can see that such a meeting might inject complications. From our side, there is the question of France, which is very delicate at the moment.7 The Soviets have indicated that, if there were oral conversations, they would want to bring in the Chinese Communists.

My impression is that matters are in a reasonably good way, but that they require constant concern and vigilance and, I hope, frequent and intimate personal exchanges of views between the two of us.

With warm regard, As ever

1 Secretary Dulles drafted this letter after Eisenhower had suggested incorporating his answer with one previously written to Churchill on East-West trade (see no. 782). "I have not found any good way to combine this communication with the other one about trade," Dulles had written. "The latter would require considerable dissemination while the reply to the atomic energy one should be restricted as closely as possible" (Dulles to Eisenhower, Mar. 17, 1954, AWF/I: Churchill; Telephone conversation, Smith to Dulles, Mar. 17, 1954, AWF/D).

2 Churchill had written in response to Eisenhower's letter of February 9, which had emphasized the need for unity among the free nations (no. 719). "There is no difference between us upon the major issues which overhang the world," Churchill said, and attention to these issues would "and must increase if we are to come through the anxious years and perhaps decades which lie ahead of hopeful but puzzled mankind" (Mar. [12], 1954, AWF/I: Churchill).

3 What most concerned the Prime Minister was the menace of thermonuclear weapons, as revealed by the recent castle tests at Bikini Atoll and graphically outlined by Republican Congressman W. Sterling Cole, Chairman of the Joint Congressional Committee on Atomic Energy, in a February 17 speech (New York Times, Feb. 18, 1954; for background on the tests see no. 646). Churchill had been told that "several million people would certainly be obliterated by four or five of the latest H bombs." He also feared that if one bomb were dropped in the sea windward of the British Isles "the explosion would generate an enormous radioactive cloud, many square miles in extant, which would drift over the land attacked and extinguish human life over very large areas." He understood that "human minds recoil from such facts" and retreat into a kind of "merciful numbness" which cannot, he said, "be enjoyed by the few men upon whom the supreme responsibility falls. . . . I consider that you and, if my strength lasts, I, cannot flinch from the mental exertions involved."

4 See no. 598.

5 For the substance of these discussions see State, Foreign Relations, 1952-1954, vol. VII, Germany and Austria, pt. 1, pp. 902-3, 1077-78.

6 The proposal for an International Atomic Energy Agency under the aegis of the United Nations--prepared by the Atomic Energy Commission after discussions with the Departments of State and Defense--would be hand delivered to the Soviet Ambassador on this day (State, Foreign Relations, 1952-1954, vol. II, National Security Affairs, pt. 2, pp. 1372-77).

7 Churchill had suggested a three-way summit meeting with the Soviet Union. "Men have to settle with men," he wrote, "no matter how vast, and in part beyond their comprehension, the business in hand may be. I can even imagine that a few simple words, spoken in the awe which may at once oppress and inspire the speakers might lift this nuclear monster from our world." Relations with the French were complicated by the controversy over EDC and the worsening situation in Indochina (see nos. 457 and 718).

Bibliographic reference to this document:
Eisenhower, Dwight D. Top secret To Winston Spencer Churchill, 19 March 1954. In The Papers of Dwight David Eisenhower, ed. L. Galambos and D. van Ee, doc. 785. World Wide Web facsimile by The Dwight D. Eisenhower Memorial Commission of the print edition; Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996, http://www.eisenhowermemorial.org/presidential-papers/first-term/documents/785.cfm

 


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