Dear
Mr. Secretary: Because of my long years in the Army, I am sure you well understand the temptations constantly confronting me to interfere in your business. I think you will agree that I successfully resist the vast bulk of these. However, a matter has come to my attention which impels me to say that the surface evidence is that there has been some mishandling of a case of which I have personal knowledge.
I shall describe it:
Psychological warfare was unheard of in our Army prior to World War II. Because it was considered by most officers as a strange, if not mysterious, activity, all the fearful and the timid--especially those concerned with the particular item of promotion--loudly objected to any assignment to that kind of work. When I was commanding in the European Theatre during World War II, I was well aware of the way that most officers, both regular and reserve, looked at this kind of assignment, and it was very difficult to find any individual who would really put his heart into it. Finally I found a man named Robert McClure. (There are two Robert McClures in the Army--I think this one was Robert A.)1
When I returned from Europe in December of '45 and at the President's request assumed the duties of Chief of Staff, I found that nothing whatsoever had been done in our Army to carry forward adequate preparatory activities in this important field. In fact, most officers were ready to dismiss it as just another "crackpot" conception; at that time there was very little appreciation of the tremendous importance that this activity would assume both in cold and hot wars.
In this situation I called back to Washington the same General McClure who had served with me during the war. I gave to him the mission of organizing the psychological activities for the Army.2
I did not stay long enough in that post to see this new division of the staff brought forward to a satisfactory state of organization and doctrine, but it never occurred to me that successors would not push this project earnestly and seriously.
Of course McClure's assignment to this job, after his war experience in the same kind of work, probably ruined his chances for promotion as a line officer. But as the only career officer at that time who had the slightest notion of what psychological warfare was all about, he was practically an indispensable asset. In spite of this, I learn that he was about to retire four years ago as a Brigadier General, or possibly as a Colonel. At that moment the Korean War broke out and Congressional action prevented retirements. He was again brought back to Washington and according to his statement, the purpose was "to organize the psychological warfare division."3 If this means that the division had been allowed to disappear from the War Department organization, it is the next thing to a disgrace. At any rate, the next thing that happened to McClure was that he was sent to Iran, apparently to head our Military Mission.4
You know all the money and effort we have spent in that region in support of the Shah, the present Prime Minister, and in helping to develop the military forces that will support these people.5 I am told that McClure has very fine relationships with the Shah and other senior people in whom we are interested.
Now, after all this, I understand that he, along with a couple of hundred other permanent Colonels, is to be retired. I understand, too, that the exception to this legal requirement is that the President may retain twenty of these officers until 1957, if he so desires.6
I should like for you to look up this entire case--and I should like to talk to you personally about it. My reports on McClure's work in Iran are very sketchy, but if my impressions of the situation are even approximately correct, I feel that far from relieving him as a Colonel or Brigadier General, arrangements should be made to give him his second star--even if only on a temporary basis--and he should be kept in Iran on his present task.7
Please let me know about this matter early next week.8 Sincerely
